Narrative:

Aborted takeoff. Having just finished my IOE during the same week, my first assignment was to do a functional check flight as an first officer at ZZZ, on a B757. The assignment was done late at night (is this really a good time to do this). Tests would include deployment of the 'RAT,' in-flight shutdowns, stalls, etc. I realize I have done all these things in the simulator, and did really well in training too, but I did not know this would be part of the daily expected job of a regular pilot. I was told by the captain, who was very professional, that if I felt uncomfortable, I did not have to do this job. I was unable to read the union contract, if this mission for me was optional. After extensive ground checks which I assisted the best I could, we finally headed to the runway, now after early am. On the takeoff roll, my airspeed indicator did not work, which resulted in an abort. This abort had a potential for more ugly results. For starters, I was not used to the very light weight, and rapid acceleration of this near empty airplane, as I only had 20 hours of B757 experience. Not only that, it was pitch black outside, so the sense of speed to the human brain was reduced. Additionally, because air carrier does not have an 'airspeed alive' callout by both pilots, looking back I wish I would have made a 'no airspeed indicator callout earlier, but I did the best I could under the conditions. Because the airspeed readout/needle starts at 60 KTS, it is normal to wait several seconds before the airspeed comes alive. I waited, waited and then crosschecked over at the captain's side. His was past 80 KTS, as I made my callout that I had none. The captain made an excellent textbook abort, however, the rejected takeoff managed to blow 1 tire. After we cleared the runway, the fire department inspected the gear. Plane was towed to hangar. I am not a court judge, but you can debate if we should have continued the takeoff. It was a difficult decision for the captain possibly, as his brain had not been told yet by me that we are at '80 KTS.' in addition, do you really want to continue a takeoff with no airspeed indicator after a plane comes out of a hangar. Isn't it possible that all 3 airspeed indicators had been rigged by the same guy in the hangar. Bottom line, we did an abort for a broken airspeed indicator, under the conditions at night, regardless of the actual speed of the airplane, the captain could only assume we were at a lower speed than we probably actually were. I feel very comfortable being employed to do normal flts, and handle abnormal and emergency procedures if needed. But I would enjoy more information from airline management if they feel regular pilots are really the right people to do tests in the future. It seems this is a subject that needs to be addressed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 FO WAS ASSIGNED TO CREW AN ACR TEST FLT AFTER MAINT.

Narrative: ABORTED TKOF. HAVING JUST FINISHED MY IOE DURING THE SAME WEEK, MY FIRST ASSIGNMENT WAS TO DO A FUNCTIONAL CHK FLT AS AN FO AT ZZZ, ON A B757. THE ASSIGNMENT WAS DONE LATE AT NIGHT (IS THIS REALLY A GOOD TIME TO DO THIS). TESTS WOULD INCLUDE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 'RAT,' INFLT SHUTDOWNS, STALLS, ETC. I REALIZE I HAVE DONE ALL THESE THINGS IN THE SIMULATOR, AND DID REALLY WELL IN TRAINING TOO, BUT I DID NOT KNOW THIS WOULD BE PART OF THE DAILY EXPECTED JOB OF A REGULAR PLT. I WAS TOLD BY THE CAPT, WHO WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL, THAT IF I FELT UNCOMFORTABLE, I DID NOT HAVE TO DO THIS JOB. I WAS UNABLE TO READ THE UNION CONTRACT, IF THIS MISSION FOR ME WAS OPTIONAL. AFTER EXTENSIVE GND CHKS WHICH I ASSISTED THE BEST I COULD, WE FINALLY HEADED TO THE RWY, NOW AFTER EARLY AM. ON THE TKOF ROLL, MY AIRSPD INDICATOR DID NOT WORK, WHICH RESULTED IN AN ABORT. THIS ABORT HAD A POTENTIAL FOR MORE UGLY RESULTS. FOR STARTERS, I WAS NOT USED TO THE VERY LIGHT WT, AND RAPID ACCELERATION OF THIS NEAR EMPTY AIRPLANE, AS I ONLY HAD 20 HRS OF B757 EXPERIENCE. NOT ONLY THAT, IT WAS PITCH BLACK OUTSIDE, SO THE SENSE OF SPD TO THE HUMAN BRAIN WAS REDUCED. ADDITIONALLY, BECAUSE ACR DOES NOT HAVE AN 'AIRSPD ALIVE' CALLOUT BY BOTH PLTS, LOOKING BACK I WISH I WOULD HAVE MADE A 'NO AIRSPD INDICATOR CALLOUT EARLIER, BUT I DID THE BEST I COULD UNDER THE CONDITIONS. BECAUSE THE AIRSPD READOUT/NEEDLE STARTS AT 60 KTS, IT IS NORMAL TO WAIT SEVERAL SECONDS BEFORE THE AIRSPD COMES ALIVE. I WAITED, WAITED AND THEN XCHKED OVER AT THE CAPT'S SIDE. HIS WAS PAST 80 KTS, AS I MADE MY CALLOUT THAT I HAD NONE. THE CAPT MADE AN EXCELLENT TEXTBOOK ABORT, HOWEVER, THE RTO MANAGED TO BLOW 1 TIRE. AFTER WE CLRED THE RWY, THE FIRE DEPT INSPECTED THE GEAR. PLANE WAS TOWED TO HANGAR. I AM NOT A COURT JUDGE, BUT YOU CAN DEBATE IF WE SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED THE TKOF. IT WAS A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR THE CAPT POSSIBLY, AS HIS BRAIN HAD NOT BEEN TOLD YET BY ME THAT WE ARE AT '80 KTS.' IN ADDITION, DO YOU REALLY WANT TO CONTINUE A TKOF WITH NO AIRSPD INDICATOR AFTER A PLANE COMES OUT OF A HANGAR. ISN'T IT POSSIBLE THAT ALL 3 AIRSPD INDICATORS HAD BEEN RIGGED BY THE SAME GUY IN THE HANGAR. BOTTOM LINE, WE DID AN ABORT FOR A BROKEN AIRSPD INDICATOR, UNDER THE CONDITIONS AT NIGHT, REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL SPD OF THE AIRPLANE, THE CAPT COULD ONLY ASSUME WE WERE AT A LOWER SPD THAN WE PROBABLY ACTUALLY WERE. I FEEL VERY COMFORTABLE BEING EMPLOYED TO DO NORMAL FLTS, AND HANDLE ABNORMAL AND EMER PROCS IF NEEDED. BUT I WOULD ENJOY MORE INFO FROM AIRLINE MGMNT IF THEY FEEL REGULAR PLTS ARE REALLY THE RIGHT PEOPLE TO DO TESTS IN THE FUTURE. IT SEEMS THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.