Narrative:

During a practice GPS approach to runway 11 at W29 in VMC (VFR) with a qualified safety pilot aboard, a near miss with an aircraft operated by the local flight school (I believe a solo student was operating the aircraft) a near miss occurred. Runway 11 was active at W29 at the time of the occurrence. Because 1 of the iafs for the RNAV (GPS) 11 is located inside and above the floor (1500 ft) of an adjacent class B airspace, I run the approach at 1400 ft MSL. The airport pattern altitude for runway 11 is 1200 ft. Hence, running the approach at 1400 ft provides some vertical clearance to poss opposing traffic on downwind and left base. During the practice approach we were continuously announcing our position and intentions. The safety pilot was maintaining a continuous search for traffic. The aircraft strobes were operational. Inside doctr at 1400 ft at approximately 3.5 NM from the threshold of runway 11 at 1400 ft MSL (the point at which a descent to landing is normally initiated) we again announced our position with respect to distance west of the airport and our intention to land on runway 11. Just prior to initiation of descent the opposing aircraft announced downwind for runway 11. No calls from this aircraft had previously been heard by either pilot. We maintained our altitude and both pilots searched for the opposing aircraft. The opposing aircraft was not acquired. I turned on our landing light (strobes are not particularly effective during bright sunlight), requested a position report from the opposing aircraft and requested that he turn on his landing light. This request was ignored. Having not acquired the opposing aircraft 1400 ft was maintained. I again announced our position and that we were #1 to land. (The flight school aircraft frequently initiate downwind for runway 11 as much as 2 NM east of the airport and turn left base as much as 2 NM west of the airport.) having not acquired the aircraft 1400 ft was maintained. Shortly thereafter the opposing aircraft announced that he had us in sight. Again I requested a position report. The opposing aircraft announced a position that indicated that he was directly or nearly directly below us. Exclaiming that 'he's below us' I immediately initiated a climbing 360 degree turn for avoidance and announced my intentions. Upon completion of the turn the opposing aircraft was acquired on final for runway 11. Upon completion of the turn I initiated a descent and engaged the autoplt for the final segment to see if it would acquire the approach. At MDA the approach was not satisfactory. A standard missed approach was initiated at MDA, ie, full power, position rate, flaps up, gear up, etc. A subsequent approach was more successful. Contributing factors: 1) the diamond is an all composite aircraft with a long very thin wing, a small fuselage cross section and a small tail. The aircraft is almost all white (because of temperature limits on the composite material). As a result, the aircraft is very difficult to see, especially head on. 2) although the flight school does use strobes, strobes are not particularly effective on a bright day. Failure of the flight school to require the use of landing lights in the pattern or the vicinity of the airport. 3) the extremely long patterns taught by the flight school contributed to our anticipation that the opposing aircraft would not be a factor. 4) failure of the pilot of the opposing aircraft to continuously announce his position. (Lack of adequate training.) 5) failure of the pilot of the opposing aircraft to take action to insure spacing from an aircraft on final that had indicated #1 for the landing and that he had in sight and that he knew did not have him in sight. (Lack of adequate training.) comments: 1) my continuing to maintain 1400 ft MSL until the opposing aircraft was positively acquired prevented a potential accident. 2) in retrospect I should have completely abandoned the approach after the avoidance turn. Recommendation: 1) reiterate to all flight schools, especially those that use diamond or similar aircraft, the necessity to train students to use the landing light in the pattern or the vicinity of the airport.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE33 PLT AND A DIAMOND ACFT HAD AN NMAC IN THE VFR PATTERN AT W29.

Narrative: DURING A PRACTICE GPS APCH TO RWY 11 AT W29 IN VMC (VFR) WITH A QUALIFIED SAFETY PLT ABOARD, A NEAR MISS WITH AN ACFT OPERATED BY THE LCL FLT SCHOOL (I BELIEVE A SOLO STUDENT WAS OPERATING THE ACFT) A NEAR MISS OCCURRED. RWY 11 WAS ACTIVE AT W29 AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE. BECAUSE 1 OF THE IAFS FOR THE RNAV (GPS) 11 IS LOCATED INSIDE AND ABOVE THE FLOOR (1500 FT) OF AN ADJACENT CLASS B AIRSPACE, I RUN THE APCH AT 1400 FT MSL. THE ARPT PATTERN ALT FOR RWY 11 IS 1200 FT. HENCE, RUNNING THE APCH AT 1400 FT PROVIDES SOME VERT CLRNC TO POSS OPPOSING TFC ON DOWNWIND AND L BASE. DURING THE PRACTICE APCH WE WERE CONTINUOUSLY ANNOUNCING OUR POS AND INTENTIONS. THE SAFETY PLT WAS MAINTAINING A CONTINUOUS SEARCH FOR TFC. THE ACFT STROBES WERE OPERATIONAL. INSIDE DOCTR AT 1400 FT AT APPROX 3.5 NM FROM THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 11 AT 1400 FT MSL (THE POINT AT WHICH A DSCNT TO LNDG IS NORMALLY INITIATED) WE AGAIN ANNOUNCED OUR POS WITH RESPECT TO DISTANCE W OF THE ARPT AND OUR INTENTION TO LAND ON RWY 11. JUST PRIOR TO INITIATION OF DSCNT THE OPPOSING ACFT ANNOUNCED DOWNWIND FOR RWY 11. NO CALLS FROM THIS ACFT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN HEARD BY EITHER PLT. WE MAINTAINED OUR ALT AND BOTH PLTS SEARCHED FOR THE OPPOSING ACFT. THE OPPOSING ACFT WAS NOT ACQUIRED. I TURNED ON OUR LNDG LIGHT (STROBES ARE NOT PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE DURING BRIGHT SUNLIGHT), REQUESTED A POS RPT FROM THE OPPOSING ACFT AND REQUESTED THAT HE TURN ON HIS LNDG LIGHT. THIS REQUEST WAS IGNORED. HAVING NOT ACQUIRED THE OPPOSING ACFT 1400 FT WAS MAINTAINED. I AGAIN ANNOUNCED OUR POS AND THAT WE WERE #1 TO LAND. (THE FLT SCHOOL ACFT FREQUENTLY INITIATE DOWNWIND FOR RWY 11 AS MUCH AS 2 NM E OF THE ARPT AND TURN L BASE AS MUCH AS 2 NM W OF THE ARPT.) HAVING NOT ACQUIRED THE ACFT 1400 FT WAS MAINTAINED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE OPPOSING ACFT ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD US IN SIGHT. AGAIN I REQUESTED A POS RPT. THE OPPOSING ACFT ANNOUNCED A POS THAT INDICATED THAT HE WAS DIRECTLY OR NEARLY DIRECTLY BELOW US. EXCLAIMING THAT 'HE'S BELOW US' I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A CLBING 360 DEG TURN FOR AVOIDANCE AND ANNOUNCED MY INTENTIONS. UPON COMPLETION OF THE TURN THE OPPOSING ACFT WAS ACQUIRED ON FINAL FOR RWY 11. UPON COMPLETION OF THE TURN I INITIATED A DSCNT AND ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT FOR THE FINAL SEGMENT TO SEE IF IT WOULD ACQUIRE THE APCH. AT MDA THE APCH WAS NOT SATISFACTORY. A STANDARD MISSED APCH WAS INITIATED AT MDA, IE, FULL PWR, POS RATE, FLAPS UP, GEAR UP, ETC. A SUBSEQUENT APCH WAS MORE SUCCESSFUL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE DIAMOND IS AN ALL COMPOSITE ACFT WITH A LONG VERY THIN WING, A SMALL FUSELAGE CROSS SECTION AND A SMALL TAIL. THE ACFT IS ALMOST ALL WHITE (BECAUSE OF TEMP LIMITS ON THE COMPOSITE MATERIAL). AS A RESULT, THE ACFT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE, ESPECIALLY HEAD ON. 2) ALTHOUGH THE FLT SCHOOL DOES USE STROBES, STROBES ARE NOT PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE ON A BRIGHT DAY. FAILURE OF THE FLT SCHOOL TO REQUIRE THE USE OF LNDG LIGHTS IN THE PATTERN OR THE VICINITY OF THE ARPT. 3) THE EXTREMELY LONG PATTERNS TAUGHT BY THE FLT SCHOOL CONTRIBUTED TO OUR ANTICIPATION THAT THE OPPOSING ACFT WOULD NOT BE A FACTOR. 4) FAILURE OF THE PLT OF THE OPPOSING ACFT TO CONTINUOUSLY ANNOUNCE HIS POS. (LACK OF ADEQUATE TRAINING.) 5) FAILURE OF THE PLT OF THE OPPOSING ACFT TO TAKE ACTION TO INSURE SPACING FROM AN ACFT ON FINAL THAT HAD INDICATED #1 FOR THE LNDG AND THAT HE HAD IN SIGHT AND THAT HE KNEW DID NOT HAVE HIM IN SIGHT. (LACK OF ADEQUATE TRAINING.) COMMENTS: 1) MY CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN 1400 FT MSL UNTIL THE OPPOSING ACFT WAS POSITIVELY ACQUIRED PREVENTED A POTENTIAL ACCIDENT. 2) IN RETROSPECT I SHOULD HAVE COMPLETELY ABANDONED THE APCH AFTER THE AVOIDANCE TURN. RECOMMENDATION: 1) REITERATE TO ALL FLT SCHOOLS, ESPECIALLY THOSE THAT USE DIAMOND OR SIMILAR ACFT, THE NECESSITY TO TRAIN STUDENTS TO USE THE LNDG LIGHT IN THE PATTERN OR THE VICINITY OF THE ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.