Narrative:

Kbuf to kewr. During climb out, the electric horizontal stabilizer became inoperative. Manual trimming was attempted but the stabilizer would not move. A crosscheck for tripped circuit breaker's was made and all appeared to be in, including the 'stabilizer trim' circuit breaker. The QRH 'jammed stabilizer' checklist was utilized. The aircraft was controllable but with notable forward yoke pressure. Any emergency was declared, an air return back to kbuf. The landing was uneventful with a return to the gate. Main inspected the aircraft and found the 'trim actuator' circuit breaker tripped. Main said the circuit breaker might have tripped due to the H.south. Trim motor binding or overheating. Human performance: the air carrier afm to abnormal procedures describes checking for tripped circuit breaker's prior to initiating any QRH checklist. My perception of seeing the stabilizer trim circuit breaker in and not seeing the trim actuator circuit breaker tripped (which is on a different panel) had me believe electrical power was available to the motor. The QRH would have been a lot more helpful if it stated that two different circuit breaker's control power to one sy (electric trim). I recommend an update to the QRH, referencing more circuit breaker locations that control the electrical power to system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-500 CREW HAD JAMMED STAB IN BUF CLASS E.

Narrative: KBUF TO KEWR. DURING CLBOUT, THE ELECTRIC HORIZONTAL STABILIZER BECAME INOPERATIVE. MANUAL TRIMMING WAS ATTEMPTED BUT THE STABILIZER WOULD NOT MOVE. A CROSSCHECK FOR TRIPPED CB'S WAS MADE AND ALL APPEARED TO BE IN, INCLUDING THE 'STABILIZER TRIM' CB. THE QRH 'JAMMED STABILIZER' CHECKLIST WAS UTILIZED. THE ACFT WAS CONTROLLABLE BUT WITH NOTABLE FORWARD YOKE PRESSURE. ANY EMER WAS DECLARED, AN AIR RETURN BACK TO KBUF. THE LANDING WAS UNEVENTFUL WITH A RETURN TO THE GATE. MAIN INSPECTED THE ACFT AND FOUND THE 'TRIM ACTUATOR' CB TRIPPED. MAIN SAID THE CB MIGHT HAVE TRIPPED DUE TO THE H.S. TRIM MOTOR BINDING OR OVERHEATING. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: THE ACR AFM TO ABNORMAL PROCEDURES DESCRIBES CHECKING FOR TRIPPED CB'S PRIOR TO INITIATING ANY QRH CHECKLIST. MY PERCEPTION OF SEEING THE STABILIZER TRIM CB IN AND NOT SEEING THE TRIM ACTUATOR CB TRIPPED (WHICH IS ON A DIFFERENT PANEL) HAD ME BELIEVE ELECTRICAL PWR WAS AVAILABLE TO THE MOTOR. THE QRH WOULD HAVE BEEN A LOT MORE HELPFUL IF IT STATED THAT TWO DIFFERENT CB'S CONTROL PWR TO ONE SY (ELECTRIC TRIM). I RECOMMEND AN UPDATE TO THE QRH, REFERENCING MORE CB LOCATIONS THAT CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL PWR TO SYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.