Narrative:

Spoiler fault 3 and 5. Maintenance did a byte check -- found nothing. On approach to jfk VOR runway 13L cri to visual runway 13L, on extending flaps to 20 degrees and slowing to 170 KTS, primary flight display hook indicated this speed too low. FMC had given final approach speed 130 KTS. Experienced loss of altitude from 800 ft MDA and loss of airspace. Had to use considerably more power than normal to regain minimum altitude and keep speed above the hook. Checked static instruments to xchk. No ECAM messages. Reseated slat handle, left it stowed, went to 40 degrees flaps. Airspeed to stay at the hook was 150+ KTS and indicator on pfd showed approaching high speed for 40 degrees flaps. These indications plus vibrations were indicative to us that 2 or more spoilers were deployed and not air data computer problem. Reference to approach speed in FMC had disappeared. I did not want to slow to this original approach speed as I felt the aircraft would stall. We were very close to the ground and shooting this approach faster than normal with considerably more power required -- a different approach attitude than normal. This unsettled the flight attendants and they reported so. From experience seeing the pfd and handling characteristics, when flaps are extended and the slats have been inadvertently left out, this is how it felt -- but we could not stow the slats in this instance. Landed at 148 KTS. Did not have time to monitor N1 etc. Landing smooth. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter indicated that the first officer placed the spoiler handle into the stowed position, however, the aircraft performance remained the same. The airspeed indication on the pdf showed that the aircraft was approaching the overspd for the flaps 40 degree selection and he was afraid that the flaps would blow up if he exceeded the speed causing the aircraft to stall. Additionally, the pdf indicated that the aircraft was close to the alpha floor (stall speed) and he could not reduce HSI speed. The reporter felt that he was task saturated and could only concentrate on the airspeed and landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 FLC HAS SPOILERS DEPLOY DURING APCH CAUSING ACFT TO LOSE ALT AND AIRSPD.

Narrative: SPOILER FAULT 3 AND 5. MAINT DID A BYTE CHK -- FOUND NOTHING. ON APCH TO JFK VOR RWY 13L CRI TO VISUAL RWY 13L, ON EXTENDING FLAPS TO 20 DEGS AND SLOWING TO 170 KTS, PRIMARY FLT DISPLAY HOOK INDICATED THIS SPD TOO LOW. FMC HAD GIVEN FINAL APCH SPD 130 KTS. EXPERIENCED LOSS OF ALT FROM 800 FT MDA AND LOSS OF AIRSPACE. HAD TO USE CONSIDERABLY MORE PWR THAN NORMAL TO REGAIN MINIMUM ALT AND KEEP SPD ABOVE THE HOOK. CHKED STATIC INSTS TO XCHK. NO ECAM MESSAGES. RESEATED SLAT HANDLE, LEFT IT STOWED, WENT TO 40 DEGS FLAPS. AIRSPD TO STAY AT THE HOOK WAS 150+ KTS AND INDICATOR ON PFD SHOWED APCHING HIGH SPD FOR 40 DEGS FLAPS. THESE INDICATIONS PLUS VIBRATIONS WERE INDICATIVE TO US THAT 2 OR MORE SPOILERS WERE DEPLOYED AND NOT AIR DATA COMPUTER PROB. REF TO APCH SPD IN FMC HAD DISAPPEARED. I DID NOT WANT TO SLOW TO THIS ORIGINAL APCH SPD AS I FELT THE ACFT WOULD STALL. WE WERE VERY CLOSE TO THE GND AND SHOOTING THIS APCH FASTER THAN NORMAL WITH CONSIDERABLY MORE PWR REQUIRED -- A DIFFERENT APCH ATTITUDE THAN NORMAL. THIS UNSETTLED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THEY RPTED SO. FROM EXPERIENCE SEEING THE PFD AND HANDLING CHARACTERISTICS, WHEN FLAPS ARE EXTENDED AND THE SLATS HAVE BEEN INADVERTENTLY LEFT OUT, THIS IS HOW IT FELT -- BUT WE COULD NOT STOW THE SLATS IN THIS INSTANCE. LANDED AT 148 KTS. DID NOT HAVE TIME TO MONITOR N1 ETC. LNDG SMOOTH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT THE FO PLACED THE SPOILER HANDLE INTO THE STOWED POS, HOWEVER, THE ACFT PERFORMANCE REMAINED THE SAME. THE AIRSPD INDICATION ON THE PDF SHOWED THAT THE ACFT WAS APCHING THE OVERSPD FOR THE FLAPS 40 DEG SELECTION AND HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE FLAPS WOULD BLOW UP IF HE EXCEEDED THE SPD CAUSING THE ACFT TO STALL. ADDITIONALLY, THE PDF INDICATED THAT THE ACFT WAS CLOSE TO THE ALPHA FLOOR (STALL SPD) AND HE COULD NOT REDUCE HSI SPD. THE RPTR FELT THAT HE WAS TASK SATURATED AND COULD ONLY CONCENTRATE ON THE AIRSPD AND LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.