|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : grb.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||general aviation : personal|
|Make Model Name||Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 91|
|Flight Phase||ground : taxi|
|Function||flight crew : single pilot|
|Qualification||pilot : private|
pilot : instrument
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 40|
flight time total : 1070
flight time type : 800
|Affiliation||government : faa|
|Function||controller : local|
|Anomaly||incursion : runway|
non adherence : far
non adherence : clearance
|Independent Detector||other controllera|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
|Consequence||faa : reviewed incident with flight crew|
|Problem Areas||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
While I was taxiing to runway 36 from the FBO ramp, the tower controller informed me that I had crossed an active runway (6) without clearance. Both runway 6 and runway 36, which intersect, were active. I paused briefly before crossing runway 6 to consider whether to confirm my clearance to cross it. After recalling that a clearance to a runway included clearance to cross runways as necessary, I proceeded across runway 6. I had been monitoring traffic on the radio, and I looked carefully to be sure that the runway was clear. The ctrl was polite and firm in bringing the problem to my attention. I perceived at all times that I was cleared to runway 36, but I trust that recordings would confirm that he was correct. The incident has shaken me. I read a lot of aviation literature, so I know about the issues of runway incursions, and I always try to be very safe and follow the rules. The fact that this incident occurred in spite of my efforts leads me to report this incident -- the first I have ever reported. Runways 6 and 36 also were active when I arrived about XA00. I landed from an ILS approach to runway 36, with instructions to hold short of runway 6. I taxied to FBO on M, crossing runway 6 on the way. Preparing for departure, I wrote down the ATIS and then requested flight following when I contacted ground with my VFR departure plans. I received a transponder code and understood that I was to taxi to runway 36, with the possibility of an intersection departure. I have made about 5 trips to this airport, about 1 per yr. I therefore was referring to the airport diagram in the current terminal procedures publication. I ordinarily repeat back taxiing instructions, so I must have repeated back runway 6 while all the while thinking runway 36 in my mind. I think my belief was reinforced because the controller did not specify an intersection, and while there are 2 reasonable intxns for departing runway 36, labeled M3 and M4, there is no label on the only reasonable intersection for departing runway 6 (which is where M crosses 6). Many factors contributed to this occurrence, including my relative unfamiliarity with the airport, active intersecting runways with similar numbers, and perhaps my earlier arrival on runway 36. I know that in the future I will be much more careful about crossing runways. I expect to confirm runway crossing instructions whenever it is necessary to cross one that is active.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PLT CROSSES ACTIVE RWY ENRTE TO DEP RWY.
Narrative: WHILE I WAS TAXIING TO RWY 36 FROM THE FBO RAMP, THE TWR CTLR INFORMED ME THAT I HAD CROSSED AN ACTIVE RWY (6) WITHOUT CLRNC. BOTH RWY 6 AND RWY 36, WHICH INTERSECT, WERE ACTIVE. I PAUSED BRIEFLY BEFORE XING RWY 6 TO CONSIDER WHETHER TO CONFIRM MY CLRNC TO CROSS IT. AFTER RECALLING THAT A CLRNC TO A RWY INCLUDED CLRNC TO CROSS RWYS AS NECESSARY, I PROCEEDED ACROSS RWY 6. I HAD BEEN MONITORING TFC ON THE RADIO, AND I LOOKED CAREFULLY TO BE SURE THAT THE RWY WAS CLR. THE CTRL WAS POLITE AND FIRM IN BRINGING THE PROB TO MY ATTN. I PERCEIVED AT ALL TIMES THAT I WAS CLRED TO RWY 36, BUT I TRUST THAT RECORDINGS WOULD CONFIRM THAT HE WAS CORRECT. THE INCIDENT HAS SHAKEN ME. I READ A LOT OF AVIATION LITERATURE, SO I KNOW ABOUT THE ISSUES OF RWY INCURSIONS, AND I ALWAYS TRY TO BE VERY SAFE AND FOLLOW THE RULES. THE FACT THAT THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED IN SPITE OF MY EFFORTS LEADS ME TO RPT THIS INCIDENT -- THE FIRST I HAVE EVER RPTED. RWYS 6 AND 36 ALSO WERE ACTIVE WHEN I ARRIVED ABOUT XA00. I LANDED FROM AN ILS APCH TO RWY 36, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 6. I TAXIED TO FBO ON M, XING RWY 6 ON THE WAY. PREPARING FOR DEP, I WROTE DOWN THE ATIS AND THEN REQUESTED FLT FOLLOWING WHEN I CONTACTED GND WITH MY VFR DEP PLANS. I RECEIVED A XPONDER CODE AND UNDERSTOOD THAT I WAS TO TAXI TO RWY 36, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTXN DEP. I HAVE MADE ABOUT 5 TRIPS TO THIS ARPT, ABOUT 1 PER YR. I THEREFORE WAS REFERRING TO THE ARPT DIAGRAM IN THE CURRENT TERMINAL PROCS PUB. I ORDINARILY REPEAT BACK TAXIING INSTRUCTIONS, SO I MUST HAVE REPEATED BACK RWY 6 WHILE ALL THE WHILE THINKING RWY 36 IN MY MIND. I THINK MY BELIEF WAS REINFORCED BECAUSE THE CTLR DID NOT SPECIFY AN INTXN, AND WHILE THERE ARE 2 REASONABLE INTXNS FOR DEPARTING RWY 36, LABELED M3 AND M4, THERE IS NO LABEL ON THE ONLY REASONABLE INTXN FOR DEPARTING RWY 6 (WHICH IS WHERE M CROSSES 6). MANY FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OCCURRENCE, INCLUDING MY RELATIVE UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT, ACTIVE INTERSECTING RWYS WITH SIMILAR NUMBERS, AND PERHAPS MY EARLIER ARR ON RWY 36. I KNOW THAT IN THE FUTURE I WILL BE MUCH MORE CAREFUL ABOUT XING RWYS. I EXPECT TO CONFIRM RWY XING INSTRUCTIONS WHENEVER IT IS NECESSARY TO CROSS ONE THAT IS ACTIVE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.