Narrative:

On downwind, with better than 7 mi visibility, copilot called the field in sight. 1 min later, approach control cleared us for a visual approach 'following a learjet 1 mi final.' we were never instructed to follow the learjet. Captain turned a 3 mi base. 1 1/2 mi before turn to final, learjet rolls out and tower advises there will be one departure prior to landing. Neither pilot of landing aircraft remembered a specific instruction from tower, but we understood the departing aircraft would be a B707, the term 'heavy' was never used. Captain 'squared off' base to final turn, which at this late time amounted to only a 10 second delay in the base-to-final turn. Aircraft was slowed and landing flaps choice was reduced from 3-2 notches for thrust turbulence. At 1000 ft AGL the B707 was just crossing the hold short line. Captain had advised copilot before this point to tell tower to hold the B707 short, because of insufficient separation, but the frequency was full of chatter. Captain communicated to tower that the separation was unacceptable. Tower told us if we did not like it to go around, left traffic, and asked us why. Captain stated that we were 1 mi final and the heavy jet was just beginning its takeoff roll. At 600 ft AGL we went around as heavy was only 1000 ft down runway. Landed uneventfully. Captain called the tower to express dissatisfaction with having insufficient separation behind departing heavy jet. Problem #1: landing aircraft given insufficient time to delay landing, with flight pattern or airspeed. Problem #2: tower should never have departed a 'heavy' B707 in front of a 30000 pound plane that was only 3-3 1/2 mi in-trail. Problem #3: B707 taxied slowly onto runway and then delayed takeoff. Problem #4: B707 would have not broken ground by arrival of landing aircraft. Even if the heavy jet would have broken ground by the time of our touchdown, we still would have gone around. Apparently there is no guidance in the ATC manual for separating smaller landing aircraft behind departing 'heavies.' we would have gotten 5 mi in-trail for landing and 5 mi or 2 mins if taking off behind a heavy. The aim warns of thrust and wake turbulence behind departing heavy aircraft. We would have encountered the takeoff thrust turbulence of 4 B707 engines only 30 seconds after application, while we were flaring for touchdown. During the phone conversation, tower said they did not realize this was a consideration. Nevertheless, squeezing a B707 into a tight landing sequence was a bad idea for obvious reasons. Perhaps tower did not realize how big a B707 is, because the term 'heavy' was never used. Contributing factor could be that this airport, though class C, is a training ground for ATC. Tower controllers should receive guidance on the taxi speed, maneuverability, sluggishness and effects of takeoff thrust of 'heavy' aircraft. There should be at least 4 mi separation behind a departing 'heavy' and a landing 'small' airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: D328 FLC AT BHM REFUSED TO LAND BEHIND A DEPARTING B707.

Narrative: ON DOWNWIND, WITH BETTER THAN 7 MI VISIBILITY, COPLT CALLED THE FIELD IN SIGHT. 1 MIN LATER, APCH CTL CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH 'FOLLOWING A LEARJET 1 MI FINAL.' WE WERE NEVER INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW THE LEARJET. CAPT TURNED A 3 MI BASE. 1 1/2 MI BEFORE TURN TO FINAL, LEARJET ROLLS OUT AND TWR ADVISES THERE WILL BE ONE DEP PRIOR TO LNDG. NEITHER PLT OF LNDG ACFT REMEMBERED A SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION FROM TWR, BUT WE UNDERSTOOD THE DEPARTING ACFT WOULD BE A B707, THE TERM 'HVY' WAS NEVER USED. CAPT 'SQUARED OFF' BASE TO FINAL TURN, WHICH AT THIS LATE TIME AMOUNTED TO ONLY A 10 SECOND DELAY IN THE BASE-TO-FINAL TURN. ACFT WAS SLOWED AND LNDG FLAPS CHOICE WAS REDUCED FROM 3-2 NOTCHES FOR THRUST TURB. AT 1000 FT AGL THE B707 WAS JUST XING THE HOLD SHORT LINE. CAPT HAD ADVISED COPLT BEFORE THIS POINT TO TELL TWR TO HOLD THE B707 SHORT, BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT SEPARATION, BUT THE FREQ WAS FULL OF CHATTER. CAPT COMMUNICATED TO TWR THAT THE SEPARATION WAS UNACCEPTABLE. TWR TOLD US IF WE DID NOT LIKE IT TO GO AROUND, L TFC, AND ASKED US WHY. CAPT STATED THAT WE WERE 1 MI FINAL AND THE HVY JET WAS JUST BEGINNING ITS TKOF ROLL. AT 600 FT AGL WE WENT AROUND AS HVY WAS ONLY 1000 FT DOWN RWY. LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. CAPT CALLED THE TWR TO EXPRESS DISSATISFACTION WITH HAVING INSUFFICIENT SEPARATION BEHIND DEPARTING HVY JET. PROB #1: LNDG ACFT GIVEN INSUFFICIENT TIME TO DELAY LNDG, WITH FLT PATTERN OR AIRSPD. PROB #2: TWR SHOULD NEVER HAVE DEPARTED A 'HVY' B707 IN FRONT OF A 30000 LB PLANE THAT WAS ONLY 3-3 1/2 MI IN-TRAIL. PROB #3: B707 TAXIED SLOWLY ONTO RWY AND THEN DELAYED TKOF. PROB #4: B707 WOULD HAVE NOT BROKEN GND BY ARR OF LNDG ACFT. EVEN IF THE HVY JET WOULD HAVE BROKEN GND BY THE TIME OF OUR TOUCHDOWN, WE STILL WOULD HAVE GONE AROUND. APPARENTLY THERE IS NO GUIDANCE IN THE ATC MANUAL FOR SEPARATING SMALLER LNDG ACFT BEHIND DEPARTING 'HEAVIES.' WE WOULD HAVE GOTTEN 5 MI IN-TRAIL FOR LNDG AND 5 MI OR 2 MINS IF TAKING OFF BEHIND A HVY. THE AIM WARNS OF THRUST AND WAKE TURB BEHIND DEPARTING HVY ACFT. WE WOULD HAVE ENCOUNTERED THE TKOF THRUST TURB OF 4 B707 ENGS ONLY 30 SECONDS AFTER APPLICATION, WHILE WE WERE FLARING FOR TOUCHDOWN. DURING THE PHONE CONVERSATION, TWR SAID THEY DID NOT REALIZE THIS WAS A CONSIDERATION. NEVERTHELESS, SQUEEZING A B707 INTO A TIGHT LNDG SEQUENCE WAS A BAD IDEA FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. PERHAPS TWR DID NOT REALIZE HOW BIG A B707 IS, BECAUSE THE TERM 'HVY' WAS NEVER USED. CONTRIBUTING FACTOR COULD BE THAT THIS ARPT, THOUGH CLASS C, IS A TRAINING GND FOR ATC. TWR CTLRS SHOULD RECEIVE GUIDANCE ON THE TAXI SPD, MANEUVERABILITY, SLUGGISHNESS AND EFFECTS OF TKOF THRUST OF 'HVY' ACFT. THERE SHOULD BE AT LEAST 4 MI SEPARATION BEHIND A DEPARTING 'HVY' AND A LNDG 'SMALL' AIRPLANE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.