Narrative:

Just after liftoff on a flight to fra, the forward and mid flight attendant call buttons illuminated and chimes came on. I was flying and had the interphone on at a low volume. I heard the a-line flight attendant say they had smoke in the cabin with several smoke detectors in the lavatories sounding. I also heard 'lavatory fire' and 'halon bottle.' I thought it was a lavatory fire. At that point, I assumed the radios as well as flying the aircraft. The captain declared an emergency just previous to this. I could not see or smell any smoke in the cockpit and did not put on my oxygen mask. We made a short pattern at 5000 ft MSL and landed back on runway 27R atl. In that time we dumped approximately 15000 pounds of fuel. We landed 50000 pounds overweight. Touchdown was smooth and we taxied clear. Once we were checked over by fire personnel, we taxied back to the gate. The brakes did not overheat to the point of excess. There were quite a few lessons that were learned or reinforced from past simulator sessions: 1) it was a quite busy 10 mins. I had the easiest job as the PF. Normally, in an emergency, we are taught to slow down and be methodical. However, with a potential onboard fire, landing safely as soon as possible is critical. We did not accomplish all the checklists. The checklists included after takeoff, descent, approach, before landing, smoke/fire in cabin, fuel dumping, and overweight landing. The smoke checklist was not finished by the time we landed. The fuel dumping checklist was not accomplished at all. We were all confused by the subsequent load shed after we selected the fuel jettison switch. We talked about the side window inoperative lights and thought it might be related to the problem (they were not -- they were load shed). Even though we were not able to finish the emergency checklists, we were all comfortable in landing when we did. 2) it is easy to settle on a cause, or confuse things we hear with what is actually happening. We are taught to continually ask the flight attendants what is happening in the back during smoke/fire problems. In my case, I was out of the loop almost immediately since I concentrated on only flying. However, I thought we had a lavatory fire and continued to believe that until after we landed. We didn't -- it was an equipment cooling fan overheating. We also had reports that we were trailing smoke which obviously concerned us. However, after several mins, I said that they were probably just seeing our aircraft dumping fuel -- they were. Keep an open mind on what is happening so that you all can actually determine what is happening. 3) crew coordination learned from past training works! Once the decision was made by the captain that this was an emergency, our past training took over. Even though we did not accomplish all the checklists, everything went as smoothly as was possible. 4) the checklists don't cover everything -- there is room for judgement, and it is in fact critical. We all fear repercussions from the company and the FAA from wrong decisions or not following the book to the letter. However, safe operation needs sound judgement from the entire flight crew. 5) the checklists we have are fine. If we were in any different phase of flight, we would have been able to cover everything. Supplemental information from acn 541740: leveloff at 5000 ft, turn to downwind, and landing took approximately 10 mins. After landing, smoke/odor was greatly reduced. Maintenance reported no obvious faults. Aircraft was taken OTS. Aircraft had just returned to passenger service.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OVERWT RETURN LAND AFTER FUEL DUMPED BY A FLC IN A B767-300 AFTER FLT ATTENDANTS RPT LAVATORY SMOKE ALARMS AND VISIBLE SMOKE IN CABIN AFTER TKOF FROM ATL, GA.

Narrative: JUST AFTER LIFTOFF ON A FLT TO FRA, THE FORWARD AND MID FLT ATTENDANT CALL BUTTONS ILLUMINATED AND CHIMES CAME ON. I WAS FLYING AND HAD THE INTERPHONE ON AT A LOW VOLUME. I HEARD THE A-LINE FLT ATTENDANT SAY THEY HAD SMOKE IN THE CABIN WITH SEVERAL SMOKE DETECTORS IN THE LAVATORIES SOUNDING. I ALSO HEARD 'LAVATORY FIRE' AND 'HALON BOTTLE.' I THOUGHT IT WAS A LAVATORY FIRE. AT THAT POINT, I ASSUMED THE RADIOS AS WELL AS FLYING THE ACFT. THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER JUST PREVIOUS TO THIS. I COULD NOT SEE OR SMELL ANY SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AND DID NOT PUT ON MY OXYGEN MASK. WE MADE A SHORT PATTERN AT 5000 FT MSL AND LANDED BACK ON RWY 27R ATL. IN THAT TIME WE DUMPED APPROX 15000 LBS OF FUEL. WE LANDED 50000 LBS OVERWT. TOUCHDOWN WAS SMOOTH AND WE TAXIED CLR. ONCE WE WERE CHKED OVER BY FIRE PERSONNEL, WE TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE. THE BRAKES DID NOT OVERHEAT TO THE POINT OF EXCESS. THERE WERE QUITE A FEW LESSONS THAT WERE LEARNED OR REINFORCED FROM PAST SIMULATOR SESSIONS: 1) IT WAS A QUITE BUSY 10 MINS. I HAD THE EASIEST JOB AS THE PF. NORMALLY, IN AN EMER, WE ARE TAUGHT TO SLOW DOWN AND BE METHODICAL. HOWEVER, WITH A POTENTIAL ONBOARD FIRE, LNDG SAFELY ASAP IS CRITICAL. WE DID NOT ACCOMPLISH ALL THE CHKLISTS. THE CHKLISTS INCLUDED AFTER TKOF, DSCNT, APCH, BEFORE LNDG, SMOKE/FIRE IN CABIN, FUEL DUMPING, AND OVERWT LNDG. THE SMOKE CHKLIST WAS NOT FINISHED BY THE TIME WE LANDED. THE FUEL DUMPING CHKLIST WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED AT ALL. WE WERE ALL CONFUSED BY THE SUBSEQUENT LOAD SHED AFTER WE SELECTED THE FUEL JETTISON SWITCH. WE TALKED ABOUT THE SIDE WINDOW INOP LIGHTS AND THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE RELATED TO THE PROB (THEY WERE NOT -- THEY WERE LOAD SHED). EVEN THOUGH WE WERE NOT ABLE TO FINISH THE EMER CHKLISTS, WE WERE ALL COMFORTABLE IN LNDG WHEN WE DID. 2) IT IS EASY TO SETTLE ON A CAUSE, OR CONFUSE THINGS WE HEAR WITH WHAT IS ACTUALLY HAPPENING. WE ARE TAUGHT TO CONTINUALLY ASK THE FLT ATTENDANTS WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE BACK DURING SMOKE/FIRE PROBS. IN MY CASE, I WAS OUT OF THE LOOP ALMOST IMMEDIATELY SINCE I CONCENTRATED ON ONLY FLYING. HOWEVER, I THOUGHT WE HAD A LAVATORY FIRE AND CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT UNTIL AFTER WE LANDED. WE DIDN'T -- IT WAS AN EQUIP COOLING FAN OVERHEATING. WE ALSO HAD RPTS THAT WE WERE TRAILING SMOKE WHICH OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED US. HOWEVER, AFTER SEVERAL MINS, I SAID THAT THEY WERE PROBABLY JUST SEEING OUR ACFT DUMPING FUEL -- THEY WERE. KEEP AN OPEN MIND ON WHAT IS HAPPENING SO THAT YOU ALL CAN ACTUALLY DETERMINE WHAT IS HAPPENING. 3) CREW COORD LEARNED FROM PAST TRAINING WORKS! ONCE THE DECISION WAS MADE BY THE CAPT THAT THIS WAS AN EMER, OUR PAST TRAINING TOOK OVER. EVEN THOUGH WE DID NOT ACCOMPLISH ALL THE CHKLISTS, EVERYTHING WENT AS SMOOTHLY AS WAS POSSIBLE. 4) THE CHKLISTS DON'T COVER EVERYTHING -- THERE IS ROOM FOR JUDGEMENT, AND IT IS IN FACT CRITICAL. WE ALL FEAR REPERCUSSIONS FROM THE COMPANY AND THE FAA FROM WRONG DECISIONS OR NOT FOLLOWING THE BOOK TO THE LETTER. HOWEVER, SAFE OP NEEDS SOUND JUDGEMENT FROM THE ENTIRE FLC. 5) THE CHKLISTS WE HAVE ARE FINE. IF WE WERE IN ANY DIFFERENT PHASE OF FLT, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COVER EVERYTHING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 541740: LEVELOFF AT 5000 FT, TURN TO DOWNWIND, AND LNDG TOOK APPROX 10 MINS. AFTER LNDG, SMOKE/ODOR WAS GREATLY REDUCED. MAINT RPTED NO OBVIOUS FAULTS. ACFT WAS TAKEN OTS. ACFT HAD JUST RETURNED TO PAX SVC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.