Narrative:

Navigation. On takeoff from runway 8 at abq, tower gave us a right turn to the socorro (onm) VOR per our clearance on the albuquerque one departure. We were cleared on the ground to climb to 10000 ft. We had performed an adverse takeoff profile. Although no windshear was reported, the windshear were reported at 30 KTS gusting to 40 KTS and llwsa were in effect. As a result we were attempting to climb quickly to get out of moderate turbulence. Although I reviewed the release, SID and FMC routing at the gate, I had not made the connection that the socorro VOR's identifier was onm. Therefore, I did not program the CDU direct to onm right away for the first officer, who was flying, as the identifier was not remotely like the name for the fix we were given. I had thought that perhaps we were being given an alternate clearance. I could not query ATC as he was working tower, ground and clearance and now was in the middle of giving a clearance to an aircraft parked on the ramp. Additionally, we were too low to pick up the actual VOR. I had the frequency in the #1 navigation but again had not made the socorro/onm connection. As I was fumbling with my light trying to see if onm was in fact the socorro VOR, I noticed that the first officer was not programming the CDU for direct to (at this point assumed) to socorro. Adding to the confusion, somehow the CDU had clicked over to next fix beyond socorro, leading me to believe that we had passed it when in fact we had not. Realizing that we were now both heads down with the autoplt not yet engaged, I thought it was a good time for me to look up and make sure that we were adequately flying the airplane as well as navigating. Doing so I noticed that we were approaching 9000 ft in excess of 4000 FPM as we were extremely light. Passing through 9000 ft, I made an additional call out of 'watch the altitude.' although he verbally responded and began to pitch over, both his hands were on the yoke and we still had full climb power. Seeing this, I reached up and pulled the power back to approximately 45% N1 knowing that the aircraft would not typically climb at this setting. Nevertheless, our momentum and the turbulent air carried us through 10000 ft and actually above 10200 ft before we stopped climbing and leveled off at 10000 ft. The contributing factors? Obviously, I did not make the socorro/onm connection. I will make every effort in such sits, to do so in the future. It was the last leg of a long day. We both agreed later that this was when these things seem to happen. Lack of familiarity with the routing. I'd done this only once before a long while ago, and I'm not sure my relatively new first officer ever had. ATC probably assumed we were initially familiar with the routing. It would really help eliminate such confusion if the NAVAID designators at least remotely resembled their names. If this is not possible, perhaps an ATC procedure using the phonetic designator along with the name could be implemented when they are this far off. The turbulence was making it very difficult to read the chart and to leveloff accurately. Having the autoplt engaged would have helped. The first officer later mentioned that in preparation for his upcoming off probation check ride he was attempting to hand fly a little more often.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 CREW HAD AN ALT OVERSHOOT ON THE ABQ ONE SID IN ABQ CLASS E.

Narrative: NAV. ON TKOF FROM RWY 8 AT ABQ, TWR GAVE US A R TURN TO THE SOCORRO (ONM) VOR PER OUR CLRNC ON THE ALBUQUERQUE ONE DEP. WE WERE CLRED ON THE GND TO CLB TO 10000 FT. WE HAD PERFORMED AN ADVERSE TKOF PROFILE. ALTHOUGH NO WINDSHEAR WAS RPTED, THE WINDSHEAR WERE RPTED AT 30 KTS GUSTING TO 40 KTS AND LLWSA WERE IN EFFECT. AS A RESULT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO CLB QUICKLY TO GET OUT OF MODERATE TURB. ALTHOUGH I REVIEWED THE RELEASE, SID AND FMC ROUTING AT THE GATE, I HAD NOT MADE THE CONNECTION THAT THE SOCORRO VOR'S IDENTIFIER WAS ONM. THEREFORE, I DID NOT PROGRAM THE CDU DIRECT TO ONM RIGHT AWAY FOR THE FO, WHO WAS FLYING, AS THE IDENTIFIER WAS NOT REMOTELY LIKE THE NAME FOR THE FIX WE WERE GIVEN. I HAD THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS WE WERE BEING GIVEN AN ALTERNATE CLRNC. I COULD NOT QUERY ATC AS HE WAS WORKING TWR, GND AND CLRNC AND NOW WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF GIVING A CLRNC TO AN ACFT PARKED ON THE RAMP. ADDITIONALLY, WE WERE TOO LOW TO PICK UP THE ACTUAL VOR. I HAD THE FREQ IN THE #1 NAV BUT AGAIN HAD NOT MADE THE SOCORRO/ONM CONNECTION. AS I WAS FUMBLING WITH MY LIGHT TRYING TO SEE IF ONM WAS IN FACT THE SOCORRO VOR, I NOTICED THAT THE FO WAS NOT PROGRAMMING THE CDU FOR DIRECT TO (AT THIS POINT ASSUMED) TO SOCORRO. ADDING TO THE CONFUSION, SOMEHOW THE CDU HAD CLICKED OVER TO NEXT FIX BEYOND SOCORRO, LEADING ME TO BELIEVE THAT WE HAD PASSED IT WHEN IN FACT WE HAD NOT. REALIZING THAT WE WERE NOW BOTH HEADS DOWN WITH THE AUTOPLT NOT YET ENGAGED, I THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD TIME FOR ME TO LOOK UP AND MAKE SURE THAT WE WERE ADEQUATELY FLYING THE AIRPLANE AS WELL AS NAVING. DOING SO I NOTICED THAT WE WERE APCHING 9000 FT IN EXCESS OF 4000 FPM AS WE WERE EXTREMELY LIGHT. PASSING THROUGH 9000 FT, I MADE AN ADDITIONAL CALL OUT OF 'WATCH THE ALT.' ALTHOUGH HE VERBALLY RESPONDED AND BEGAN TO PITCH OVER, BOTH HIS HANDS WERE ON THE YOKE AND WE STILL HAD FULL CLB PWR. SEEING THIS, I REACHED UP AND PULLED THE PWR BACK TO APPROX 45% N1 KNOWING THAT THE ACFT WOULD NOT TYPICALLY CLB AT THIS SETTING. NEVERTHELESS, OUR MOMENTUM AND THE TURBULENT AIR CARRIED US THROUGH 10000 FT AND ACTUALLY ABOVE 10200 FT BEFORE WE STOPPED CLBING AND LEVELED OFF AT 10000 FT. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS? OBVIOUSLY, I DID NOT MAKE THE SOCORRO/ONM CONNECTION. I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT IN SUCH SITS, TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE. IT WAS THE LAST LEG OF A LONG DAY. WE BOTH AGREED LATER THAT THIS WAS WHEN THESE THINGS SEEM TO HAPPEN. LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE ROUTING. I'D DONE THIS ONLY ONCE BEFORE A LONG WHILE AGO, AND I'M NOT SURE MY RELATIVELY NEW FO EVER HAD. ATC PROBABLY ASSUMED WE WERE INITIALLY FAMILIAR WITH THE ROUTING. IT WOULD REALLY HELP ELIMINATE SUCH CONFUSION IF THE NAVAID DESIGNATORS AT LEAST REMOTELY RESEMBLED THEIR NAMES. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, PERHAPS AN ATC PROC USING THE PHONETIC DESIGNATOR ALONG WITH THE NAME COULD BE IMPLEMENTED WHEN THEY ARE THIS FAR OFF. THE TURB WAS MAKING IT VERY DIFFICULT TO READ THE CHART AND TO LEVELOFF ACCURATELY. HAVING THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED WOULD HAVE HELPED. THE FO LATER MENTIONED THAT IN PREPARATION FOR HIS UPCOMING OFF PROBATION CHK RIDE HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO HAND FLY A LITTLE MORE OFTEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.