Narrative:

Landed. Operations advised a 15 min wait for our gate. Started APU, shut down left engine. 10 mins into our wait, the 'forward water system freeze protection' circuit breaker popped (ground service buss). 2 mins later, a flight attendant called saying there was smoke in the cabin. 15 seconds later, a different flight attendant called saying the cabin was filling with smoke. The captain decided an evacuate/evacuation was prudent. Advised ground to call crash fire rescue equipment and we were evacing. Ran evacuate/evacuation checklist. Captain made a PA for passenger to calmly exit through the forward cabin airstair door. The attendants had trouble locking the stairs. Firefighters held the stairs firmly while we evacuate/evacuationed. An elderly woman seated in the front row needed assistance and 'blocked' the remainder of passenger from quickly exiting. The evacuate/evacuation took approximately 5 mins due to those 2 items. Also, several passenger wanted to take their personal belongings with them. No one was injured and the aircraft was towed to the gate without further incident. Lessons learned: 1) running the MD80 evacuate/evacuation checklist interrupted power from the flight attendant's interior panel, not allowing the stairs to fully extend, therefore, not allowing them to lock. You must proceed outside the aircraft and FLIP the external power switch for the stairs. 2) passenger, when they perceive the threat not to be real, will not listen to crew member's requests even when shouted via a megaphone. No idea of what to do here. 3) plan on people needing assistance to have assistance readily available. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the smoke was from an overheating heater in the forward galley. The circuit breaker protecting the system did pop as designed and smoke dissipated as soon as the door was opened to exit the airplane. Escape slides were not used. The evacuate/evacuation checklist was run, but in reviewing the incident, the crew determined it would have been better to have run the normal shutdown checklist. This would have left power available to operate the exit stairway solving some of the exit problems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMOKE IN CABIN AFTER LNDG RESULTS IN A RATHER CONFUSED EVAC OF AN MD81. SMOKE RPTED AS MINOR AND PROTECTING CIRCUIT BREAKER PERFORMED AS DESIGNED.

Narrative: LANDED. OPS ADVISED A 15 MIN WAIT FOR OUR GATE. STARTED APU, SHUT DOWN L ENG. 10 MINS INTO OUR WAIT, THE 'FORWARD WATER SYS FREEZE PROTECTION' CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED (GND SVC BUSS). 2 MINS LATER, A FLT ATTENDANT CALLED SAYING THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE CABIN. 15 SECONDS LATER, A DIFFERENT FLT ATTENDANT CALLED SAYING THE CABIN WAS FILLING WITH SMOKE. THE CAPT DECIDED AN EVAC WAS PRUDENT. ADVISED GND TO CALL CFR AND WE WERE EVACING. RAN EVAC CHKLIST. CAPT MADE A PA FOR PAX TO CALMLY EXIT THROUGH THE FORWARD CABIN AIRSTAIR DOOR. THE ATTENDANTS HAD TROUBLE LOCKING THE STAIRS. FIREFIGHTERS HELD THE STAIRS FIRMLY WHILE WE EVACED. AN ELDERLY WOMAN SEATED IN THE FRONT ROW NEEDED ASSISTANCE AND 'BLOCKED' THE REMAINDER OF PAX FROM QUICKLY EXITING. THE EVAC TOOK APPROX 5 MINS DUE TO THOSE 2 ITEMS. ALSO, SEVERAL PAX WANTED TO TAKE THEIR PERSONAL BELONGINGS WITH THEM. NO ONE WAS INJURED AND THE ACFT WAS TOWED TO THE GATE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. LESSONS LEARNED: 1) RUNNING THE MD80 EVAC CHKLIST INTERRUPTED PWR FROM THE FLT ATTENDANT'S INTERIOR PANEL, NOT ALLOWING THE STAIRS TO FULLY EXTEND, THEREFORE, NOT ALLOWING THEM TO LOCK. YOU MUST PROCEED OUTSIDE THE ACFT AND FLIP THE EXTERNAL PWR SWITCH FOR THE STAIRS. 2) PAX, WHEN THEY PERCEIVE THE THREAT NOT TO BE REAL, WILL NOT LISTEN TO CREW MEMBER'S REQUESTS EVEN WHEN SHOUTED VIA A MEGAPHONE. NO IDEA OF WHAT TO DO HERE. 3) PLAN ON PEOPLE NEEDING ASSISTANCE TO HAVE ASSISTANCE READILY AVAILABLE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE SMOKE WAS FROM AN OVERHEATING HEATER IN THE FORWARD GALLEY. THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PROTECTING THE SYS DID POP AS DESIGNED AND SMOKE DISSIPATED AS SOON AS THE DOOR WAS OPENED TO EXIT THE AIRPLANE. ESCAPE SLIDES WERE NOT USED. THE EVAC CHKLIST WAS RUN, BUT IN REVIEWING THE INCIDENT, THE CREW DETERMINED IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO HAVE RUN THE NORMAL SHUTDOWN CHKLIST. THIS WOULD HAVE LEFT PWR AVAILABLE TO OPERATE THE EXIT STAIRWAY SOLVING SOME OF THE EXIT PROBS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.