Narrative:

This flight was the final of a long day of moderately hard IFR flying. The whole southeast was under the effects of a storm. I was flying single pilot moving my boss and one of his salesmen to business meetings along the north and south carolina coast. On this leg, although the WX was MVFR, I elected to file IFR due to my lack of familiarity with the charlotte class B airspace. I contacted charlotte clearance on the uza remote communications outlet and obtained my clearance. The controller instructed me to call for release when I was #1 at the hold line. After my run-up, I attempted to contact clearance for my release. After many attempts, a local pilot called me on my other radio and told me that the rco could not communicate with aircraft when the aircraft was at the end of runway 2. This pilot told me either to depart VFR or taxi back to the ramp and obtain my release. I elected to follow the local pilot's lead and depart VFR and pick up my clearance airborne. Because I was unfamiliar with airspace surrounding this airfield, I elected to remain in closed traffic until I had received my clearance. This is where my first problem occurred. Due to radio frequency congestion (caused by many other pilots who had the same problem as me) I was unable to communicate with ATC until I was on the base to final turn at 1000 ft AGL. Shortly after I established contact, the controller gave me evasive heading and altitude assignments to avoid an aircraft in the pattern that was not talking to anyone. (I was monitoring CTAF.) I continued on to my destination. Due to my level of fatigue, I asked my boss, who is also a rated instrument pilot, to brief my approach into svh. I elected to execute the GPS to runway 10. We loaded the approach into the GPS, and he read to me the stop down fixes. I asked him to monitor my approach and advise me when to descend for each of the step-downs. To make a long story short, when it mattered most, he misread the government chart and had me start my initial descent one fix early. ZTL caught our error, but not before I had descended 500 ft. Fatigue and the fact that I generally use commercial charts, but did not have one for this airport, contributed to my breakdown in positional awareness. Next time, I will have a chart that I am used to reading and I will read it instead of trusting someone else to read it to me.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CPR SMT TWIN PLT HAD DIFFICULTY PICKING UP IFR CLRNC WHEN DEPARTING NON TWR ARPT AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY, DSNDED PRIOR TO THE SVH GPS FAF.

Narrative: THIS FLT WAS THE FINAL OF A LONG DAY OF MODERATELY HARD IFR FLYING. THE WHOLE SE WAS UNDER THE EFFECTS OF A STORM. I WAS FLYING SINGLE PLT MOVING MY BOSS AND ONE OF HIS SALESMEN TO BUSINESS MEETINGS ALONG THE NORTH AND SOUTH CAROLINA COAST. ON THIS LEG, ALTHOUGH THE WX WAS MVFR, I ELECTED TO FILE IFR DUE TO MY LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE CHARLOTTE CLASS B AIRSPACE. I CONTACTED CHARLOTTE CLRNC ON THE UZA REMOTE COMS OUTLET AND OBTAINED MY CLRNC. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED ME TO CALL FOR RELEASE WHEN I WAS #1 AT THE HOLD LINE. AFTER MY RUN-UP, I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT CLRNC FOR MY RELEASE. AFTER MANY ATTEMPTS, A LCL PLT CALLED ME ON MY OTHER RADIO AND TOLD ME THAT THE RCO COULD NOT COMMUNICATE WITH ACFT WHEN THE ACFT WAS AT THE END OF RWY 2. THIS PLT TOLD ME EITHER TO DEPART VFR OR TAXI BACK TO THE RAMP AND OBTAIN MY RELEASE. I ELECTED TO FOLLOW THE LCL PLT'S LEAD AND DEPART VFR AND PICK UP MY CLRNC AIRBORNE. BECAUSE I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH AIRSPACE SURROUNDING THIS AIRFIELD, I ELECTED TO REMAIN IN CLOSED TFC UNTIL I HAD RECEIVED MY CLRNC. THIS IS WHERE MY FIRST PROB OCCURRED. DUE TO RADIO FREQ CONGESTION (CAUSED BY MANY OTHER PLTS WHO HAD THE SAME PROB AS ME) I WAS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH ATC UNTIL I WAS ON THE BASE TO FINAL TURN AT 1000 FT AGL. SHORTLY AFTER I ESTABLISHED CONTACT, THE CTLR GAVE ME EVASIVE HDG AND ALT ASSIGNMENTS TO AVOID AN ACFT IN THE PATTERN THAT WAS NOT TALKING TO ANYONE. (I WAS MONITORING CTAF.) I CONTINUED ON TO MY DEST. DUE TO MY LEVEL OF FATIGUE, I ASKED MY BOSS, WHO IS ALSO A RATED INST PLT, TO BRIEF MY APCH INTO SVH. I ELECTED TO EXECUTE THE GPS TO RWY 10. WE LOADED THE APCH INTO THE GPS, AND HE READ TO ME THE STOP DOWN FIXES. I ASKED HIM TO MONITOR MY APCH AND ADVISE ME WHEN TO DSND FOR EACH OF THE STEP-DOWNS. TO MAKE A LONG STORY SHORT, WHEN IT MATTERED MOST, HE MISREAD THE GOV CHART AND HAD ME START MY INITIAL DSCNT ONE FIX EARLY. ZTL CAUGHT OUR ERROR, BUT NOT BEFORE I HAD DSNDED 500 FT. FATIGUE AND THE FACT THAT I GENERALLY USE COMMERCIAL CHARTS, BUT DID NOT HAVE ONE FOR THIS ARPT, CONTRIBUTED TO MY BREAKDOWN IN POSITIONAL AWARENESS. NEXT TIME, I WILL HAVE A CHART THAT I AM USED TO READING AND I WILL READ IT INSTEAD OF TRUSTING SOMEONE ELSE TO READ IT TO ME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.