Narrative:

During a descent to ewr, ZBW issued us a clearance to cross 20 mi north of sax VOR. The first officer was flying the aircraft and he programmed the FMC to cross 20 mi north of sax as cleared. The first officer chose to use the VNAV feature to comply with the clearance. We left 16000 ft and the VNAV feature appeared to do what it was designed to do. During the descent, I noticed that the 'math' didn't compute to meet the crossing restr. I then suggested to use the speed brakes to expedite the descent and to decelerate to 250 KTS prior to passing 10000 ft. First officer protested by saying, 'the machine will do it.' when it became obvious that the rate of descent would not comply with the crossing clearance, first officer became fixated as to why the VNAV feature did not work as programmed. At this point, I fully extended the speed brake to increase the rate of descent and descend to our assigned altitude as rapidly as possible. It is painfully obvious that too much emphasis is being placed in the automation and the basics of flying an aircraft are being abandoned. The concept of automation should be considered as an aid instead of the principal mode of safely operating an aircraft. Common sense is rapidly dwindling.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 CREW, DSNDING INTO EWR, UNDERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT.

Narrative: DURING A DSCNT TO EWR, ZBW ISSUED US A CLRNC TO CROSS 20 MI N OF SAX VOR. THE FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND HE PROGRAMMED THE FMC TO CROSS 20 MI N OF SAX AS CLRED. THE FO CHOSE TO USE THE VNAV FEATURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CLRNC. WE LEFT 16000 FT AND THE VNAV FEATURE APPEARED TO DO WHAT IT WAS DESIGNED TO DO. DURING THE DSCNT, I NOTICED THAT THE 'MATH' DIDN'T COMPUTE TO MEET THE XING RESTR. I THEN SUGGESTED TO USE THE SPD BRAKES TO EXPEDITE THE DSCNT AND TO DECELERATE TO 250 KTS PRIOR TO PASSING 10000 FT. FO PROTESTED BY SAYING, 'THE MACHINE WILL DO IT.' WHEN IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THE RATE OF DSCNT WOULD NOT COMPLY WITH THE XING CLRNC, FO BECAME FIXATED AS TO WHY THE VNAV FEATURE DID NOT WORK AS PROGRAMMED. AT THIS POINT, I FULLY EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKE TO INCREASE THE RATE OF DSCNT AND DSND TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. IT IS PAINFULLY OBVIOUS THAT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS IS BEING PLACED IN THE AUTOMATION AND THE BASICS OF FLYING AN ACFT ARE BEING ABANDONED. THE CONCEPT OF AUTOMATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN AID INSTEAD OF THE PRINCIPAL MODE OF SAFELY OPERATING AN ACFT. COMMON SENSE IS RAPIDLY DWINDLING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.