Narrative:

The dca departure procedure stipulates interception of the oca 328 degree right. I built the radial and inserted it into the flight plan. The FMS was set to automatically intercept the radial. The first officer who was PF, as we took the runway for departure, set a heading into the flight control unit (FCU). The effect of this action was to cause the FMS to no longer attempt to automatically capture the VOR radial I built but rather to command a track equal to runway track until the pilot 'tells' the FMS to fly heading. I did not catch the fact a heading had mistakenly been set into the FCU. After lift-off, at the point where I knew from experience that the flight directors should be commanding a left turn, I looked at the FMS indications and noticed the flight directors were commanding a runway track not a turn. I told the first officer to turn now which he did. On raw data we went through the dca 328 degree right but not by enough to have flown into the prohibited area north of the airport. ATC said nothing. We reintegrated the 328 degree right in short order. I was angry with myself for not noticing a heading in the FCU when none should have been set. I asked the first officer why he set a heading. His answer surprised me: he said the last captain used raw data and heading select to depart dca. He thought that was 'how it's done.' all of our company information on dca specifies building a departure as I did, and briefing to the first officer as to the fact we would be using a 'managed departure,' as I did. Later, I realized I relied too heavily on my assuming he knew correct procedures and would follow same.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CREW, DEPARTING DCA, WERE SLOW TO MAKE LEFT TURN UP THE POTOMAC.

Narrative: THE DCA DEPARTURE PROCEDURE STIPULATES INTERCEPTION OF THE OCA 328 DEG R. I BUILT THE RADIAL AND INSERTED IT INTO THE FLIGHT PLAN. THE FMS WAS SET TO AUTOMATICALLY INTERCEPT THE RADIAL. THE FO WHO WAS PF, AS WE TOOK THE RUNWAY FOR DEPARTURE, SET A HDG INTO THE FLIGHT CONTROL UNIT (FCU). THE EFFECT OF THIS ACTION WAS TO CAUSE THE FMS TO NO LONGER ATTEMPT TO AUTOMATICALLY CAPTURE THE VOR RADIAL I BUILT BUT RATHER TO COMMAND A TRACK EQUAL TO RUNWAY TRACK UNTIL THE PILOT 'TELLS' THE FMS TO FLY HDG. I DID NOT CATCH THE FACT A HDG HAD MISTAKENLY BEEN SET INTO THE FCU. AFTER LIFT-OFF, AT THE POINT WHERE I KNEW FROM EXPERIENCE THAT THE FLIGHT DIRECTORS SHOULD BE COMMANDING A LEFT TURN, I LOOKED AT THE FMS INDICATIONS AND NOTICED THE FLIGHT DIRECTORS WERE COMMANDING A RUNWAY TRACK NOT A TURN. I TOLD THE FO TO TURN NOW WHICH HE DID. ON RAW DATA WE WENT THROUGH THE DCA 328 DEG R BUT NOT BY ENOUGH TO HAVE FLOWN INTO THE PROHIBITED AREA NORTH OF THE AIRPORT. ATC SAID NOTHING. WE REINTEGRATED THE 328 DEG R IN SHORT ORDER. I WAS ANGRY WITH MYSELF FOR NOT NOTICING A HDG IN THE FCU WHEN NONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET. I ASKED THE FO WHY HE SET A HDG. HIS ANSWER SURPRISED ME: HE SAID THE LAST CAPT USED RAW DATA AND HDG SELECT TO DEPART DCA. HE THOUGHT THAT WAS 'HOW IT'S DONE.' ALL OF OUR COMPANY INFO ON DCA SPECIFIES BUILDING A DEPARTURE AS I DID, AND BRIEFING TO THE FO AS TO THE FACT WE WOULD BE USING A 'MANAGED DEPARTURE,' AS I DID. LATER, I REALIZED I RELIED TOO HEAVILY ON MY ASSUMING HE KNEW CORRECT PROCEDURES AND WOULD FOLLOW SAME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.