Narrative:

We were inbound to pbi. We were on vectors with approach control for a right downwind to runway 9L. As we got approximately abeam the numbers, the controller said 'call the field in sight.' we called the field in sight and the controller cleared us for the visual to runway 9L. We began to turn our base leg, and the controller changed his instructions, and said 'don't turn final until outside of the FAF (rubin) for noise abatement and keep the speed up. At this time we were already established on our base leg, so we had to turn outbound on a downwind leg and extend it for another 2 mi, and our turning radios was cut in half due to the modified downwind need to comply with the controller's new orders. This, combined with 'keep the speed up,' made it impossible for us to make a turn inbound at the FAF without flying left of the centerline to get established on final. When this occurred, the controller began screaming 'traffic alert, plane within 1 mi' to another aircraft in the area.. This came to a surprise to us since we were never told another plane was in our immediate area. We landed uneventfully. This was a clear case of the approach controller trying to rush too many planes into a tight area. If we had known another plane was so close, we would have refused the clearance for a visual approach. Also, we were first given the clearance for a 'visual approach,' and then 10 seconds later more restricting orders were added to the visual approach clearance, after we were established in the pattern and configured to land.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A TWR MODIFICATION TO THE VISUAL APCH CLRNC RESULTS IN AN OVERSHOOT OF FINAL AND A TFC CONFLICT AFTER COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW CLRNC.

Narrative: WE WERE INBOUND TO PBI. WE WERE ON VECTORS WITH APCH CTL FOR A R DOWNWIND TO RWY 9L. AS WE GOT APPROX ABEAM THE NUMBERS, THE CTLR SAID 'CALL THE FIELD IN SIGHT.' WE CALLED THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND THE CTLR CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 9L. WE BEGAN TO TURN OUR BASE LEG, AND THE CTLR CHANGED HIS INSTRUCTIONS, AND SAID 'DON'T TURN FINAL UNTIL OUTSIDE OF THE FAF (RUBIN) FOR NOISE ABATEMENT AND KEEP THE SPD UP. AT THIS TIME WE WERE ALREADY ESTABLISHED ON OUR BASE LEG, SO WE HAD TO TURN OUTBOUND ON A DOWNWIND LEG AND EXTEND IT FOR ANOTHER 2 MI, AND OUR TURNING RADIOS WAS CUT IN HALF DUE TO THE MODIFIED DOWNWIND NEED TO COMPLY WITH THE CTLR'S NEW ORDERS. THIS, COMBINED WITH 'KEEP THE SPD UP,' MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO MAKE A TURN INBOUND AT THE FAF WITHOUT FLYING L OF THE CTRLINE TO GET ESTABLISHED ON FINAL. WHEN THIS OCCURRED, THE CTLR BEGAN SCREAMING 'TFC ALERT, PLANE WITHIN 1 MI' TO ANOTHER ACFT IN THE AREA.. THIS CAME TO A SURPRISE TO US SINCE WE WERE NEVER TOLD ANOTHER PLANE WAS IN OUR IMMEDIATE AREA. WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. THIS WAS A CLR CASE OF THE APCH CTLR TRYING TO RUSH TOO MANY PLANES INTO A TIGHT AREA. IF WE HAD KNOWN ANOTHER PLANE WAS SO CLOSE, WE WOULD HAVE REFUSED THE CLRNC FOR A VISUAL APCH. ALSO, WE WERE FIRST GIVEN THE CLRNC FOR A 'VISUAL APCH,' AND THEN 10 SECONDS LATER MORE RESTRICTING ORDERS WERE ADDED TO THE VISUAL APCH CLRNC, AFTER WE WERE ESTABLISHED IN THE PATTERN AND CONFIGURED TO LAND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.