Narrative:

This event occurred during the final stages of a part 121 airline flight from den to abq. As captain in training on my very first flight of IOE, I had a company check airman in the right seat, and a new hire first officer observer in the jumpseat. Our aircraft was in the final stages of the arrival when this event began. Approximately 20 mi from the abq airport, we were cleared by abq approach from our intermediate step-down altitude down to 8000 ft. I had planned my top-of-descent carefully, but apparently, we had significant tailwinds throughout our descent, making it much more difficult to maintain adequate descent rate and to gradually slow our B737-200 aircraft. I had already extended landing gear to create drag to assist when we were cleared for the visual approach to runway 8. Seeing we were a bit high, I turned approximately 20 degrees south to create a slightly angling base leg so as to lose altitude, at which point my check airman aggressively asked 'why are you turning away from the airport?' I responded by telling him that we were slightly high, but in retrospect I'm not sure he heard me. I turned back toward the airport, and continued to slow the aircraft to a point where we could safely extend flaps to 15 and get onto profile. We were 6 mi from the runway, passing through approximately 8900 ft, approximately 3500 ft above the airport elevation. By 7000 ft, it was obvious that this approach was never going to work. I stated this fact out loud, said I was going around, and asked my check airman to tell ATC and to get us a right turn vector back to the final for runway 8. He did not respond right away. I repeated my request, to which he replied, 'how about a base to runway 3 instead?' aware that our flight was late, I agreed to do this, and asked my check airman to look outside and call my base leg turn for runway 3, since he could see the runway much better than I could. We were cleared for the visual to runway 3. I asked my check airman if it looked good to start my turn. He said yes. I began banking towards the runway, configuring final flaps for landing, and in my effort to line up with the runway, inadvertently over banked the aircraft so that the 'bank angle' annunciator sounded. I immediately began correcting, and within seconds saw that this was not going to work. I immediately initiated another go around. We were cleared back up to 7000 ft, vectored back to the downwind for runway 8, and landed uneventfully. In nearly 20 yrs of flying, I have never, ever maneuvered an aircraft with passenger on board in a manner where I exceeded 30 degrees of bank, and this incident shocked and embarrassed me. Several factors contributed to this situation, and I am resolved to never allow even one of these influences to creep into my cockpit again. One fact was that this was a high-intensity workload, short-hop flight, especially for a brand new captain. The second factor was that because this initial flight to abq was 1 of 5 legs to be flown that day, I was acutely aware of the need to keep our flight on time. Another factor was that because the check airman and first officer jumpseat observer were neighbors, they were continually talking about unrelated subjects, with the check airman occasionally making sarcastic remarks asking me why I was doing certain things. The final, and I believe most influential factor was that this check airman can be an enigmatic, intimidating character at times. He is zealous about saving fuel, brakes, and other aircraft elements. He constantly pushes people he's flying with to adopt his non-standard techniques in order to 'enhance his bonus check' (for fuel savings). I feel this check airman fostered a cockpit environment where CRM principles were not allowed to be applied. I feel these factors created a significant level of distraction. I was not aggressive enough in demanding what I wanted during our first missed approach procedure. I feel my efforts to please this check airman led me to momentarily maneuver the airplane in a way that I have never ever done in 17 yrs of safe flying. In the future, I will aggressively monitor my descent profile so as to always be in a position for a normal landing on any visual approach, and the instant I sense I am off profile, I will aggressively ask for specific vectors for a missed approach or go around that will give me plenty of time to reconfigure and evaluate the approach for all aspects of safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-200 CAPT MADE 2 GAR'S DURING IOE FLT AT THE FIRST OF THE 5 SCHEDULED STOPS DUE TO FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS FROM THE CHK PLT.

Narrative: THIS EVENT OCCURRED DURING THE FINAL STAGES OF A PART 121 AIRLINE FLT FROM DEN TO ABQ. AS CAPT IN TRAINING ON MY VERY FIRST FLT OF IOE, I HAD A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN IN THE R SEAT, AND A NEW HIRE FO OBSERVER IN THE JUMPSEAT. OUR ACFT WAS IN THE FINAL STAGES OF THE ARR WHEN THIS EVENT BEGAN. APPROX 20 MI FROM THE ABQ ARPT, WE WERE CLRED BY ABQ APCH FROM OUR INTERMEDIATE STEP-DOWN ALT DOWN TO 8000 FT. I HAD PLANNED MY TOP-OF-DSCNT CAREFULLY, BUT APPARENTLY, WE HAD SIGNIFICANT TAILWINDS THROUGHOUT OUR DSCNT, MAKING IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DSCNT RATE AND TO GRADUALLY SLOW OUR B737-200 ACFT. I HAD ALREADY EXTENDED LNDG GEAR TO CREATE DRAG TO ASSIST WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 8. SEEING WE WERE A BIT HIGH, I TURNED APPROX 20 DEGS S TO CREATE A SLIGHTLY ANGLING BASE LEG SO AS TO LOSE ALT, AT WHICH POINT MY CHK AIRMAN AGGRESSIVELY ASKED 'WHY ARE YOU TURNING AWAY FROM THE ARPT?' I RESPONDED BY TELLING HIM THAT WE WERE SLIGHTLY HIGH, BUT IN RETROSPECT I'M NOT SURE HE HEARD ME. I TURNED BACK TOWARD THE ARPT, AND CONTINUED TO SLOW THE ACFT TO A POINT WHERE WE COULD SAFELY EXTEND FLAPS TO 15 AND GET ONTO PROFILE. WE WERE 6 MI FROM THE RWY, PASSING THROUGH APPROX 8900 FT, APPROX 3500 FT ABOVE THE ARPT ELEVATION. BY 7000 FT, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THIS APCH WAS NEVER GOING TO WORK. I STATED THIS FACT OUT LOUD, SAID I WAS GOING AROUND, AND ASKED MY CHK AIRMAN TO TELL ATC AND TO GET US A R TURN VECTOR BACK TO THE FINAL FOR RWY 8. HE DID NOT RESPOND RIGHT AWAY. I REPEATED MY REQUEST, TO WHICH HE REPLIED, 'HOW ABOUT A BASE TO RWY 3 INSTEAD?' AWARE THAT OUR FLT WAS LATE, I AGREED TO DO THIS, AND ASKED MY CHK AIRMAN TO LOOK OUTSIDE AND CALL MY BASE LEG TURN FOR RWY 3, SINCE HE COULD SEE THE RWY MUCH BETTER THAN I COULD. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 3. I ASKED MY CHK AIRMAN IF IT LOOKED GOOD TO START MY TURN. HE SAID YES. I BEGAN BANKING TOWARDS THE RWY, CONFIGURING FINAL FLAPS FOR LNDG, AND IN MY EFFORT TO LINE UP WITH THE RWY, INADVERTENTLY OVER BANKED THE ACFT SO THAT THE 'BANK ANGLE' ANNUNCIATOR SOUNDED. I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN CORRECTING, AND WITHIN SECONDS SAW THAT THIS WAS NOT GOING TO WORK. I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED ANOTHER GAR. WE WERE CLRED BACK UP TO 7000 FT, VECTORED BACK TO THE DOWNWIND FOR RWY 8, AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. IN NEARLY 20 YRS OF FLYING, I HAVE NEVER, EVER MANEUVERED AN ACFT WITH PAX ON BOARD IN A MANNER WHERE I EXCEEDED 30 DEGS OF BANK, AND THIS INCIDENT SHOCKED AND EMBARRASSED ME. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT, AND I AM RESOLVED TO NEVER ALLOW EVEN ONE OF THESE INFLUENCES TO CREEP INTO MY COCKPIT AGAIN. ONE FACT WAS THAT THIS WAS A HIGH-INTENSITY WORKLOAD, SHORT-HOP FLT, ESPECIALLY FOR A BRAND NEW CAPT. THE SECOND FACTOR WAS THAT BECAUSE THIS INITIAL FLT TO ABQ WAS 1 OF 5 LEGS TO BE FLOWN THAT DAY, I WAS ACUTELY AWARE OF THE NEED TO KEEP OUR FLT ON TIME. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THAT BECAUSE THE CHK AIRMAN AND FO JUMPSEAT OBSERVER WERE NEIGHBORS, THEY WERE CONTINUALLY TALKING ABOUT UNRELATED SUBJECTS, WITH THE CHK AIRMAN OCCASIONALLY MAKING SARCASTIC REMARKS ASKING ME WHY I WAS DOING CERTAIN THINGS. THE FINAL, AND I BELIEVE MOST INFLUENTIAL FACTOR WAS THAT THIS CHK AIRMAN CAN BE AN ENIGMATIC, INTIMIDATING CHARACTER AT TIMES. HE IS ZEALOUS ABOUT SAVING FUEL, BRAKES, AND OTHER ACFT ELEMENTS. HE CONSTANTLY PUSHES PEOPLE HE'S FLYING WITH TO ADOPT HIS NON-STANDARD TECHNIQUES IN ORDER TO 'ENHANCE HIS BONUS CHK' (FOR FUEL SAVINGS). I FEEL THIS CHK AIRMAN FOSTERED A COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT WHERE CRM PRINCIPLES WERE NOT ALLOWED TO BE APPLIED. I FEEL THESE FACTORS CREATED A SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF DISTR. I WAS NOT AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH IN DEMANDING WHAT I WANTED DURING OUR FIRST MISSED APCH PROC. I FEEL MY EFFORTS TO PLEASE THIS CHK AIRMAN LED ME TO MOMENTARILY MANEUVER THE AIRPLANE IN A WAY THAT I HAVE NEVER EVER DONE IN 17 YRS OF SAFE FLYING. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL AGGRESSIVELY MONITOR MY DSCNT PROFILE SO AS TO ALWAYS BE IN A POS FOR A NORMAL LNDG ON ANY VISUAL APCH, AND THE INSTANT I SENSE I AM OFF PROFILE, I WILL AGGRESSIVELY ASK FOR SPECIFIC VECTORS FOR A MISSED APCH OR GAR THAT WILL GIVE ME PLENTY OF TIME TO RECONFIGURE AND EVALUATE THE APCH FOR ALL ASPECTS OF SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.