Narrative:

Fuel gauge problem. We requested mdw maintenance assistance in deferring or repairing an inoperative #1 fuel quantity gauge. The mechanic who was given the task of repairing our gauge problem must have switched the gauges while doing the initial troubleshooting. After he had replaced the gauge and completed the paperwork we continued our flight sequence to bdl. On climb out, I noticed that our #2 fuel gauge was still indicating the same fuel quantity that we had prior to departure. We ultimately determined that the mechanic had switched fuel gauges and then left the inoperative gauge in the #2 wing tank position instead of replacing it. The aircraft had been refueled prior to the mechanic working on the gauges and I was confident that we indeed had the required fuel in the #2 tank to complete the flight to bdl. We consulted with dispatch and maintenance control and they agreed that we could continue to our destination. Supplemental information from acn 559145: apparently, the maintenance technician switched the #1 gauge to the #2 position during troubleshooting the system. After logbook paperwork was computed, flight continued mdw to bdl. On climb out, #2 fuel quantity indicator showed no xfer initially. During discussions with dispatch and maintenance, #2 indicator gave second unreliable indications. These indications were similar to the ones that occurred with #1 indicator which was now operating properly. Aircraft had been refueled at mdw prior to maintenance technician working on gauges. Crew was confident that required fuel was aboard aircraft to complete flight. After consulting dispatch and maintenance, crew agreed that flight could safely continue to destination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 MECH SWAPPED AN INOP FUEL GAUGE INTO #2 POS WHILE CORRECTING A PROB WITH #1 SYS.

Narrative: FUEL GAUGE PROB. WE REQUESTED MDW MAINT ASSISTANCE IN DEFERRING OR REPAIRING AN INOP #1 FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE. THE MECH WHO WAS GIVEN THE TASK OF REPAIRING OUR GAUGE PROB MUST HAVE SWITCHED THE GAUGES WHILE DOING THE INITIAL TROUBLESHOOTING. AFTER HE HAD REPLACED THE GAUGE AND COMPLETED THE PAPERWORK WE CONTINUED OUR FLT SEQUENCE TO BDL. ON CLBOUT, I NOTICED THAT OUR #2 FUEL GAUGE WAS STILL INDICATING THE SAME FUEL QUANTITY THAT WE HAD PRIOR TO DEP. WE ULTIMATELY DETERMINED THAT THE MECH HAD SWITCHED FUEL GAUGES AND THEN LEFT THE INOP GAUGE IN THE #2 WING TANK POS INSTEAD OF REPLACING IT. THE ACFT HAD BEEN REFUELED PRIOR TO THE MECH WORKING ON THE GAUGES AND I WAS CONFIDENT THAT WE INDEED HAD THE REQUIRED FUEL IN THE #2 TANK TO COMPLETE THE FLT TO BDL. WE CONSULTED WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL AND THEY AGREED THAT WE COULD CONTINUE TO OUR DEST. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 559145: APPARENTLY, THE MAINT TECHNICIAN SWITCHED THE #1 GAUGE TO THE #2 POS DURING TROUBLESHOOTING THE SYS. AFTER LOGBOOK PAPERWORK WAS COMPUTED, FLT CONTINUED MDW TO BDL. ON CLBOUT, #2 FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR SHOWED NO XFER INITIALLY. DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT, #2 INDICATOR GAVE SECOND UNRELIABLE INDICATIONS. THESE INDICATIONS WERE SIMILAR TO THE ONES THAT OCCURRED WITH #1 INDICATOR WHICH WAS NOW OPERATING PROPERLY. ACFT HAD BEEN REFUELED AT MDW PRIOR TO MAINT TECHNICIAN WORKING ON GAUGES. CREW WAS CONFIDENT THAT REQUIRED FUEL WAS ABOARD ACFT TO COMPLETE FLT. AFTER CONSULTING DISPATCH AND MAINT, CREW AGREED THAT FLT COULD SAFELY CONTINUE TO DEST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.