Narrative:

An intermittently inoperative VHF transmitter may have contributed to confusion that resulted in descent below MSA while being radar vectored to final for the VOR DME runway 30R approach at sjc. I was the PF in VMC on top of scattered to broken clouds. Both of us noted the proximity to terrain, but being well clear above it, we did not immediately question our clearance. We had just noticed that somehow the active communication had been switched prematurely to tower. Whether that was a result of setting over the active frequency or accepting another aircraft's frequency, I'm not sure, but bay approach figured what happened and soon sjc tower asked us to climb to 5000 ft. Next we were given several vectors, one of which we responded to was for an aircraft with a similar call sign. This fact coupled with an inoperative transmitter may have prevented approach control from hearing our response, thus eliminating the fail safe feature of precise readbacks. The approach continued normally until we were given a low altitude alert by tower. I had prematurely transitioned to visual guidance and failed to maintain the recommended altitude after acquiring the runway. Equipment failure aside, I believe complacency played a role in this poorly executed flight. Recognition of this, plus improved CRM and adherence to non precision approach procedures, should help prevent a recurrence of these mistakes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE FLC WHILE ON VECTORS FOR AN APCH DSND BELOW MSA FOR THE AREA.

Narrative: AN INTERMITTENTLY INOP VHF XMITTER MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO CONFUSION THAT RESULTED IN DSCNT BELOW MSA WHILE BEING RADAR VECTORED TO FINAL FOR THE VOR DME RWY 30R APCH AT SJC. I WAS THE PF IN VMC ON TOP OF SCATTERED TO BROKEN CLOUDS. BOTH OF US NOTED THE PROX TO TERRAIN, BUT BEING WELL CLR ABOVE IT, WE DID NOT IMMEDIATELY QUESTION OUR CLRNC. WE HAD JUST NOTICED THAT SOMEHOW THE ACTIVE COM HAD BEEN SWITCHED PREMATURELY TO TWR. WHETHER THAT WAS A RESULT OF SETTING OVER THE ACTIVE FREQ OR ACCEPTING ANOTHER ACFT'S FREQ, I'M NOT SURE, BUT BAY APCH FIGURED WHAT HAPPENED AND SOON SJC TWR ASKED US TO CLB TO 5000 FT. NEXT WE WERE GIVEN SEVERAL VECTORS, ONE OF WHICH WE RESPONDED TO WAS FOR AN ACFT WITH A SIMILAR CALL SIGN. THIS FACT COUPLED WITH AN INOP XMITTER MAY HAVE PREVENTED APCH CTL FROM HEARING OUR RESPONSE, THUS ELIMINATING THE FAIL SAFE FEATURE OF PRECISE READBACKS. THE APCH CONTINUED NORMALLY UNTIL WE WERE GIVEN A LOW ALT ALERT BY TWR. I HAD PREMATURELY TRANSITIONED TO VISUAL GUIDANCE AND FAILED TO MAINTAIN THE RECOMMENDED ALT AFTER ACQUIRING THE RWY. EQUIP FAILURE ASIDE, I BELIEVE COMPLACENCY PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS POORLY EXECUTED FLT. RECOGNITION OF THIS, PLUS IMPROVED CRM AND ADHERENCE TO NON PRECISION APCH PROCS, SHOULD HELP PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THESE MISTAKES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.