Narrative:

During preflight we noted that crew oxygen was 400 psi. We both checked our masks and regulators and the captain said he thought his was stuck open. We determined that we were below the minimum required pressure after checking the aircraft flight manual. We then discussed what our options might be, whereupon the captain left the aircraft to consult by phone with dispatch and maintenance. The captain returned and said that it had been decided that we would fly to sju where both oxygen and maintenance were available. He asked for my opinion and I said that I felt comfortable with the decision since it was a very short flight at low altitude and passed right by saint thomas airport. We were dispatched from sxm to sju and completed the flight uneventfully. At sju, contract maintenance replaced the crew oxygen bottle and inspected the oxygen system. We then continued our flight to phl. After reviewing our situation with safety representatives, I now believe we should not have departed sxm with low oxygen. The one thing the captain and I had failed to consider was an emergency (such as smoke in the cockpit) which would have required our use of oxygen masks. In retrospect, I think our discussions had narrowly focused on the need for oxygen to breathe at altitude and overlooked the consideration of smoke in the cockpit. Apparently, this was also overlooked by dispatch and maintenance. I feel that we used good CRM in that the captain and I discussed the situation at length and then consulted both dispatch and maintenance. Maybe, if the flight manual had a warning or caution note next to the oxygen table it would have helped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW OPERATED A FLT WITH ALMOST NO CREW OXYGEN.

Narrative: DURING PREFLT WE NOTED THAT CREW OXYGEN WAS 400 PSI. WE BOTH CHKED OUR MASKS AND REGULATORS AND THE CAPT SAID HE THOUGHT HIS WAS STUCK OPEN. WE DETERMINED THAT WE WERE BELOW THE MINIMUM REQUIRED PRESSURE AFTER CHKING THE ACFT FLT MANUAL. WE THEN DISCUSSED WHAT OUR OPTIONS MIGHT BE, WHEREUPON THE CAPT LEFT THE ACFT TO CONSULT BY PHONE WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT. THE CAPT RETURNED AND SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT WE WOULD FLY TO SJU WHERE BOTH OXYGEN AND MAINT WERE AVAILABLE. HE ASKED FOR MY OPINION AND I SAID THAT I FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE DECISION SINCE IT WAS A VERY SHORT FLT AT LOW ALT AND PASSED RIGHT BY SAINT THOMAS ARPT. WE WERE DISPATCHED FROM SXM TO SJU AND COMPLETED THE FLT UNEVENTFULLY. AT SJU, CONTRACT MAINT REPLACED THE CREW OXYGEN BOTTLE AND INSPECTED THE OXYGEN SYS. WE THEN CONTINUED OUR FLT TO PHL. AFTER REVIEWING OUR SIT WITH SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES, I NOW BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT HAVE DEPARTED SXM WITH LOW OXYGEN. THE ONE THING THE CAPT AND I HAD FAILED TO CONSIDER WAS AN EMER (SUCH AS SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT) WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED OUR USE OF OXYGEN MASKS. IN RETROSPECT, I THINK OUR DISCUSSIONS HAD NARROWLY FOCUSED ON THE NEED FOR OXYGEN TO BREATHE AT ALT AND OVERLOOKED THE CONSIDERATION OF SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. APPARENTLY, THIS WAS ALSO OVERLOOKED BY DISPATCH AND MAINT. I FEEL THAT WE USED GOOD CRM IN THAT THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE SIT AT LENGTH AND THEN CONSULTED BOTH DISPATCH AND MAINT. MAYBE, IF THE FLT MANUAL HAD A WARNING OR CAUTION NOTE NEXT TO THE OXYGEN TABLE IT WOULD HAVE HELPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.