Narrative:

As we approached the terminal area at dfw, we were instructed by dfw approach control to expect runway 18R -- the ILS, even though day, VMC prevailed. This is not uncommon as I have been into this airport numerous times. Dfw approach control cleared us to descend to 3000 ft MSL and reduce our speed to maintain 190 KIAS. We were also assigned a heading of 130 degrees. Then we were cleared to 2000 ft MSL, assigned a heading of 150 degrees and maintain 190 KIAS. A TA was issued: 'there is an MD80 landing on one of the south runways (runway 17R or runway 17C) located on the east side on the airport property of dfw.' we acknowledged we did have the MD80 in sight. Approach control told us to maintain visual separation from the MD80. No other instructions were issued. Our anticipation as a crew was to hear 'maintain visual with the aircraft intercept the localizer and cleared for the visual.' we did not get this. By now, we passed well through the runway 18R localizer course on the last assigned heading of 150 degrees. My crew member questioned approach if we could rejoin runway 18R localizer. Approach replied, 'affirmative, cleared for the visual approach runway 18R.' we never, I don't believe, advised him that we had the airport in sight. The airport was in sight to both of us. Approach control never issued any further instructions. We did not receive the clearance to switch to the tower frequency. And, we never did. We continued for runway 18R and landed without a landing clearance. This was not our intent. We then radioed tower, who switched us to ground control. We taxied to parking. I felt I should call the tower supervisor. I explained what had happened. He talked with the controller working runway 18R and the end result was that neither one had a problem with it, as there was no conflicting traffic. Air traffic volume was extremely light that morning. I am grateful the supervisor did not act unprofessionally or over aggressively. I assured him that this was not intentional. What 'might' have contributed to this event was a lack of assertiveness on approach control's part and maybe too much confidence in approach control on the crew's part.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA LANDS DFW WITHOUT CLRNC AND CHANGE TO TWR BY D10.

Narrative: AS WE APCHED THE TERMINAL AREA AT DFW, WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY DFW APCH CTL TO EXPECT RWY 18R -- THE ILS, EVEN THOUGH DAY, VMC PREVAILED. THIS IS NOT UNCOMMON AS I HAVE BEEN INTO THIS ARPT NUMEROUS TIMES. DFW APCH CTL CLRED US TO DSND TO 3000 FT MSL AND REDUCE OUR SPD TO MAINTAIN 190 KIAS. WE WERE ALSO ASSIGNED A HDG OF 130 DEGS. THEN WE WERE CLRED TO 2000 FT MSL, ASSIGNED A HDG OF 150 DEGS AND MAINTAIN 190 KIAS. A TA WAS ISSUED: 'THERE IS AN MD80 LNDG ON ONE OF THE S RWYS (RWY 17R OR RWY 17C) LOCATED ON THE E SIDE ON THE ARPT PROPERTY OF DFW.' WE ACKNOWLEDGED WE DID HAVE THE MD80 IN SIGHT. APCH CTL TOLD US TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM THE MD80. NO OTHER INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED. OUR ANTICIPATION AS A CREW WAS TO HEAR 'MAINTAIN VISUAL WITH THE ACFT INTERCEPT THE LOC AND CLRED FOR THE VISUAL.' WE DID NOT GET THIS. BY NOW, WE PASSED WELL THROUGH THE RWY 18R LOC COURSE ON THE LAST ASSIGNED HDG OF 150 DEGS. MY CREW MEMBER QUESTIONED APCH IF WE COULD REJOIN RWY 18R LOC. APCH REPLIED, 'AFFIRMATIVE, CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH RWY 18R.' WE NEVER, I DON'T BELIEVE, ADVISED HIM THAT WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. THE ARPT WAS IN SIGHT TO BOTH OF US. APCH CTL NEVER ISSUED ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. WE DID NOT RECEIVE THE CLRNC TO SWITCH TO THE TWR FREQ. AND, WE NEVER DID. WE CONTINUED FOR RWY 18R AND LANDED WITHOUT A LNDG CLRNC. THIS WAS NOT OUR INTENT. WE THEN RADIOED TWR, WHO SWITCHED US TO GND CTL. WE TAXIED TO PARKING. I FELT I SHOULD CALL THE TWR SUPVR. I EXPLAINED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE TALKED WITH THE CTLR WORKING RWY 18R AND THE END RESULT WAS THAT NEITHER ONE HAD A PROB WITH IT, AS THERE WAS NO CONFLICTING TFC. AIR TFC VOLUME WAS EXTREMELY LIGHT THAT MORNING. I AM GRATEFUL THE SUPVR DID NOT ACT UNPROFESSIONALLY OR OVER AGGRESSIVELY. I ASSURED HIM THAT THIS WAS NOT INTENTIONAL. WHAT 'MIGHT' HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT WAS A LACK OF ASSERTIVENESS ON APCH CTL'S PART AND MAYBE TOO MUCH CONFIDENCE IN APCH CTL ON THE CREW'S PART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.