Narrative:

Center cleared us direct drake at FL370. Approaching drake center cleared us to descend to FL330, cross 50 NM north of drake at FL290. We started our descent to FL330 and began programming the FMC to match our new clearance. Upon completing the FMC programming our descent profile showed us high. We immediately increased our descent rate, but not in time to make our crossing restrs. We informed center of the situation and asked if we had created any problems due to crossing the fix high. Center said there was no problem and switched us to the next controller. What caused this incident was lack of situation awareness. Once the clearance was received we should have looked at how far from drake we were and determined how much of a descent rate was needed to meet the crossing restr. Instead, we programmed the FMC and then looked to see where we were. Lesson learned here is fly the airplane not the FMC. The time spent pushing buttons was the difference between making the crossing restr and being high.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 PLT FAULTS HIMSELF FOR TAKING TIME TO PROGRAM THE FMC INSTEAD OF DSNDING IMMEDIATELY WHEN CLRED AS THE REASON FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH A CROSSING RESTR NEAR THE DRAKE VORTAC.

Narrative: CTR CLRED US DIRECT DRAKE AT FL370. APCHING DRAKE CTR CLRED US TO DSND TO FL330, CROSS 50 NM N OF DRAKE AT FL290. WE STARTED OUR DSCNT TO FL330 AND BEGAN PROGRAMMING THE FMC TO MATCH OUR NEW CLRNC. UPON COMPLETING THE FMC PROGRAMMING OUR DSCNT PROFILE SHOWED US HIGH. WE IMMEDIATELY INCREASED OUR DSCNT RATE, BUT NOT IN TIME TO MAKE OUR CROSSING RESTRS. WE INFORMED CTR OF THE SIT AND ASKED IF WE HAD CREATED ANY PROBS DUE TO CROSSING THE FIX HIGH. CTR SAID THERE WAS NO PROB AND SWITCHED US TO THE NEXT CTLR. WHAT CAUSED THIS INCIDENT WAS LACK OF SIT AWARENESS. ONCE THE CLRNC WAS RECEIVED WE SHOULD HAVE LOOKED AT HOW FAR FROM DRAKE WE WERE AND DETERMINED HOW MUCH OF A DSCNT RATE WAS NEEDED TO MEET THE CROSSING RESTR. INSTEAD, WE PROGRAMMED THE FMC AND THEN LOOKED TO SEE WHERE WE WERE. LESSON LEARNED HERE IS FLY THE AIRPLANE NOT THE FMC. THE TIME SPENT PUSHING BUTTONS WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAKING THE CROSSING RESTR AND BEING HIGH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.