Narrative:

While taxiing out to runway 3 at scottsdale airport from the hangar, ground control advised to taxi up and hold short runway 3 at taxiway B10. From this hold area visibility is restr due to construction. The aircraft was brought to a complete stop at the hold short lines. Both the co-captain and myself believed we heard ground control issue instructions to our aircraft to taxi for runway 3 and follow the single-engine cessna on the other side of the runway taxiing for runway 3. Co-captain (myself) read these taxi instructions back to ground control explicitly. The captain began to move the aircraft. We reached a point where 1/2 the aircraft was over the hold short line. This was approximately 15-20 ft. No part of the aircraft extended out onto the active runway. This was approximately 10 seconds after the taxi clearance was read back and the engines on this aircraft take 7 seconds to speed up enough to move the aircraft. It was at this point that ground control noticed our movement and told us to hold short. There was a single engine airplane on final that we were told to hold for. After this aircraft taxied off 3000 ft before our airplane, we were cleared to cross the runway and told to contact the tower. We feel this problem arose due to the fact that we gave a complete readback of the controller's instructions and if we had mistaken call signs the controller should have told us to hold short. This is a busy airport with lots of training and many times controllers are working more than 1 frequency. We contacted the supervisor by phone as requested and were told that a pilot deviation had occurred and the FAA had been notified. In the interest of safety we feel that the phone call we made was more than adequate for both parties to have discussed what occurred. No airplane at any time had to deviate from its flight path or execute a go around or was in a position of a traffic conflict. We feel that the action taken by the scottsdale tower is excessive, does not promote safety and only hampers the working relationship between all aircraft and ATC on this field.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LEAR 60 FLC STOPPED OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE AFTER MISTAKENLY RESPONDING TO ANOTHER ACFT'S TAXI CLRNC AND THE GND CTLR NOTICING THEM GETTING READY TO CROSS THE RWY WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING OUT TO RWY 3 AT SCOTTSDALE ARPT FROM THE HANGAR, GND CTL ADVISED TO TAXI UP AND HOLD SHORT RWY 3 AT TXWY B10. FROM THIS HOLD AREA VISIBILITY IS RESTR DUE TO CONSTRUCTION. THE ACFT WAS BROUGHT TO A COMPLETE STOP AT THE HOLD SHORT LINES. BOTH THE CO-CAPT AND MYSELF BELIEVED WE HEARD GND CTL ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR ACFT TO TAXI FOR RWY 3 AND FOLLOW THE SINGLE-ENG CESSNA ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RWY TAXIING FOR RWY 3. CO-CAPT (MYSELF) READ THESE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS BACK TO GND CTL EXPLICITLY. THE CAPT BEGAN TO MOVE THE ACFT. WE REACHED A POINT WHERE 1/2 THE ACFT WAS OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THIS WAS APPROX 15-20 FT. NO PART OF THE ACFT EXTENDED OUT ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY. THIS WAS APPROX 10 SECONDS AFTER THE TAXI CLRNC WAS READ BACK AND THE ENGS ON THIS ACFT TAKE 7 SECONDS TO SPD UP ENOUGH TO MOVE THE ACFT. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT GND CTL NOTICED OUR MOVEMENT AND TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT. THERE WAS A SINGLE ENG AIRPLANE ON FINAL THAT WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD FOR. AFTER THIS ACFT TAXIED OFF 3000 FT BEFORE OUR AIRPLANE, WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS THE RWY AND TOLD TO CONTACT THE TWR. WE FEEL THIS PROB AROSE DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE GAVE A COMPLETE READBACK OF THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS AND IF WE HAD MISTAKEN CALL SIGNS THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT. THIS IS A BUSY ARPT WITH LOTS OF TRAINING AND MANY TIMES CTLRS ARE WORKING MORE THAN 1 FREQ. WE CONTACTED THE SUPVR BY PHONE AS REQUESTED AND WERE TOLD THAT A PLTDEV HAD OCCURRED AND THE FAA HAD BEEN NOTIFIED. IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY WE FEEL THAT THE PHONE CALL WE MADE WAS MORE THAN ADEQUATE FOR BOTH PARTIES TO HAVE DISCUSSED WHAT OCCURRED. NO AIRPLANE AT ANY TIME HAD TO DEVIATE FROM ITS FLT PATH OR EXECUTE A GAR OR WAS IN A POS OF A TFC CONFLICT. WE FEEL THAT THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE SCOTTSDALE TWR IS EXCESSIVE, DOES NOT PROMOTE SAFETY AND ONLY HAMPERS THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BTWN ALL ACFT AND ATC ON THIS FIELD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.