Narrative:

I was working the late night shift. I had 3 position combined in the tower, local control, ground control, and clearance delivery. Normal SOP is to put all frequencys under your control in speaker position and work off a hand set (like a telephone) rather than a headset. The WX closed in shortly after I assumed tower position, decreasing to close to minimums, at the time of the occurrence, visibility was 3/4 mi increasing to 1 1/2 mi. Our primary runway closed that evening for maintenance, therefore we had no arrs until after the primary runway opened at XA30Z. Our primary runway is runway 5/23. My main functions that evening were monitoring/controling vehicular traffic and making ATIS messages due to the WX. After runway 5/23 opened, I had 2 arrival aircraft prior to the occurrence. When runway 5/23 re-opened, we were on runway 5. At the time of the occurrence, visibility was 3/4 mi increasing to 1 1/2 mi. The approach end of runway 5 to shortly beyond was visible and the field/runway was obscured on the departure end. The ceiling was reported 200 ft. The ILS monitored functioning, however, the DME and LOM had dropped off-line twice after runway 5 opened. Approach lights were on step 3, with sequence flashing lights on, taxiway lights on and runway 5 RVR greater than 6000 ft. At approximately XB50Z, I turned on the tower overhead exhaust fan to help clear the air of cigarette odor. The fan added a fair amount of ambient noise to the room. An air traffic aid arrived at approximately XC40Z and took responsibility for the clearance delivery position. Airport 6 called ground control for clearance on runway 5 to check the work performed earlier that morning and was cleared onto the runway. I called the WX office to increase the visibility to 1 1/2 mi. The morning supervisor called and asked if the approach lights were on and I replied 'yes, who asked?' he said 'the guy inbound landing, he was saying the approach lights were not on.' I replied 'on step 3, with flashers.' I then proceeded to check each lighting panel indicator to ensure they were all on, several of which are in the area of the local control position. I also checked the position of airport 6 during this time. I was turned toward the clearance delivery position when I heard engine reverse thrust consistent with that of an arriving aircraft. I spun around and grabbed for the hand set knowing immediately what had happened and saw airport 6 on taxiway G and a large aircraft approaching the runway 5/32 intersection on rollout. Airport 6 called ground control and I instructed him to remain on the terminal side of the field. Shortly thereafter, aircraft called clearing the runway. I instructed him to taxi to parking. I was relieved by the morning controller and reported the situation to the morning supervisor. Upon review of the voice recordings, there was a transmission from aircraft to the tower which I thought was airport 6 and acknowledged him. Whether the miscom was due to the increased noise levels in the tower due to the overhead fan being on, or the distrs caused by opening a position or a combination of these would be a topic of debate. Aircraft never received a landing clearance, but landed nonetheless. Airport 6 later reported hearing my 'airport 6 roger' call, but did not reply that it was not he who transmitted. Since I was on hand set and speaker, it should be noted that even with the speaker volume full, occasionally calls are difficult to hear satisfactorily from other than the local control 1 position. These issues did not clue me to scan my BRITE display. Instead, I went about checking my lighting panels to insure everything monitored normally, visually checking the field to see if the lights I could see were on, and discounting the possibility that an aircraft on approach could have made this statement. A cursory scan of the BRITE display would have avoided the entire situation. After further investigation and review of constant data recording data, the aircraft's transmission was made after he landed and was rolling out. The SOP dictates local control 1 is responsible for monitoring his position which includes the BRITE radar display.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ORF CTLR RECOGNIZES AFTER THE FACT THAT A B757 HAS LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC AND THAT HE HAS NOT ENSURED THAT A MAINT VEHICLE HAS CLRED THE RWY PRIOR TO THE LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE LATE NIGHT SHIFT. I HAD 3 POS COMBINED IN THE TWR, LCL CTL, GND CTL, AND CLRNC DELIVERY. NORMAL SOP IS TO PUT ALL FREQS UNDER YOUR CTL IN SPEAKER POS AND WORK OFF A HAND SET (LIKE A TELEPHONE) RATHER THAN A HEADSET. THE WX CLOSED IN SHORTLY AFTER I ASSUMED TWR POS, DECREASING TO CLOSE TO MINIMUMS, AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE, VISIBILITY WAS 3/4 MI INCREASING TO 1 1/2 MI. OUR PRIMARY RWY CLOSED THAT EVENING FOR MAINT, THEREFORE WE HAD NO ARRS UNTIL AFTER THE PRIMARY RWY OPENED AT XA30Z. OUR PRIMARY RWY IS RWY 5/23. MY MAIN FUNCTIONS THAT EVENING WERE MONITORING/CTLING VEHICULAR TFC AND MAKING ATIS MESSAGES DUE TO THE WX. AFTER RWY 5/23 OPENED, I HAD 2 ARR ACFT PRIOR TO THE OCCURRENCE. WHEN RWY 5/23 RE-OPENED, WE WERE ON RWY 5. AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE, VISIBILITY WAS 3/4 MI INCREASING TO 1 1/2 MI. THE APCH END OF RWY 5 TO SHORTLY BEYOND WAS VISIBLE AND THE FIELD/RWY WAS OBSCURED ON THE DEP END. THE CEILING WAS RPTED 200 FT. THE ILS MONITORED FUNCTIONING, HOWEVER, THE DME AND LOM HAD DROPPED OFF-LINE TWICE AFTER RWY 5 OPENED. APCH LIGHTS WERE ON STEP 3, WITH SEQUENCE FLASHING LIGHTS ON, TXWY LIGHTS ON AND RWY 5 RVR GREATER THAN 6000 FT. AT APPROX XB50Z, I TURNED ON THE TWR OVERHEAD EXHAUST FAN TO HELP CLR THE AIR OF CIGARETTE ODOR. THE FAN ADDED A FAIR AMOUNT OF AMBIENT NOISE TO THE ROOM. AN AIR TFC AID ARRIVED AT APPROX XC40Z AND TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CLRNC DELIVERY POS. ARPT 6 CALLED GND CTL FOR CLRNC ON RWY 5 TO CHK THE WORK PERFORMED EARLIER THAT MORNING AND WAS CLRED ONTO THE RWY. I CALLED THE WX OFFICE TO INCREASE THE VISIBILITY TO 1 1/2 MI. THE MORNING SUPVR CALLED AND ASKED IF THE APCH LIGHTS WERE ON AND I REPLIED 'YES, WHO ASKED?' HE SAID 'THE GUY INBOUND LNDG, HE WAS SAYING THE APCH LIGHTS WERE NOT ON.' I REPLIED 'ON STEP 3, WITH FLASHERS.' I THEN PROCEEDED TO CHK EACH LIGHTING PANEL INDICATOR TO ENSURE THEY WERE ALL ON, SEVERAL OF WHICH ARE IN THE AREA OF THE LCL CTL POS. I ALSO CHKED THE POS OF ARPT 6 DURING THIS TIME. I WAS TURNED TOWARD THE CLRNC DELIVERY POS WHEN I HEARD ENG REVERSE THRUST CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF AN ARRIVING ACFT. I SPUN AROUND AND GRABBED FOR THE HAND SET KNOWING IMMEDIATELY WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND SAW ARPT 6 ON TXWY G AND A LARGE ACFT APCHING THE RWY 5/32 INTXN ON ROLLOUT. ARPT 6 CALLED GND CTL AND I INSTRUCTED HIM TO REMAIN ON THE TERMINAL SIDE OF THE FIELD. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, ACFT CALLED CLRING THE RWY. I INSTRUCTED HIM TO TAXI TO PARKING. I WAS RELIEVED BY THE MORNING CTLR AND RPTED THE SIT TO THE MORNING SUPVR. UPON REVIEW OF THE VOICE RECORDINGS, THERE WAS A XMISSION FROM ACFT TO THE TWR WHICH I THOUGHT WAS ARPT 6 AND ACKNOWLEDGED HIM. WHETHER THE MISCOM WAS DUE TO THE INCREASED NOISE LEVELS IN THE TWR DUE TO THE OVERHEAD FAN BEING ON, OR THE DISTRS CAUSED BY OPENING A POS OR A COMBINATION OF THESE WOULD BE A TOPIC OF DEBATE. ACFT NEVER RECEIVED A LNDG CLRNC, BUT LANDED NONETHELESS. ARPT 6 LATER RPTED HEARING MY 'ARPT 6 ROGER' CALL, BUT DID NOT REPLY THAT IT WAS NOT HE WHO XMITTED. SINCE I WAS ON HAND SET AND SPEAKER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT EVEN WITH THE SPEAKER VOLUME FULL, OCCASIONALLY CALLS ARE DIFFICULT TO HEAR SATISFACTORILY FROM OTHER THAN THE LCL CTL 1 POS. THESE ISSUES DID NOT CLUE ME TO SCAN MY BRITE DISPLAY. INSTEAD, I WENT ABOUT CHKING MY LIGHTING PANELS TO INSURE EVERYTHING MONITORED NORMALLY, VISUALLY CHKING THE FIELD TO SEE IF THE LIGHTS I COULD SEE WERE ON, AND DISCOUNTING THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN ACFT ON APCH COULD HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT. A CURSORY SCAN OF THE BRITE DISPLAY WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THE ENTIRE SIT. AFTER FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW OF CONSTANT DATA RECORDING DATA, THE ACFT'S XMISSION WAS MADE AFTER HE LANDED AND WAS ROLLING OUT. THE SOP DICTATES LCL CTL 1 IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING HIS POS WHICH INCLUDES THE BRITE RADAR DISPLAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.