Narrative:

While on final approach into san juan (tjsj), we received an engine #2 fire indication. I ordered the first officer to continue flying and I performed memory items almost instinctively, shutting down the engine and discharging 1 extinguisher in the process. After 30 seconds from discharge, the warning continued. I felt in my judgement as captain that I would discharge the second bottle, and so I did. Between the time of the first and second discharge I contacted tower and requested all arff and also advised flight attendant of evacuate/evacuation possibility. It became clear that after the discharge of the second bottle the warning did not go away. After an uneventful landing (which resulted in only #4 main tire deflation), I elected to use the momentum of the rollout onto an abeam taxiway and initiated an evacuate/evacuation. The fact that we were so close to landing was the deciding factor in not pulling out the checklist, but rather using my judgement and experience in performing only memory items that I deemed critical. A later analysis of the aircraft maintenance log showed maintenance had replaced a collector tank and ignition system. As of this writing, I still do not know if the indication was real.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATR 72 CREW DEALS WITH A FIRE WARNING ON SHORT FINAL THAT COULD NOT BE SILENCED WITH THE USE OF 2 FIRE BOTTLES. LNDG RESULTED IN A FAILED TIRE AND WAS FOLLOWED BY AN EVAC.

Narrative: WHILE ON FINAL APCH INTO SAN JUAN (TJSJ), WE RECEIVED AN ENG #2 FIRE INDICATION. I ORDERED THE FO TO CONTINUE FLYING AND I PERFORMED MEMORY ITEMS ALMOST INSTINCTIVELY, SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG AND DISCHARGING 1 EXTINGUISHER IN THE PROCESS. AFTER 30 SECONDS FROM DISCHARGE, THE WARNING CONTINUED. I FELT IN MY JUDGEMENT AS CAPT THAT I WOULD DISCHARGE THE SECOND BOTTLE, AND SO I DID. BTWN THE TIME OF THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCHARGE I CONTACTED TWR AND REQUESTED ALL ARFF AND ALSO ADVISED FLT ATTENDANT OF EVAC POSSIBILITY. IT BECAME CLR THAT AFTER THE DISCHARGE OF THE SECOND BOTTLE THE WARNING DID NOT GO AWAY. AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG (WHICH RESULTED IN ONLY #4 MAIN TIRE DEFLATION), I ELECTED TO USE THE MOMENTUM OF THE ROLLOUT ONTO AN ABEAM TXWY AND INITIATED AN EVAC. THE FACT THAT WE WERE SO CLOSE TO LNDG WAS THE DECIDING FACTOR IN NOT PULLING OUT THE CHKLIST, BUT RATHER USING MY JUDGEMENT AND EXPERIENCE IN PERFORMING ONLY MEMORY ITEMS THAT I DEEMED CRITICAL. A LATER ANALYSIS OF THE ACFT MAINT LOG SHOWED MAINT HAD REPLACED A COLLECTOR TANK AND IGNITION SYS. AS OF THIS WRITING, I STILL DO NOT KNOW IF THE INDICATION WAS REAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.