Narrative:

This was a flight from iah to shv. It was an uneventful flight from startup until we reached 13000 ft. At that time the dc generator #2 faulted. I, the captain, who was hand-flying at the time called for the dc generator fault checklist. My first officer complied with the checklist and I then instructed him to tell ZHU that we were returning to iah. During this time the dc bus tie contactor did not close therefore dc bus #2 was not powered. I want to point out that this is where I should have recognized that I have 2 checklists to complete. Why didn't I recognize this? First, I was hand-flying still because the autoplt needs dc bus #2. Second, we had one initial item to correct and it was done. Basically, I was mentally busy and it did not register that I should call for the dc bus #2 off checklist. I will also add that in training we should be teaching pilots to ask this question. 'Checklist complete. Is there anything else lost/offline? Run the checklist for that item.' during training we tend to have one problem at a time and then we move along to the next event. Never developing the thought process needed when you have more than one problem. This is when your training 'kicks in' and that is what your mind will give you to work with as a template to solve problems. During the descent I selected 'continuous relight' and at that time the airplane generated multiple cautions, chimes, and the sound of relays switching back and forth. Not normal. I then deselected the relight switch. All cautions, chimes, and switching stopped. I asked myself, could this be related? Maybe, but it is an aircraft and things like this are not uncommon. During the landing phase, I called for gear down and the first officer informed me that the gear had not started to drop down. I need to point out that had I been in the mode of thinking discussed previously and completed the dc bus #2 off checklist the gear would have dropped because that checklist calls for the hydraulic xfeed to be selected on. The hydraulic system for the gear is controled by dc bus #2. I need to add that the AC wild generators that power the hydraulic pumps were both on line. The green system lo psi local alert was illuminated. At this time my gut feeling was to land the airplane. I called for the manual gear extension, all 3 green indications illuminated, and confirmed with the tower. I elected not to go around just to run the checklist for the gear. The landing checklist calls for 'continuous relight' and it was selected on again. The same cautions, chimes and relay switching happened again, but just for a split second and stopped. I elected to keep it turned on. Please keep in mind that the ATR is full of relays that do not always do what they should. This, I know now, can and will create complacency. Now we are on short final. Gears down, flaps down, landing checklist completed. We land. No normal braking because the green hydraulic system has a low psi indication that could have been corrected in the beginning had I not been busy hand-flying and thinking that my one problem had been corrected. Once again, this is a frame of mind created during training. 'You have a problem. Correct it. Continue on.' I used the emergency brake to stop the aircraft. Also, for no reason whatsoever, the nosewheel steering did not work. All associated system that power the steering were indicating normal operation. I will add that the hydraulic system for the gear is a separate system. Fluid and electrical. I took a moment to analyze what was happening and then I selected the hydraulic cross-eyed on. At that time I released the parking brake and test the normal brakes. They operated normally. At the same time I moved the nosewheel to the left and it started operating normally. At this time I am thinking we will exit the runway, complete all checklist, and return to the gate. As we started to exit the runway my first officer looked at me and stated that he smelled smoke. He asked me if I smelled it and about that time I smelled smoke also. By the time I stopped the airplane the cockpit had filled with visible smoke. No smoke warnings were ever generated by the aircraft. I then called for the emergency evacuate/evacuation checklist and the evacuate/evacuation was completed. All passenger and crew exited the airplane and were accounted for. From the time I smelled smoke to the time we had evacuate/evacuationed the airplane was about 45 seconds. I had 1 passenger who was a paraplegic and he was carried off the airplane by other passenger. 1 passenger claimed injuries to his back and neck and was taken to the hospital. All other passenger stated to me that they were ok. I need to add that even though I did not discuss the calls made to ATC, flight attendant, company, and passenger they were completed at their appropriate times. I just tried to recount the events only. On final note, I am very upset with my inability to have not recognized that there were more checklists to complete. I will state that not completing the dc bus #2 off checklist would have solved the landing gear problem, but why didn't the nosewheel steering work? My reference to training is what I feel contributed to that inability. Also, throughout these events there was no reason to think that an emergency should be declared. It was just one small problem after another. Only when we had smoke was it evident that life was in danger. And I made my decision to evacuate/evacuation. Supplemental information from acn 520664: flight XXX level 13000 ft, experienced a dc generator #2 fault. Proper checklists complied with and began returning to iah. Light rain encountered on descent and captain selected continuous relight. We then experienced multiple cautions and deselected continuous relight. Air return normal after this occurrence until captain called for 'gear down.' gear did not extend and we received a hydraulic low pressure caution. Manually extended the gear, received a down and locked indication, and verified with bush tower. Landed and experienced no braking. Captain applied emergency braking and stopped the aircraft. We then experienced loss of nosewheel hydraulics xfeed and rendered the problem for runway exit. Upon exiting runway 15L, I smelled electrical smoke in the flight deck. The captain agreed, visually saw the smoke, and called for emergency aircraft evacuate/evacuation. We ran memory items backed by the QRH and all people evacuate/evacuationed. Fire chief gave the ok later and confirmed our smoke. The crew performed as trained, remained extremely calm, and performed all duties to safely return the flight to houston and safely remove the 46 souls.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AT43 CREW HAD #2 DC GENERATOR FAIL ON DEP AT IAH.

Narrative: THIS WAS A FLT FROM IAH TO SHV. IT WAS AN UNEVENTFUL FLT FROM STARTUP UNTIL WE REACHED 13000 FT. AT THAT TIME THE DC GENERATOR #2 FAULTED. I, THE CAPT, WHO WAS HAND-FLYING AT THE TIME CALLED FOR THE DC GENERATOR FAULT CHKLIST. MY FO COMPLIED WITH THE CHKLIST AND I THEN INSTRUCTED HIM TO TELL ZHU THAT WE WERE RETURNING TO IAH. DURING THIS TIME THE DC BUS TIE CONTACTOR DID NOT CLOSE THEREFORE DC BUS #2 WAS NOT POWERED. I WANT TO POINT OUT THAT THIS IS WHERE I SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT I HAVE 2 CHKLISTS TO COMPLETE. WHY DIDN'T I RECOGNIZE THIS? FIRST, I WAS HAND-FLYING STILL BECAUSE THE AUTOPLT NEEDS DC BUS #2. SECOND, WE HAD ONE INITIAL ITEM TO CORRECT AND IT WAS DONE. BASICALLY, I WAS MENTALLY BUSY AND IT DID NOT REGISTER THAT I SHOULD CALL FOR THE DC BUS #2 OFF CHKLIST. I WILL ALSO ADD THAT IN TRAINING WE SHOULD BE TEACHING PLTS TO ASK THIS QUESTION. 'CHKLIST COMPLETE. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE LOST/OFFLINE? RUN THE CHKLIST FOR THAT ITEM.' DURING TRAINING WE TEND TO HAVE ONE PROB AT A TIME AND THEN WE MOVE ALONG TO THE NEXT EVENT. NEVER DEVELOPING THE THOUGHT PROCESS NEEDED WHEN YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PROB. THIS IS WHEN YOUR TRAINING 'KICKS IN' AND THAT IS WHAT YOUR MIND WILL GIVE YOU TO WORK WITH AS A TEMPLATE TO SOLVE PROBS. DURING THE DSCNT I SELECTED 'CONTINUOUS RELIGHT' AND AT THAT TIME THE AIRPLANE GENERATED MULTIPLE CAUTIONS, CHIMES, AND THE SOUND OF RELAYS SWITCHING BACK AND FORTH. NOT NORMAL. I THEN DESELECTED THE RELIGHT SWITCH. ALL CAUTIONS, CHIMES, AND SWITCHING STOPPED. I ASKED MYSELF, COULD THIS BE RELATED? MAYBE, BUT IT IS AN ACFT AND THINGS LIKE THIS ARE NOT UNCOMMON. DURING THE LNDG PHASE, I CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN AND THE FO INFORMED ME THAT THE GEAR HAD NOT STARTED TO DROP DOWN. I NEED TO POINT OUT THAT HAD I BEEN IN THE MODE OF THINKING DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY AND COMPLETED THE DC BUS #2 OFF CHKLIST THE GEAR WOULD HAVE DROPPED BECAUSE THAT CHKLIST CALLS FOR THE HYD XFEED TO BE SELECTED ON. THE HYD SYS FOR THE GEAR IS CTLED BY DC BUS #2. I NEED TO ADD THAT THE AC WILD GENERATORS THAT PWR THE HYD PUMPS WERE BOTH ON LINE. THE GREEN SYS LO PSI LCL ALERT WAS ILLUMINATED. AT THIS TIME MY GUT FEELING WAS TO LAND THE AIRPLANE. I CALLED FOR THE MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION, ALL 3 GREEN INDICATIONS ILLUMINATED, AND CONFIRMED WITH THE TWR. I ELECTED NOT TO GO AROUND JUST TO RUN THE CHKLIST FOR THE GEAR. THE LNDG CHKLIST CALLS FOR 'CONTINUOUS RELIGHT' AND IT WAS SELECTED ON AGAIN. THE SAME CAUTIONS, CHIMES AND RELAY SWITCHING HAPPENED AGAIN, BUT JUST FOR A SPLIT SECOND AND STOPPED. I ELECTED TO KEEP IT TURNED ON. PLEASE KEEP IN MIND THAT THE ATR IS FULL OF RELAYS THAT DO NOT ALWAYS DO WHAT THEY SHOULD. THIS, I KNOW NOW, CAN AND WILL CREATE COMPLACENCY. NOW WE ARE ON SHORT FINAL. GEARS DOWN, FLAPS DOWN, LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETED. WE LAND. NO NORMAL BRAKING BECAUSE THE GREEN HYD SYS HAS A LOW PSI INDICATION THAT COULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED IN THE BEGINNING HAD I NOT BEEN BUSY HAND-FLYING AND THINKING THAT MY ONE PROB HAD BEEN CORRECTED. ONCE AGAIN, THIS IS A FRAME OF MIND CREATED DURING TRAINING. 'YOU HAVE A PROB. CORRECT IT. CONTINUE ON.' I USED THE EMER BRAKE TO STOP THE ACFT. ALSO, FOR NO REASON WHATSOEVER, THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING DID NOT WORK. ALL ASSOCIATED SYS THAT PWR THE STEERING WERE INDICATING NORMAL OP. I WILL ADD THAT THE HYD SYS FOR THE GEAR IS A SEPARATE SYS. FLUID AND ELECTRICAL. I TOOK A MOMENT TO ANALYZE WHAT WAS HAPPENING AND THEN I SELECTED THE HYD CROSS-EYED ON. AT THAT TIME I RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND TEST THE NORMAL BRAKES. THEY OPERATED NORMALLY. AT THE SAME TIME I MOVED THE NOSEWHEEL TO THE L AND IT STARTED OPERATING NORMALLY. AT THIS TIME I AM THINKING WE WILL EXIT THE RWY, COMPLETE ALL CHKLIST, AND RETURN TO THE GATE. AS WE STARTED TO EXIT THE RWY MY FO LOOKED AT ME AND STATED THAT HE SMELLED SMOKE. HE ASKED ME IF I SMELLED IT AND ABOUT THAT TIME I SMELLED SMOKE ALSO. BY THE TIME I STOPPED THE AIRPLANE THE COCKPIT HAD FILLED WITH VISIBLE SMOKE. NO SMOKE WARNINGS WERE EVER GENERATED BY THE ACFT. I THEN CALLED FOR THE EMER EVAC CHKLIST AND THE EVAC WAS COMPLETED. ALL PAX AND CREW EXITED THE AIRPLANE AND WERE ACCOUNTED FOR. FROM THE TIME I SMELLED SMOKE TO THE TIME WE HAD EVACED THE AIRPLANE WAS ABOUT 45 SECONDS. I HAD 1 PAX WHO WAS A PARAPLEGIC AND HE WAS CARRIED OFF THE AIRPLANE BY OTHER PAX. 1 PAX CLAIMED INJURIES TO HIS BACK AND NECK AND WAS TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL. ALL OTHER PAX STATED TO ME THAT THEY WERE OK. I NEED TO ADD THAT EVEN THOUGH I DID NOT DISCUSS THE CALLS MADE TO ATC, FLT ATTENDANT, COMPANY, AND PAX THEY WERE COMPLETED AT THEIR APPROPRIATE TIMES. I JUST TRIED TO RECOUNT THE EVENTS ONLY. ON FINAL NOTE, I AM VERY UPSET WITH MY INABILITY TO HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WERE MORE CHKLISTS TO COMPLETE. I WILL STATE THAT NOT COMPLETING THE DC BUS #2 OFF CHKLIST WOULD HAVE SOLVED THE LNDG GEAR PROB, BUT WHY DIDN'T THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING WORK? MY REF TO TRAINING IS WHAT I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO THAT INABILITY. ALSO, THROUGHOUT THESE EVENTS THERE WAS NO REASON TO THINK THAT AN EMER SHOULD BE DECLARED. IT WAS JUST ONE SMALL PROB AFTER ANOTHER. ONLY WHEN WE HAD SMOKE WAS IT EVIDENT THAT LIFE WAS IN DANGER. AND I MADE MY DECISION TO EVAC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 520664: FLT XXX LEVEL 13000 FT, EXPERIENCED A DC GENERATOR #2 FAULT. PROPER CHKLISTS COMPLIED WITH AND BEGAN RETURNING TO IAH. LIGHT RAIN ENCOUNTERED ON DSCNT AND CAPT SELECTED CONTINUOUS RELIGHT. WE THEN EXPERIENCED MULTIPLE CAUTIONS AND DESELECTED CONTINUOUS RELIGHT. AIR RETURN NORMAL AFTER THIS OCCURRENCE UNTIL CAPT CALLED FOR 'GEAR DOWN.' GEAR DID NOT EXTEND AND WE RECEIVED A HYD LOW PRESSURE CAUTION. MANUALLY EXTENDED THE GEAR, RECEIVED A DOWN AND LOCKED INDICATION, AND VERIFIED WITH BUSH TWR. LANDED AND EXPERIENCED NO BRAKING. CAPT APPLIED EMER BRAKING AND STOPPED THE ACFT. WE THEN EXPERIENCED LOSS OF NOSEWHEEL HYDS XFEED AND RENDERED THE PROB FOR RWY EXIT. UPON EXITING RWY 15L, I SMELLED ELECTRICAL SMOKE IN THE FLT DECK. THE CAPT AGREED, VISUALLY SAW THE SMOKE, AND CALLED FOR EMER ACFT EVAC. WE RAN MEMORY ITEMS BACKED BY THE QRH AND ALL PEOPLE EVACED. FIRE CHIEF GAVE THE OK LATER AND CONFIRMED OUR SMOKE. THE CREW PERFORMED AS TRAINED, REMAINED EXTREMELY CALM, AND PERFORMED ALL DUTIES TO SAFELY RETURN THE FLT TO HOUSTON AND SAFELY REMOVE THE 46 SOULS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.