Narrative:

I was planning to depart mry for a return flight to sac, in a cessna 172. I observed ATIS information and contacted clearance delivery/ground on 121.9, the frequency advised by ATIS. After hearing a report of a mild earthquake, I contacted mry ground for taxi clearance with VFR flight following services to sac via oak. Controller replied with a general request to all traffic to reply only when spoken to by that controller. He also stated that he was listening to many frequencys and that it was difficult to respond to everybody at once. After a few mins, I reattempted my request for taxi with radar services and received a partial clearance consisting of 'taxi to runway 10R and squawk XXXX.' controller added that we should expect further information. After completing pre-takeoff checks, I contacted tower frequency to announce that I was ready to depart runway 10R. The same controller advised me to hold short for a DC9 landing on runway 28L. After the DC9 had cleared the runway, the controller cleared me for takeoff on runway 10R. Assuming normal departure procedures and on course towards the gilro intersection, a few mins had passed since my departure and I had yet to switch to departure frequency. Consequently, I queried about changing to a departure frequency, only to be replied with an aggravated response. Mins later, the controller xferred me to his departure frequency. Proceeding towards gilro and climbing to 5500 ft MSL, I overheard at least 6 aircraft on field or in the pattern, with possibly more within mry tower/TRACON's airspace. Apparent confusion and aggravation developed on the part of the controller as inbound traffic were holding in anticipation of landing clrncs. Efforts to direct the traffic and/or confusion upon the controller and/or pilots' part caused the sole controller to speak to traffic with an aggravated and discourteous tone. The controller spoke with a disrespectful and unprofessional tone, disregarding communications procedures and etiquette as described in the aim (aim 4-2-1). Upon hearing this, I requested the initials of the controller and for him to 'mark the tapes.' the controller idented himself. Personally, I felt insulted to be spoken to in the manner he spoke to myself and towards the other traffic within his airspace. I do believe that the aforementioned incidents were partially due to a workload beyond the abilities of the controller. It seemed as though he was the only controller on duty, as he was controling all of mry's airspace and all of mry's frequencys. Under the circumstances that evening, I feel that if any emergency had arisen, the controller would not have been able to deal with the situation in an expeditious and safe manner. I followed up this incident with a call to mry tower, 2 days later. I spoke to the supervisor and advised him of the prior incident. He informed me that this incident would be reviewed further.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT DEPARTING MRY, OBJECTS TO MRY CTLR'S DEMEANOR AND CONDUCT WITH ALL OTHER ACFT ON FREQ.

Narrative: I WAS PLANNING TO DEPART MRY FOR A RETURN FLT TO SAC, IN A CESSNA 172. I OBSERVED ATIS INFO AND CONTACTED CLRNC DELIVERY/GND ON 121.9, THE FREQ ADVISED BY ATIS. AFTER HEARING A RPT OF A MILD EARTHQUAKE, I CONTACTED MRY GND FOR TAXI CLRNC WITH VFR FLT FOLLOWING SVCS TO SAC VIA OAK. CTLR REPLIED WITH A GENERAL REQUEST TO ALL TFC TO REPLY ONLY WHEN SPOKEN TO BY THAT CTLR. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE WAS LISTENING TO MANY FREQS AND THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO RESPOND TO EVERYBODY AT ONCE. AFTER A FEW MINS, I REATTEMPTED MY REQUEST FOR TAXI WITH RADAR SVCS AND RECEIVED A PARTIAL CLRNC CONSISTING OF 'TAXI TO RWY 10R AND SQUAWK XXXX.' CTLR ADDED THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT FURTHER INFO. AFTER COMPLETING PRE-TKOF CHKS, I CONTACTED TWR FREQ TO ANNOUNCE THAT I WAS READY TO DEPART RWY 10R. THE SAME CTLR ADVISED ME TO HOLD SHORT FOR A DC9 LNDG ON RWY 28L. AFTER THE DC9 HAD CLRED THE RWY, THE CTLR CLRED ME FOR TKOF ON RWY 10R. ASSUMING NORMAL DEP PROCS AND ON COURSE TOWARDS THE GILRO INTXN, A FEW MINS HAD PASSED SINCE MY DEP AND I HAD YET TO SWITCH TO DEP FREQ. CONSEQUENTLY, I QUERIED ABOUT CHANGING TO A DEP FREQ, ONLY TO BE REPLIED WITH AN AGGRAVATED RESPONSE. MINS LATER, THE CTLR XFERRED ME TO HIS DEP FREQ. PROCEEDING TOWARDS GILRO AND CLBING TO 5500 FT MSL, I OVERHEARD AT LEAST 6 ACFT ON FIELD OR IN THE PATTERN, WITH POSSIBLY MORE WITHIN MRY TWR/TRACON'S AIRSPACE. APPARENT CONFUSION AND AGGRAVATION DEVELOPED ON THE PART OF THE CTLR AS INBOUND TFC WERE HOLDING IN ANTICIPATION OF LNDG CLRNCS. EFFORTS TO DIRECT THE TFC AND/OR CONFUSION UPON THE CTLR AND/OR PLTS' PART CAUSED THE SOLE CTLR TO SPEAK TO TFC WITH AN AGGRAVATED AND DISCOURTEOUS TONE. THE CTLR SPOKE WITH A DISRESPECTFUL AND UNPROFESSIONAL TONE, DISREGARDING COMS PROCS AND ETIQUETTE AS DESCRIBED IN THE AIM (AIM 4-2-1). UPON HEARING THIS, I REQUESTED THE INITIALS OF THE CTLR AND FOR HIM TO 'MARK THE TAPES.' THE CTLR IDENTED HIMSELF. PERSONALLY, I FELT INSULTED TO BE SPOKEN TO IN THE MANNER HE SPOKE TO MYSELF AND TOWARDS THE OTHER TFC WITHIN HIS AIRSPACE. I DO BELIEVE THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED INCIDENTS WERE PARTIALLY DUE TO A WORKLOAD BEYOND THE ABILITIES OF THE CTLR. IT SEEMED AS THOUGH HE WAS THE ONLY CTLR ON DUTY, AS HE WAS CTLING ALL OF MRY'S AIRSPACE AND ALL OF MRY'S FREQS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EVENING, I FEEL THAT IF ANY EMER HAD ARISEN, THE CTLR WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE SIT IN AN EXPEDITIOUS AND SAFE MANNER. I FOLLOWED UP THIS INCIDENT WITH A CALL TO MRY TWR, 2 DAYS LATER. I SPOKE TO THE SUPVR AND ADVISED HIM OF THE PRIOR INCIDENT. HE INFORMED ME THAT THIS INCIDENT WOULD BE REVIEWED FURTHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.