Narrative:

Before returning on our final scheduled flight to our home base in reading, PA, dispatch advised my first officer and I that we would be swapping aircraft with another crew. After asking why, I was told that the aircraft which we were supposed to accept had a slight fuel seep from the right main tank. Since rdg is a maintenance base for our company, dispatch wanted to rerte the aircraft to rdg that night in case the seepage worsened. Although the aircraft was airworthy (in the opinion of our maintenance control facility), no mechanic had inspected the leak. I was slightly perturbed by this last min aircraft swap that would cause our flight to depart late with a possible maintenance issue to be resolved. Before accepting the aircraft, my first officer and I inspected the seepage. We could see beads of fuel forming under the wing, but there was no continuous flow. I discussed this further with maintenance. We could see beads of fuel forming under the wing, but there was no continuous flow. I discussed this further with maintenance control and we again decided that the aircraft was airworthy. To document this discussion, however, I filled out an aircraft condition record. Our company uses aircraft condition records to document anomalies that are not airworthiness items, but require attention nonetheless. We then departed for rdg. After landing at rdg, we contacted maintenance to inspect the seepage. The a&P immediately grounded the aircraft, citing the location and amount of leakage. The leakage had grown significantly during flight. Although on paper the aircraft was airworthy at all times, flying this aircraft on a part 121 operation was a dubious decision. The proper action would have been to contact a mechanic in phl and have him inspect the problem there. Maintenance in ZZZ is notorious for being slow getting to the aircraft and fixing any potential problems. Knowing this, plus factors such as the flight being already delayed, the desire to get back to our home base, anger at the other crew who improperly left us with this maintenance issue, and pressure from dispatch to fly caused me to not take the most prudent route.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE1900 PIC ACCEPTS AN ACFT THAT WAS SEEPING FUEL FROM THE WING AND THAT MAY HAVE EXCEEDED THE AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS AS SET BY FARS AND AIRLINE MAINT POLICY PROCS AT PHL, PA.

Narrative: BEFORE RETURNING ON OUR FINAL SCHEDULED FLT TO OUR HOME BASE IN READING, PA, DISPATCH ADVISED MY FO AND I THAT WE WOULD BE SWAPPING ACFT WITH ANOTHER CREW. AFTER ASKING WHY, I WAS TOLD THAT THE ACFT WHICH WE WERE SUPPOSED TO ACCEPT HAD A SLIGHT FUEL SEEP FROM THE R MAIN TANK. SINCE RDG IS A MAINT BASE FOR OUR COMPANY, DISPATCH WANTED TO RERTE THE ACFT TO RDG THAT NIGHT IN CASE THE SEEPAGE WORSENED. ALTHOUGH THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY (IN THE OPINION OF OUR MAINT CTL FACILITY), NO MECH HAD INSPECTED THE LEAK. I WAS SLIGHTLY PERTURBED BY THIS LAST MIN ACFT SWAP THAT WOULD CAUSE OUR FLT TO DEPART LATE WITH A POSSIBLE MAINT ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED. BEFORE ACCEPTING THE ACFT, MY FO AND I INSPECTED THE SEEPAGE. WE COULD SEE BEADS OF FUEL FORMING UNDER THE WING, BUT THERE WAS NO CONTINUOUS FLOW. I DISCUSSED THIS FURTHER WITH MAINT. WE COULD SEE BEADS OF FUEL FORMING UNDER THE WING, BUT THERE WAS NO CONTINUOUS FLOW. I DISCUSSED THIS FURTHER WITH MAINT CTL AND WE AGAIN DECIDED THAT THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY. TO DOCUMENT THIS DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, I FILLED OUT AN ACFT CONDITION RECORD. OUR COMPANY USES ACFT CONDITION RECORDS TO DOCUMENT ANOMALIES THAT ARE NOT AIRWORTHINESS ITEMS, BUT REQUIRE ATTN NONETHELESS. WE THEN DEPARTED FOR RDG. AFTER LNDG AT RDG, WE CONTACTED MAINT TO INSPECT THE SEEPAGE. THE A&P IMMEDIATELY GNDED THE ACFT, CITING THE LOCATION AND AMOUNT OF LEAKAGE. THE LEAKAGE HAD GROWN SIGNIFICANTLY DURING FLT. ALTHOUGH ON PAPER THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY AT ALL TIMES, FLYING THIS ACFT ON A PART 121 OP WAS A DUBIOUS DECISION. THE PROPER ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO CONTACT A MECH IN PHL AND HAVE HIM INSPECT THE PROB THERE. MAINT IN ZZZ IS NOTORIOUS FOR BEING SLOW GETTING TO THE ACFT AND FIXING ANY POTENTIAL PROBS. KNOWING THIS, PLUS FACTORS SUCH AS THE FLT BEING ALREADY DELAYED, THE DESIRE TO GET BACK TO OUR HOME BASE, ANGER AT THE OTHER CREW WHO IMPROPERLY LEFT US WITH THIS MAINT ISSUE, AND PRESSURE FROM DISPATCH TO FLY CAUSED ME TO NOT TAKE THE MOST PRUDENT RTE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.