Narrative:

On pushback from gate, leg #2 of 3 on a 3-DAY trip, after completing the pretkof checklist, we tried to call for taxi clearance several times. The ground controller was very busy and seemed to be getting frustrated. We finally received our clearance which was to taxi to runway 4R via taxiway Y, hold short of runway 31C. On taxi out, my attention was on all the ground traffic moving about us and also on the obstruction due to the ramp construction in progress. As we approached taxiway Y, a company aircraft had just landed on runway 4R and was clearing the runway on taxiway P. Ground then told us to use runway 31R to taxiway Y, to allow our company aircraft to his gate. We then turned onto taxiway Y and continued our taxi. As we passed runway 31C, the ground controller asked us to read back our taxi clearance, which was taxi to runway 4R, hold short runway 31C. At that point I realized I had made a mistake. All along in my mind, I kept thinking runway 31R instead of runway 31C the active runway this day was runway 4R. Supplemental information from acn 558927: I believe the ground controller's workload and obvious frustration contributed to this incursion incident by causing a reluctance to question his instructions when he was obviously over tasked. However, looking back on the event, strictly following the instructions actually given would have prevented this incident. To prevent this from happening in the future, I/we can't let a controller's problems become our problems. When clearance instructions given are not clear, I/we need to get clarification before continuing, even at the expense of waiting for the controller's workload to diminish, or adding to the workload. The consequence is too important.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLC FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY AS INSTRUCTED IN TAXI OUT CLRNC DUE TO A MINOR ROUTING CHANGE PRIOR TO THE HOLD SHORT LEFT THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE UPCOMING RWY HOLD SHORT NO LONGER APPLIED.

Narrative: ON PUSHBACK FROM GATE, LEG #2 OF 3 ON A 3-DAY TRIP, AFTER COMPLETING THE PRETKOF CHKLIST, WE TRIED TO CALL FOR TAXI CLRNC SEVERAL TIMES. THE GND CTLR WAS VERY BUSY AND SEEMED TO BE GETTING FRUSTRATED. WE FINALLY RECEIVED OUR CLRNC WHICH WAS TO TAXI TO RWY 4R VIA TXWY Y, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 31C. ON TAXI OUT, MY ATTN WAS ON ALL THE GND TFC MOVING ABOUT US AND ALSO ON THE OBSTRUCTION DUE TO THE RAMP CONSTRUCTION IN PROGRESS. AS WE APCHED TXWY Y, A COMPANY ACFT HAD JUST LANDED ON RWY 4R AND WAS CLRING THE RWY ON TXWY P. GND THEN TOLD US TO USE RWY 31R TO TXWY Y, TO ALLOW OUR COMPANY ACFT TO HIS GATE. WE THEN TURNED ONTO TXWY Y AND CONTINUED OUR TAXI. AS WE PASSED RWY 31C, THE GND CTLR ASKED US TO READ BACK OUR TAXI CLRNC, WHICH WAS TAXI TO RWY 4R, HOLD SHORT RWY 31C. AT THAT POINT I REALIZED I HAD MADE A MISTAKE. ALL ALONG IN MY MIND, I KEPT THINKING RWY 31R INSTEAD OF RWY 31C THE ACTIVE RWY THIS DAY WAS RWY 4R. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 558927: I BELIEVE THE GND CTLR'S WORKLOAD AND OBVIOUS FRUSTRATION CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCURSION INCIDENT BY CAUSING A RELUCTANCE TO QUESTION HIS INSTRUCTIONS WHEN HE WAS OBVIOUSLY OVER TASKED. HOWEVER, LOOKING BACK ON THE EVENT, STRICTLY FOLLOWING THE INSTRUCTIONS ACTUALLY GIVEN WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT. TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE, I/WE CAN'T LET A CTLR'S PROBS BECOME OUR PROBS. WHEN CLRNC INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN ARE NOT CLR, I/WE NEED TO GET CLARIFICATION BEFORE CONTINUING, EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF WAITING FOR THE CTLR'S WORKLOAD TO DIMINISH, OR ADDING TO THE WORKLOAD. THE CONSEQUENCE IS TOO IMPORTANT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.