Narrative:

Operated MD80 aircraft on 3 scheduled flts. On subject date with fire bottle circuit breakers collared, aircraft had current airworthiness release no open maintenance discrepancies. It is responsibility of crew to insure circuit breakers are set. There are numerous 'collared circuit breakers' and no directive to question or examine collared circuit breakers. 3 different crews operated subject aircraft in this confign. If crews are to be held responsible for failure of maintenance personnel to complete required functions, then there needs to be additional guidance. Supplemental information from acn 534288: flew from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with 2 circuit breakers (fire control bottles) pulled and collared. The flight crew did not see them pulled and flew the trip with them out, the aircraft did not have any write-ups for that day. It had no MEL's and the airworthiness release was signed off. All system tested normally during the preflight and the flight to ZZZ1 was uneventful. Contributing factors were a clean logbook, the first officer was looking for white circuit breakers out. The mechanic who pulled and collared the circuit breakers collared in red. The location of the 2 circuit breakers is the second to the bottom row, in the corner of the aircraft, so just the location made them harder to see. It was an early morning departure with a clean logbook and a normal preflight. I think to prevent a recurrence the walkaround mechanics for the aircraft should check circuit breakers, confer with the crews which ones are out and why prior to flight. Crew members are just used to seeing circuit breakers collared by maintenance without questions. A better xchk of the system needs to be in place. Better wording in the air carrier manual should also be redone to address the coding of circuit breakers and the maintenance collared ones that are pulled and collared. Currently it only addresses the popped circuit breakers. Supplemental information from acn 534274: aircraft flew with circuit breakers fire bottle control pulled and collared. Flight crew did not notice maintenance had pulled and collared circuit breakers as aircraft had no MEL's and airworthiness release had been signed off. All system on normal preflight tested normally, and flight to ZZZ1 was uneventful. Contributing factors: maintenance had pulled circuit breakers and collard them to perform some procedure and they did not get reset. Corrective actions: follow maintenance checklist to reset all circuit breakers pulled and collared. Flight crew query maintenance on every circuit breaker pulled and collared and why system deactivated or not being used.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 CREW NOTED SEVERAL FLT SEGMENTS HAD BEEN OPERATED WITH AN ACFT THAT HAD PULLED AND COLLARED FIRE BOTTLE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. THIS RENDERED THE FIRE PROTECTION SYS INOP.

Narrative: OPERATED MD80 ACFT ON 3 SCHEDULED FLTS. ON SUBJECT DATE WITH FIRE BOTTLE CIRCUIT BREAKERS COLLARED, ACFT HAD CURRENT AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE NO OPEN MAINT DISCREPANCIES. IT IS RESPONSIBILITY OF CREW TO INSURE CIRCUIT BREAKERS ARE SET. THERE ARE NUMEROUS 'COLLARED CIRCUIT BREAKERS' AND NO DIRECTIVE TO QUESTION OR EXAMINE COLLARED CIRCUIT BREAKERS. 3 DIFFERENT CREWS OPERATED SUBJECT ACFT IN THIS CONFIGN. IF CREWS ARE TO BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR FAILURE OF MAINT PERSONNEL TO COMPLETE REQUIRED FUNCTIONS, THEN THERE NEEDS TO BE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 534288: FLEW FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 WITH 2 CIRCUIT BREAKERS (FIRE CTL BOTTLES) PULLED AND COLLARED. THE FLC DID NOT SEE THEM PULLED AND FLEW THE TRIP WITH THEM OUT, THE ACFT DID NOT HAVE ANY WRITE-UPS FOR THAT DAY. IT HAD NO MEL'S AND THE AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE WAS SIGNED OFF. ALL SYS TESTED NORMALLY DURING THE PREFLT AND THE FLT TO ZZZ1 WAS UNEVENTFUL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE A CLEAN LOGBOOK, THE FO WAS LOOKING FOR WHITE CIRCUIT BREAKERS OUT. THE MECH WHO PULLED AND COLLARED THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS COLLARED IN RED. THE LOCATION OF THE 2 CIRCUIT BREAKERS IS THE SECOND TO THE BOTTOM ROW, IN THE CORNER OF THE ACFT, SO JUST THE LOCATION MADE THEM HARDER TO SEE. IT WAS AN EARLY MORNING DEP WITH A CLEAN LOGBOOK AND A NORMAL PREFLT. I THINK TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE THE WALKAROUND MECHS FOR THE ACFT SHOULD CHK CIRCUIT BREAKERS, CONFER WITH THE CREWS WHICH ONES ARE OUT AND WHY PRIOR TO FLT. CREW MEMBERS ARE JUST USED TO SEEING CIRCUIT BREAKERS COLLARED BY MAINT WITHOUT QUESTIONS. A BETTER XCHK OF THE SYS NEEDS TO BE IN PLACE. BETTER WORDING IN THE ACR MANUAL SHOULD ALSO BE REDONE TO ADDRESS THE CODING OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND THE MAINT COLLARED ONES THAT ARE PULLED AND COLLARED. CURRENTLY IT ONLY ADDRESSES THE POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 534274: ACFT FLEW WITH CIRCUIT BREAKERS FIRE BOTTLE CTL PULLED AND COLLARED. FLC DID NOT NOTICE MAINT HAD PULLED AND COLLARED CIRCUIT BREAKERS AS ACFT HAD NO MEL'S AND AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE HAD BEEN SIGNED OFF. ALL SYS ON NORMAL PREFLT TESTED NORMALLY, AND FLT TO ZZZ1 WAS UNEVENTFUL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: MAINT HAD PULLED CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND COLLARD THEM TO PERFORM SOME PROC AND THEY DID NOT GET RESET. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: FOLLOW MAINT CHKLIST TO RESET ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS PULLED AND COLLARED. FLC QUERY MAINT ON EVERY CIRCUIT BREAKER PULLED AND COLLARED AND WHY SYS DEACTIVATED OR NOT BEING USED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.