Narrative:

While cruising at 13000 ft MSL en route, the master caution flasher began flashing. Looking at the caution/warning light panel showed the roll spoiler inboard hydraulic and #1 hydraulic isolation valve lights illuminated. I then looked at the #1 hydraulic quantity gauge and found it to be just above .5 qts. I designated the PF, which was the first officer, and got out the emergency procedures checklist. I first ran the checklist for the roll spoiler caution light, knowing it was the shorter and less involved checklist. Then I proceeded to run the partial loss of hydraulic contents checklist. This checklist directed me to run the flapless landing checklist, which I did next. During these checklists we were given numerous altitude changes, vectors to fixes, and frequency changes. Upon contact with ny approach I told them we were working on a hydraulic problem that we would probably divert to isp and to standby. I finished the flapless landing checklist, figuring out approach and vref speeds, and required landing distance. After discussing it with the first officer we decided to divert to isp, the closer airport with a longer runway. He then took communication with approach, declared the emergency and got vectors for isp. I talked with the flight attendant, called air carrier operations, made an announcement to the passenger, and talked to the flight attendant again, to let her know that we would brace the passenger just to be safe. With that complete I got back on approach control with the first officer. We were now on a wide right base to runway 6 at isp. I ran the arrival checklist, and we landed without incident. I was able to bring the aircraft to a stop with the parking brake on the runway. Having ample control of the aircraft, I taxied to a parking spot. The passenger were deplaned. I called the company and maintenance with the logbook write-up. Overall, I felt everything went well, and the checklists and training did their job. If anything didn't go by the book it would be that we didn't slow down and take our time. I know and take full responsibility for allowing the approach controller to vector us right to the airport, and not getting delaying vectors to slow down. All checklists were completed, and safety was achieved, but we could have given the flight attendant more time for her preparation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DH8A CREW, CRUISING AT 13000 FT, EXPERIENCED A HYD FLUID LOSS, SPAWNING AN EMER WITH A LNDG SHORT OF DEST.

Narrative: WHILE CRUISING AT 13000 FT MSL ENRTE, THE MASTER CAUTION FLASHER BEGAN FLASHING. LOOKING AT THE CAUTION/WARNING LIGHT PANEL SHOWED THE ROLL SPOILER INBOARD HYD AND #1 HYD ISOLATION VALVE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. I THEN LOOKED AT THE #1 HYD QUANTITY GAUGE AND FOUND IT TO BE JUST ABOVE .5 QTS. I DESIGNATED THE PF, WHICH WAS THE FO, AND GOT OUT THE EMER PROCS CHKLIST. I FIRST RAN THE CHKLIST FOR THE ROLL SPOILER CAUTION LIGHT, KNOWING IT WAS THE SHORTER AND LESS INVOLVED CHKLIST. THEN I PROCEEDED TO RUN THE PARTIAL LOSS OF HYD CONTENTS CHKLIST. THIS CHKLIST DIRECTED ME TO RUN THE FLAPLESS LNDG CHKLIST, WHICH I DID NEXT. DURING THESE CHKLISTS WE WERE GIVEN NUMEROUS ALT CHANGES, VECTORS TO FIXES, AND FREQ CHANGES. UPON CONTACT WITH NY APCH I TOLD THEM WE WERE WORKING ON A HYD PROB THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY DIVERT TO ISP AND TO STANDBY. I FINISHED THE FLAPLESS LNDG CHKLIST, FIGURING OUT APCH AND VREF SPDS, AND REQUIRED LNDG DISTANCE. AFTER DISCUSSING IT WITH THE FO WE DECIDED TO DIVERT TO ISP, THE CLOSER ARPT WITH A LONGER RWY. HE THEN TOOK COM WITH APCH, DECLARED THE EMER AND GOT VECTORS FOR ISP. I TALKED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT, CALLED ACR OPS, MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX, AND TALKED TO THE FLT ATTENDANT AGAIN, TO LET HER KNOW THAT WE WOULD BRACE THE PAX JUST TO BE SAFE. WITH THAT COMPLETE I GOT BACK ON APCH CTL WITH THE FO. WE WERE NOW ON A WIDE R BASE TO RWY 6 AT ISP. I RAN THE ARR CHKLIST, AND WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. I WAS ABLE TO BRING THE ACFT TO A STOP WITH THE PARKING BRAKE ON THE RWY. HAVING AMPLE CTL OF THE ACFT, I TAXIED TO A PARKING SPOT. THE PAX WERE DEPLANED. I CALLED THE COMPANY AND MAINT WITH THE LOGBOOK WRITE-UP. OVERALL, I FELT EVERYTHING WENT WELL, AND THE CHKLISTS AND TRAINING DID THEIR JOB. IF ANYTHING DIDN'T GO BY THE BOOK IT WOULD BE THAT WE DIDN'T SLOW DOWN AND TAKE OUR TIME. I KNOW AND TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALLOWING THE APCH CTLR TO VECTOR US R TO THE ARPT, AND NOT GETTING DELAYING VECTORS TO SLOW DOWN. ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED, AND SAFETY WAS ACHIEVED, BUT WE COULD HAVE GIVEN THE FLT ATTENDANT MORE TIME FOR HER PREPARATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.