Narrative:

We were cleared into position on runway 8R to hold while inbound aircraft were crossed at midfield. When the crossing traffic appeared to have exited (and disappeared into an ocean of runway and taxiway lights), we were cleared for takeoff. After setting power and accelerating towards takeoff speed, we heard a blind transmission indicating that an air carrier Y crj was still within the runway boundaries. At about the same time, the illuminated air carrier Y logo emerged from the background lights, and appeared to be barely clear of the right runway edge. He had been blocked by a B767 who had also just crossed runway 8R. After a quick assessment of the options available to us 1) a risky abort, 2) a rotation before V1, or 3) a side-step to the left, we elected to maneuver to the center of the left half of the runway. By moving left we created an additional 37 ft of space (about 12 ft inside the runway edge). This allowed us to pass behind the crj's tail, which was just outside the runway boundary. After safely passing the other aircraft -- and at approximately V2 -- we rotated and lifted off normally, and continued our flight. It appears everyone involved had a proper clearance. The conflict arose when an aircraft ahead of the crj stopped to contact ground control for taxi guidance. This situation could be avoided in the future if the local controller would confirm visually (or by radio call from all crossing traffic) that the runway is, in fact, clear before issuing a takeoff clearance. If the situational awareness in the B767 cockpit had been a little better they could have continued ahead far enough to have permitted the smaller jet to have completely vacated the runway. Supplemental information from acn 524495: airport was in east operation, aircraft were landing on runway 8L and departing on runway 8R. After landing on runway 8L, aircraft were told to hold short of runway 8R and remain on tower frequency. We were given position and hold on runway 8R and at least two aircraft were cleared to cross runway 8R down field and told to switch to ground. Subsequently we were cleared for takeoff. During our takeoff roll another aircrew called 'air carrier X, you have an rj still on the runway.' the captain could see the tail of the rj, that had been cleared to cross 8R still extending on 8R. The rj had stopped because the aircraft it was following (a B757 I think) had stopped (reason unknown). When the call was made: 1) we (the captain) moved to the left of centerline about 35-40 ft (middle of left half of runway). 2) the rj moved as far forward as possible behind the other aircraft. It was very close to that aircraft. When we passed behind the rj, its tail was just off the runway. We felt the jet blast from the rj's engines. The two aircraft were crossing runway 8R at taxiway 'C' or 'D'. Subsequent takeoff and departure were normal, cause: 1) tower controller crossing multiple aircraft and assuming they will move into ground controller space with no hold ups. Essentially working at maximum capacity with no margin. 2) because it was nighttime, and we were approximately 5000 ft away from the crossing aircraft, we could not see the conflict. By the time we were aware of the problem we were above 100 KTS (V1 was 138) and too close to the crossing aircraft to stop before their location. Prevention: not issuing takeoff clearance until runway is actually clear. Note: aircraft are frequently cleared to land and take off as other aircraft are in the process of clearing the runway. Controllers are counting on the previous aircraft to move along, and they do 99.9 percent of the time, but occasionally things don't work correctly. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the crew was a standard 2 pilot crew. A relief pilot was available and occupying the jump seat for the takeoff. Both crossing aircraft received the usual clearance to cross and contact ground, however the second aircraft was probably the only one of the two who was aware of the subsequent takeoff clearance. This could account for the fact that he pulled up so close behind the B767 which he would not normally do because of the jet blast. It was observed that the regional jet was just barely clear of the runway edge markings. The dimensions of the B777 are 199 ft 11 inches in wingspan. The landing gear are 36 ft apart. With this in mind the decision to move to the left to line up on the center of the left half of the runway was made to assure that the left landing gear would not get involved with edge lights on that side. V1 speed is called by the aircraft computer. Rotation was begun just slightly after the computed vr speed and very near the V2 speed. There was no comment from the tower at the time of the incident. The reporter feels that he was put in a position that was hazardous to his passengers, as well as the passengers on the regional jet, as well as up to 200 more on the first crossing aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING NIGHT OP AT THE HARTSFIELD ATLANTA INTL ARPT, AN ACR IS CLRED FOR TKOF WHEN DOWN FIELD XING TFC HAVE NOT YET, AND ARE UNABLE, TO CLR THE RWY. AVOIDANCE ACTION IS TAKEN. THE ESTIMATED MISS DISTANCE IS 8 TO 12 FT.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED INTO POS ON RWY 8R TO HOLD WHILE INBOUND ACFT WERE CROSSED AT MIDFIELD. WHEN THE XING TFC APPEARED TO HAVE EXITED (AND DISAPPEARED INTO AN OCEAN OF RWY AND TXWY LIGHTS), WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. AFTER SETTING POWER AND ACCELERATING TOWARDS TKOF SPEED, WE HEARD A BLIND XMISSION INDICATING THAT AN ACR Y CRJ WAS STILL WITHIN THE RWY BOUNDARIES. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, THE ILLUMINATED ACR Y LOGO EMERGED FROM THE BACKGROUND LIGHTS, AND APPEARED TO BE BARELY CLEAR OF THE RIGHT RWY EDGE. HE HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY A B767 WHO HAD ALSO JUST CROSSED RWY 8R. AFTER A QUICK ASSESSMENT OF THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO US 1) A RISKY ABORT, 2) A ROTATION BEFORE V1, OR 3) A SIDE-STEP TO THE L, WE ELECTED TO MANEUVER TO THE CENTER OF THE LEFT HALF OF THE RWY. BY MOVING L WE CREATED AN ADDITIONAL 37 FT OF SPACE (ABOUT 12 FT INSIDE THE RWY EDGE). THIS ALLOWED US TO PASS BEHIND THE CRJ'S TAIL, WHICH WAS JUST OUTSIDE THE RWY BOUNDARY. AFTER SAFELY PASSING THE OTHER ACFT -- AND AT APPROX V2 -- WE ROTATED AND LIFTED OFF NORMALLY, AND CONTINUED OUR FLT. IT APPEARS EVERYONE INVOLVED HAD A PROPER CLRNC. THE CONFLICT AROSE WHEN AN ACFT AHEAD OF THE CRJ STOPPED TO CONTACT GND CTL FOR TAXI GUIDANCE. THIS SIT COULD BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE IF THE LOCAL CTLR WOULD CONFIRM VISUALLY (OR BY RADIO CALL FROM ALL XING TFC) THAT THE RWY IS, IN FACT, CLR BEFORE ISSUING A TKOF CLRNC. IF THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN THE B767 COCKPIT HAD BEEN A LITTLE BETTER THEY COULD HAVE CONTINUED AHEAD FAR ENOUGH TO HAVE PERMITTED THE SMALLER JET TO HAVE COMPLETELY VACATED THE RWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 524495: ARPT WAS IN E OP, ACFT WERE LNDG ON RWY 8L AND DEPARTING ON RWY 8R. AFTER LNDG ON RWY 8L, ACFT WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 8R AND REMAIN ON TWR FREQ. WE WERE GIVEN POS AND HOLD ON RWY 8R AND AT LEAST TWO ACFT WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 8R DOWN FIELD AND TOLD TO SWITCH TO GND. SUBSEQUENTLY WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. DURING OUR TKOF ROLL ANOTHER AIRCREW CALLED 'ACR X, YOU HAVE AN RJ STILL ON THE RWY.' THE CAPT COULD SEE THE TAIL OF THE RJ, THAT HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS 8R STILL EXTENDING ON 8R. THE RJ HAD STOPPED BECAUSE THE ACFT IT WAS FOLLOWING (A B757 I THINK) HAD STOPPED (REASON UNKNOWN). WHEN THE CALL WAS MADE: 1) WE (THE CAPT) MOVED TO THE L OF CENTERLINE ABOUT 35-40 FT (MIDDLE OF LEFT HALF OF RWY). 2) THE RJ MOVED AS FAR FORWARD AS POSSIBLE BEHIND THE OTHER ACFT. IT WAS VERY CLOSE TO THAT ACFT. WHEN WE PASSED BEHIND THE RJ, ITS TAIL WAS JUST OFF THE RWY. WE FELT THE JET BLAST FROM THE RJ'S ENGS. THE TWO ACFT WERE XING RWY 8R AT TXWY 'C' OR 'D'. SUBSEQUENT TKOF AND DEPARTURE WERE NORMAL, CAUSE: 1) TWR CTLR XING MULTIPLE ACFT AND ASSUMING THEY WILL MOVE INTO GND CTLR SPACE WITH NO HOLD UPS. ESSENTIALLY WORKING AT MAX CAPACITY WITH NO MARGIN. 2) BECAUSE IT WAS NIGHTTIME, AND WE WERE APPROX 5000 FT AWAY FROM THE XING ACFT, WE COULD NOT SEE THE CONFLICT. BY THE TIME WE WERE AWARE OF THE PROB WE WERE ABOVE 100 KTS (V1 WAS 138) AND TOO CLOSE TO THE XING ACFT TO STOP BEFORE THEIR LOCATION. PREVENTION: NOT ISSUING TKOF CLRNC UNTIL RWY IS ACTUALLY CLEAR. NOTE: ACFT ARE FREQUENTLY CLRED TO LAND AND TAKE OFF AS OTHER ACFT ARE IN THE PROCESS OF CLRING THE RWY. CTLRS ARE COUNTING ON THE PREVIOUS ACFT TO MOVE ALONG, AND THEY DO 99.9 PERCENT OF THE TIME, BUT OCCASIONALLY THINGS DON'T WORK CORRECTLY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CREW WAS A STANDARD 2 PLT CREW. A RELIEF PLT WAS AVAILABLE AND OCCUPYING THE JUMP SEAT FOR THE TKOF. BOTH XING ACFT RECEIVED THE USUAL CLRNC TO CROSS AND CONTACT GND, HOWEVER THE SECOND ACFT WAS PROBABLY THE ONLY ONE OF THE TWO WHO WAS AWARE OF THE SUBSEQUENT TKOF CLRNC. THIS COULD ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT HE PULLED UP SO CLOSE BEHIND THE B767 WHICH HE WOULD NOT NORMALLY DO BECAUSE OF THE JET BLAST. IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THE REGIONAL JET WAS JUST BARELY CLR OF THE RWY EDGE MARKINGS. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE B777 ARE 199 FT 11 INCHES IN WINGSPAN. THE LNDG GEAR ARE 36 FT APART. WITH THIS IN MIND THE DECISION TO MOVE TO THE LEFT TO LINE UP ON THE CENTER OF THE LEFT HALF OF THE RWY WAS MADE TO ASSURE THAT THE LEFT LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT GET INVOLVED WITH EDGE LIGHTS ON THAT SIDE. V1 SPEED IS CALLED BY THE ACFT COMPUTER. ROTATION WAS BEGUN JUST SLIGHTLY AFTER THE COMPUTED VR SPEED AND VERY NEAR THE V2 SPEED. THERE WAS NO COMMENT FROM THE TWR AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. THE RPTR FEELS THAT HE WAS PUT IN A POSITION THAT WAS HAZARDOUS TO HIS PASSENGERS, AS WELL AS THE PASSENGERS ON THE REGIONAL JET, AS WELL AS UP TO 200 MORE ON THE FIRST XING ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.