B737-300 crew did not comply with an issued crossing restriction on the skebr 1 STAR into las.

Attributes
ACN	530938
Time
Date	200111
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	intersection : misen
State Reference	CA
Altitude	msl bound lower : 24000 msl bound upper : 29000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zla.artcc
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737-300
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	other
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	arrival star : skebr 1
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 4000
ASRS Report	530938
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine pilot : commercial
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 33 flight time total : 7000 flight time type : 3000
ASRS Report	530937
Events
Anomaly	altitude deviation : undershoot altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met non adherence : company policies non adherence : clearance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other
Independent Detector	atc equipment other atc equipment : radar other controllera
Resolutory Action	controller : issued alert none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Aircraft Company Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Approaching dagett on the pamona six departure out of ontario, we were given a clearance from FL290 to descend to FL250 to expect FL240 at misen intersection on the skebr one arrival into las vegas. The PNF read the clearance back correctly and the PF repeated the readback. Both pilots attended to some paperwork (logbook entries) from departure after the communication with ATC. After reviewing the skebr one arrival illustration and the FMC profile, both which read 'misen FL240 mim,' the PF understood at or above FL240 at misen, rather than the hard altitude assigned. As the PF began his descent, ATC questioned our profile and the misunderstanding became apparent. We were too high to make the restriction. Some contributing factors that lead to the error include the very short duration of the flight with both pilots attending to their logbooks rather than the descent profile. New RNAV procedures were in effect which were relatively new to the crew. In addition the daggett VOR was inoperative, so the familiar pattern of establishing situation awareness was unavailable. ATC made little differentiation between the illustrated profile and the altitude assigned. Lessons learned include: pay attention to the new arrivals into las, both flcs and ATC are new to the procedures. The standard cues for situation awareness are no longer displayed, pay attention. Don't get distracted on the short flts as a flight crew. ATC could make more of an effort to differentiate descent profiles, especially when procedures are new. Both crewmembers should better manage FMC and back each other up.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW DID NOT COMPLY WITH AN ISSUED CROSSING RESTRICTION ON THE SKEBR 1 STAR INTO LAS.

Narrative: APCHING DAGETT ON THE PAMONA SIX DEP OUT OF ONTARIO, WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC FROM FL290 TO DSND TO FL250 TO EXPECT FL240 AT MISEN INTXN ON THE SKEBR ONE ARRIVAL INTO LAS VEGAS. THE PNF READ THE CLRNC BACK CORRECTLY AND THE PF REPEATED THE READBACK. BOTH PLTS ATTENDED TO SOME PAPERWORK (LOGBOOK ENTRIES) FROM DEP AFTER THE COM WITH ATC. AFTER REVIEWING THE SKEBR ONE ARRIVAL ILLUSTRATION AND THE FMC PROFILE, BOTH WHICH READ 'MISEN FL240 MIM,' THE PF UNDERSTOOD AT OR ABOVE FL240 AT MISEN, RATHER THAN THE HARD ALT ASSIGNED. AS THE PF BEGAN HIS DSCNT, ATC QUESTIONED OUR PROFILE AND THE MISUNDERSTANDING BECAME APPARENT. WE WERE TOO HIGH TO MAKE THE RESTRICTION. SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT LEAD TO THE ERROR INCLUDE THE VERY SHORT DURATION OF THE FLT WITH BOTH PLTS ATTENDING TO THEIR LOGBOOKS RATHER THAN THE DSCNT PROFILE. NEW RNAV PROCS WERE IN EFFECT WHICH WERE RELATIVELY NEW TO THE CREW. IN ADDITION THE DAGGETT VOR WAS INOP, SO THE FAMILIAR PATTERN OF ESTABLISHING SIT AWARENESS WAS UNAVAILABLE. ATC MADE LITTLE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE ILLUSTRATED PROFILE AND THE ALT ASSIGNED. LESSONS LEARNED INCLUDE: PAY ATTENTION TO THE NEW ARRIVALS INTO LAS, BOTH FLCS AND ATC ARE NEW TO THE PROCS. THE STD CUES FOR SIT AWARENESS ARE NO LONGER DISPLAYED, PAY ATTENTION. DON'T GET DISTRACTED ON THE SHORT FLTS AS A FLC. ATC COULD MAKE MORE OF AN EFFORT TO DIFFERENTIATE DSCNT PROFILES, ESPECIALLY WHEN PROCS ARE NEW. BOTH CREWMEMBERS SHOULD BETTER MANAGE FMC AND BACK EACH OTHER UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.