Narrative:

We had just landed on runway 8L in atl and were immediately cleared to cross runway 8R. We exited runway 8L at taxiway B7 and were cleared to cross runway 8R at taxiway D. The ground controller additionally cleared us to make a right turn on taxiway east and taxi to the ramp. The captain took control of the aircraft on taxiway B7 and expeditiously taxied across runway 8R at taxiway D, but then continued on to make a right turn on taxiway F. As we began the turn on taxiway F, ground informed us that taxiway F was closed. At this point, we were unable to turn around, so ground cleared us down taxiway F. We were subsequently told that taxiway F was now opened. Upon hearing that taxiway F was closed, I looked up for the first time since I was completing the after landing flow/checklist and setting the ramp frequency. What caused the incursion? Under normal conditions, this should not have been an issue at our home field. The so copied the ATIS and informed us that taxiway F5 was closed. He later commented that the computer generated voice is hard to understand at times and taxiway F may have been on the ATIS. We do not have ACARS. Additionally, the closure was not on the NOTAMS we received with our flight plan in louisville. Another factor is the normal pace of events in the after landing phase is very high at a maximum capacity major hub. This pace is normally slowed by a brief stop while holding short of runway 8R. On this morning, we did not have the stop. Expectations also impacted the captain's actions. The typical flow at atl would have inbound traffic taxi in on taxiway F. Finally, there was no physical barrier or lights to indicate the closure or any additional warning from ground to not expect something out of the ordinary. As the first officer, I read back ground's instructions to use taxiway east and thought the captain heard it too. I then left my faith in him to taxi correctly and had no reason to believe he would have difficulty taxiing at our most familiar field. So, I then directed my attention to the after landing flow and ramp frequency. Unfortunately, I think the captain and I both clearly heard the 'east' vice 'F,' but comprehended what we expected to hear.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TXWY INCURSION WHEN THE FLC OF A TAXIING B727-200 TAKES TXWY THAT HAD BEEN ATIS'ED CLOSED AT ATL, GA.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST LANDED ON RWY 8L IN ATL AND WERE IMMEDIATELY CLRED TO CROSS RWY 8R. WE EXITED RWY 8L AT TXWY B7 AND WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 8R AT TXWY D. THE GND CTLR ADDITIONALLY CLRED US TO MAKE A R TURN ON TXWY E AND TAXI TO THE RAMP. THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT ON TXWY B7 AND EXPEDITIOUSLY TAXIED ACROSS RWY 8R AT TXWY D, BUT THEN CONTINUED ON TO MAKE A R TURN ON TXWY F. AS WE BEGAN THE TURN ON TXWY F, GND INFORMED US THAT TXWY F WAS CLOSED. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE UNABLE TO TURN AROUND, SO GND CLRED US DOWN TXWY F. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THAT TXWY F WAS NOW OPENED. UPON HEARING THAT TXWY F WAS CLOSED, I LOOKED UP FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE I WAS COMPLETING THE AFTER LNDG FLOW/CHKLIST AND SETTING THE RAMP FREQ. WHAT CAUSED THE INCURSION? UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS, THIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE AT OUR HOME FIELD. THE SO COPIED THE ATIS AND INFORMED US THAT TXWY F5 WAS CLOSED. HE LATER COMMENTED THAT THE COMPUTER GENERATED VOICE IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND AT TIMES AND TXWY F MAY HAVE BEEN ON THE ATIS. WE DO NOT HAVE ACARS. ADDITIONALLY, THE CLOSURE WAS NOT ON THE NOTAMS WE RECEIVED WITH OUR FLT PLAN IN LOUISVILLE. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THE NORMAL PACE OF EVENTS IN THE AFTER LNDG PHASE IS VERY HIGH AT A MAX CAPACITY MAJOR HUB. THIS PACE IS NORMALLY SLOWED BY A BRIEF STOP WHILE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 8R. ON THIS MORNING, WE DID NOT HAVE THE STOP. EXPECTATIONS ALSO IMPACTED THE CAPT'S ACTIONS. THE TYPICAL FLOW AT ATL WOULD HAVE INBOUND TFC TAXI IN ON TXWY F. FINALLY, THERE WAS NO PHYSICAL BARRIER OR LIGHTS TO INDICATE THE CLOSURE OR ANY ADDITIONAL WARNING FROM GND TO NOT EXPECT SOMETHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY. AS THE FO, I READ BACK GND'S INSTRUCTIONS TO USE TXWY E AND THOUGHT THE CAPT HEARD IT TOO. I THEN LEFT MY FAITH IN HIM TO TAXI CORRECTLY AND HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY TAXIING AT OUR MOST FAMILIAR FIELD. SO, I THEN DIRECTED MY ATTN TO THE AFTER LNDG FLOW AND RAMP FREQ. UNFORTUNATELY, I THINK THE CAPT AND I BOTH CLRLY HEARD THE 'E' VICE 'F,' BUT COMPREHENDED WHAT WE EXPECTED TO HEAR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.