Narrative:

The NTSB explained that repeated applications of rudder could cause the vertical stabilizer to rip free of any commercial aircraft, even below maneuvering speed, and warned pilots not to do such applications. They recommend training for 'all commercial airline pilots.' the announcement had broad ramifications on many maneuvers performed in a variety of areas. Including that the rudder pedal movement on the A300 is different from what the pilots had been taught. Pilots understand the concept that controls get more sensitive as you go faster, even though limiters are built into the systems. To try to charge that a pilot would intentionally apply full rudder in one direction after another, rhythmically, five times in a row is patently unbelievable to me. It is very surprising that, as an A300 pilot, I have received no operational supplements on the use of rudder in the A300 -- I have received no instruction from my flight department on specific use of the controls. 'No one had provided me with the operational limitations that govern the rudder on the A300.' in many ways, our aircraft are now operating without procedures that comply with certification limits. I am very troubled by the inaction regarding specific maneuvers still included in the operating manual of the A300 that may now endanger the aircraft. Also troublesome is that air carrier X did not issue the NTSB warning as part of any operational change to any checklist procedures and, until now, has not issued anything that can be considered a formal operational issue. We have no effective or timely procedure to follow in the case that we may experience 'life threatening' rudder deflection patterns. Why are we not doing inspections that reveal possible damage that may exist inside the composite materials of the vertical stabilizer, rudder and elevators of the A300's. Why is air carrier X continuing to fly with just visually inspected composite materials. There is a conflict in the logic that airbus is espousing that visual inspections are 'good enough.' callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: pilot indicated the pilots at his air carrier had lost confidence in the A300. 'They' question the NTSB acceptance of trying to cast suspicion on the pilots involved. There are pilots at this air carrier that are attempting to fly a different aircraft.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 PLT QUESTIONS THE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE A300 ACFT AFTER A RECENT ACR ACCIDENT AND NUMEROUS UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUTS IN THE ACFT. PLT ALSO QUESTIONS AND NTSB RPT DESCRIBING THE HAZARDS OF RUDDER OPERATION.

Narrative: THE NTSB EXPLAINED THAT REPEATED APPLICATIONS OF RUDDER COULD CAUSE THE VERTICAL STABILIZER TO RIP FREE OF ANY COMMERCIAL ACFT, EVEN BELOW MANEUVERING SPEED, AND WARNED PLTS NOT TO DO SUCH APPLICATIONS. THEY RECOMMEND TRAINING FOR 'ALL COMMERCIAL AIRLINE PLTS.' THE ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BROAD RAMIFICATIONS ON MANY MANEUVERS PERFORMED IN A VARIETY OF AREAS. INCLUDING THAT THE RUDDER PEDAL MOVEMENT ON THE A300 IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THE PLTS HAD BEEN TAUGHT. PLTS UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT THAT CTLS GET MORE SENSITIVE AS YOU GO FASTER, EVEN THOUGH LIMITERS ARE BUILT INTO THE SYSTEMS. TO TRY TO CHARGE THAT A PLT WOULD INTENTIONALLY APPLY FULL RUDDER IN ONE DIRECTION AFTER ANOTHER, RHYTHMICALLY, FIVE TIMES IN A ROW IS PATENTLY UNBELIEVABLE TO ME. IT IS VERY SURPRISING THAT, AS AN A300 PLT, I HAVE RECEIVED NO OPERATIONAL SUPPLEMENTS ON THE USE OF RUDDER IN THE A300 -- I HAVE RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTION FROM MY FLT DEPARTMENT ON SPECIFIC USE OF THE CONTROLS. 'NO ONE HAD PROVIDED ME WITH THE OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS THAT GOVERN THE RUDDER ON THE A300.' IN MANY WAYS, OUR ACFT ARE NOW OPERATING WITHOUT PROCS THAT COMPLY WITH CERTIFICATION LIMITS. I AM VERY TROUBLED BY THE INACTION REGARDING SPECIFIC MANEUVERS STILL INCLUDED IN THE OPERATING MANUAL OF THE A300 THAT MAY NOW ENDANGER THE ACFT. ALSO TROUBLESOME IS THAT ACR X DID NOT ISSUE THE NTSB WARNING AS PART OF ANY OPERATIONAL CHANGE TO ANY CHKLIST PROCS AND, UNTIL NOW, HAS NOT ISSUED ANYTHING THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED A FORMAL OPERATIONAL ISSUE. WE HAVE NO EFFECTIVE OR TIMELY PROC TO FOLLOW IN THE CASE THAT WE MAY EXPERIENCE 'LIFE THREATENING' RUDDER DEFLECTION PATTERNS. WHY ARE WE NOT DOING INSPECTIONS THAT REVEAL POSSIBLE DAMAGE THAT MAY EXIST INSIDE THE COMPOSITE MATERIALS OF THE VERTICAL STABILIZER, RUDDER AND ELEVATORS OF THE A300'S. WHY IS ACR X CONTINUING TO FLY WITH JUST VISUALLY INSPECTED COMPOSITE MATERIALS. THERE IS A CONFLICT IN THE LOGIC THAT AIRBUS IS ESPOUSING THAT VISUAL INSPECTIONS ARE 'GOOD ENOUGH.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: PLT INDICATED THE PLTS AT HIS ACR HAD LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE A300. 'THEY' QUESTION THE NTSB ACCEPTANCE OF TRYING TO CAST SUSPICION ON THE PLTS INVOLVED. THERE ARE PLTS AT THIS ACR THAT ARE ATTEMPTING TO FLY A DIFFERENT ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.