Procedures for egpws use into mdst airport.

Attributes
ACN	552385
Time
Date	200207
Day	Mon
Place
Locale Reference	airport : mdst.airport
State Reference	FO
Altitude	msl single value : 4000
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	A300
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	other
Flight Phase	climbout : initial descent : approach
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
ASRS Report	552385
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted
Consequence	other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Company Environmental Factor Aircraft Airport
Primary Problem	Company
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

Flight manual states that 'flight crew's are to disable egpws on approach to sti.' I looked in the A300 operating manual in normals and emergencys and could not find a normal procedure for deactivating the egpws. 1ST, safety is being compromised by operating into an airport with known high terrain without the egpws, especially at night or in IFR. 2ND, since there is no normal procedure for deactivating egpws, some pilots may turn off the entire GPWS system in error. Finally, the issue of egpws into sti is not an approach, only problem. It should remain deactivated until passing 4000 ft on departure. The flight manual 'must' be amended to include the specific instructions for deactivating the egpws and when it should be reactivated on departure. The terrain around that airport is serious and it's hard to understand how we can be operating into it without having it surveyed by check airmen and engineering to ensure adequate safety. Disabling the one thing that might prevent a hull loss is an unsafe procedure. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter discussed procedures in affect and was concerned with the safety of flight and possible CFIT with no warning ability. Subsequent to his report, the air carrier has issued new procedures and obtained the proper database for the egpws computer.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PROCS FOR EGPWS USE INTO MDST ARPT.

Narrative: FLT MANUAL STATES THAT 'FLC'S ARE TO DISABLE EGPWS ON APCH TO STI.' I LOOKED IN THE A300 OPERATING MANUAL IN NORMALS AND EMERS AND COULD NOT FIND A NORMAL PROC FOR DEACTIVATING THE EGPWS. 1ST, SAFETY IS BEING COMPROMISED BY OPERATING INTO AN ARPT WITH KNOWN HIGH TERRAIN WITHOUT THE EGPWS, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT OR IN IFR. 2ND, SINCE THERE IS NO NORMAL PROC FOR DEACTIVATING EGPWS, SOME PLTS MAY TURN OFF THE ENTIRE GPWS SYS IN ERROR. FINALLY, THE ISSUE OF EGPWS INTO STI IS NOT AN APCH, ONLY PROB. IT SHOULD REMAIN DEACTIVATED UNTIL PASSING 4000 FT ON DEP. THE FLT MANUAL 'MUST' BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE THE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEACTIVATING THE EGPWS AND WHEN IT SHOULD BE REACTIVATED ON DEP. THE TERRAIN AROUND THAT ARPT IS SERIOUS AND IT'S HARD TO UNDERSTAND HOW WE CAN BE OPERATING INTO IT WITHOUT HAVING IT SURVEYED BY CHK AIRMEN AND ENGINEERING TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SAFETY. DISABLING THE ONE THING THAT MIGHT PREVENT A HULL LOSS IS AN UNSAFE PROC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR DISCUSSED PROCS IN AFFECT AND WAS CONCERNED WITH THE SAFETY OF FLT AND POSSIBLE CFIT WITH NO WARNING ABILITY. SUBSEQUENT TO HIS RPT, THE ACR HAS ISSUED NEW PROCS AND OBTAINED THE PROPER DATABASE FOR THE EGPWS COMPUTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.