Narrative:

Takeoff out of mdw runway 31C. Heavy weight, flaps 15 degrees. Mdw tower asks if we could take runway 4R due to helicopter and airship traffic north of the field in direct conflict with runway 31C east departures. We advised tower of our heavy weight status and inability to take off runway 4R. Tower immediately gave us clearance to taxi into position and hold runway 31C. About 2 mins later he told us to fly runway heading until he called us to turn and cleared us for the takeoff. This effectively canceled any SID procedures. Our clearance was for midway 4 departure to 3000 ft. Departure procedures are to climb runway heading to 13000 ft then turn on course. Our departure frequency was 119.35. Tower continued us on runway heading until 1800 ft when we were advised to turn to 130 degree heading and contact departure. Upon initial contact with departure, we were severely chastised and told to tighten our turn, we were in conflict with ord departure traffic 1000 ft above and 'that's what the SID is for.' we told him we were cleared off the SID by tower due to airship traffic north of mdw. He continued to argue about the traffic and departure procedures and told us to change frequency to 118.4. He also said we should contact mdw tower on the phone about it. After we stabilized on departure, I contacted mdw tower on #2 radio, told him that departure wasn't happy and he said he would talk to them. Some contributing factors: 1) mdw tower not communicating with departure on the SID deviation. 2) mdw tower not coordinating the deviation prior to issuing the clearance. 3) ord approach assuming the deviation was a pilot error. 4) inflexible departure procedures in the mdw/ord class B airspace. My concern: 1) if, in fact a conflict existed, why were we cleared into the middle of it? 2) accusation from ord departure control led to confusion on our part during critical phase of flight, somewhat compromising safety by adding the potential for degraded situational awareness -- accusations derived from uninformed assumptions. Supplemental information from acn 520028: jul/sun/01 mdw-jan. Mdw ATIS XA53Z was 270 degrees at 7 KTS, 10 mi visibility, 6000 ft scattered, 2500 ft broken 33/20, altimeter 29.93, runway 31C in use. Using an allowable takeoff gross weight of 118800 pounds, we computed a heavy weight less than 117000 pounds, flaps 15 degrees, maximum power takeoff for runway 31C. As we were pushing off gate by ground control asked if we could take off runway 22L. We responded with a negative. We taxied to runway 31C and waited. Tower asked once if we could use runway 4R because of an airship and helicopter northwest of the field. Once again we responded negative, we were cleared into position and hold on runway 31C and waited for about 1 min. Cleared for takeoff runway 31C, fly runway heading, and I believe, contact departure on 118.8. Our original departure frequency was 119.35 and that remained set since we started the takeoff roll monitoring aircraft performance and accomplishing flaps 15 degrees takeoff procedures. Tower called at approximately 2000 ft stating turn right heading 130 degrees and contact departure. (Captain flying.) we started the right turn and I changed to departure on 119.35, not 118.8. When the controller responded he began by asking what we were doing, that we were 1000 ft below traffic from ord and not flying the SID. The captain, leveling at 3000 ft, decided he didn't appreciate the ATC controller's tone of voice and let the controller know we were following tower instructions to avoid the airship and helicopter. The controller told him to contact mdw tower about the matter, then stated, we should be on frequency 118.8. The switch was made and no further problems occurred on the departure and no further comments about a departure deviation were mentioned. Remainder of flight was uneventful. Being busy with a heavy weight takeoff on a hot, humid day and having a controller not controling, but lecturing was uncool. Crowded airspace and a critical phase of flight are enough stress. Finally, I believe the entire event could have been prevented had I been able to set the frequency 118.8 before takeoff roll getting the correct controller, the first time, probably would have made the departure uneventful.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 CREW HAD DEP CTLR QUESTION WHY THEY WERE NOT FLYING THE SID DEP. CREW GOT THE WRONG DEP CTL FREQ.

Narrative: TKOF OUT OF MDW RWY 31C. HVY WT, FLAPS 15 DEGS. MDW TWR ASKS IF WE COULD TAKE RWY 4R DUE TO HELI AND AIRSHIP TFC N OF THE FIELD IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH RWY 31C E DEPS. WE ADVISED TWR OF OUR HVY WT STATUS AND INABILITY TO TAKE OFF RWY 4R. TWR IMMEDIATELY GAVE US CLRNC TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 31C. ABOUT 2 MINS LATER HE TOLD US TO FLY RWY HDG UNTIL HE CALLED US TO TURN AND CLRED US FOR THE TKOF. THIS EFFECTIVELY CANCELED ANY SID PROCS. OUR CLRNC WAS FOR MIDWAY 4 DEP TO 3000 FT. DEP PROCS ARE TO CLB RWY HDG TO 13000 FT THEN TURN ON COURSE. OUR DEP FREQ WAS 119.35. TWR CONTINUED US ON RWY HDG UNTIL 1800 FT WHEN WE WERE ADVISED TO TURN TO 130 DEG HDG AND CONTACT DEP. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH DEP, WE WERE SEVERELY CHASTISED AND TOLD TO TIGHTEN OUR TURN, WE WERE IN CONFLICT WITH ORD DEP TFC 1000 FT ABOVE AND 'THAT'S WHAT THE SID IS FOR.' WE TOLD HIM WE WERE CLRED OFF THE SID BY TWR DUE TO AIRSHIP TFC N OF MDW. HE CONTINUED TO ARGUE ABOUT THE TFC AND DEP PROCS AND TOLD US TO CHANGE FREQ TO 118.4. HE ALSO SAID WE SHOULD CONTACT MDW TWR ON THE PHONE ABOUT IT. AFTER WE STABILIZED ON DEP, I CONTACTED MDW TWR ON #2 RADIO, TOLD HIM THAT DEP WASN'T HAPPY AND HE SAID HE WOULD TALK TO THEM. SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) MDW TWR NOT COMMUNICATING WITH DEP ON THE SID DEV. 2) MDW TWR NOT COORDINATING THE DEV PRIOR TO ISSUING THE CLRNC. 3) ORD APCH ASSUMING THE DEV WAS A PLT ERROR. 4) INFLEXIBLE DEP PROCS IN THE MDW/ORD CLASS B AIRSPACE. MY CONCERN: 1) IF, IN FACT A CONFLICT EXISTED, WHY WERE WE CLRED INTO THE MIDDLE OF IT? 2) ACCUSATION FROM ORD DEP CTL LED TO CONFUSION ON OUR PART DURING CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT, SOMEWHAT COMPROMISING SAFETY BY ADDING THE POTENTIAL FOR DEGRADED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS -- ACCUSATIONS DERIVED FROM UNINFORMED ASSUMPTIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 520028: JUL/SUN/01 MDW-JAN. MDW ATIS XA53Z WAS 270 DEGS AT 7 KTS, 10 MI VISIBILITY, 6000 FT SCATTERED, 2500 FT BROKEN 33/20, ALTIMETER 29.93, RWY 31C IN USE. USING AN ALLOWABLE TKOF GROSS WT OF 118800 LBS, WE COMPUTED A HVY WT LESS THAN 117000 LBS, FLAPS 15 DEGS, MAX PWR TKOF FOR RWY 31C. AS WE WERE PUSHING OFF GATE BY GND CTL ASKED IF WE COULD TAKE OFF RWY 22L. WE RESPONDED WITH A NEGATIVE. WE TAXIED TO RWY 31C AND WAITED. TWR ASKED ONCE IF WE COULD USE RWY 4R BECAUSE OF AN AIRSHIP AND HELI NW OF THE FIELD. ONCE AGAIN WE RESPONDED NEGATIVE, WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 31C AND WAITED FOR ABOUT 1 MIN. CLRED FOR TKOF RWY 31C, FLY RWY HDG, AND I BELIEVE, CONTACT DEP ON 118.8. OUR ORIGINAL DEP FREQ WAS 119.35 AND THAT REMAINED SET SINCE WE STARTED THE TKOF ROLL MONITORING ACFT PERFORMANCE AND ACCOMPLISHING FLAPS 15 DEGS TKOF PROCS. TWR CALLED AT APPROX 2000 FT STATING TURN R HDG 130 DEGS AND CONTACT DEP. (CAPT FLYING.) WE STARTED THE R TURN AND I CHANGED TO DEP ON 119.35, NOT 118.8. WHEN THE CTLR RESPONDED HE BEGAN BY ASKING WHAT WE WERE DOING, THAT WE WERE 1000 FT BELOW TFC FROM ORD AND NOT FLYING THE SID. THE CAPT, LEVELING AT 3000 FT, DECIDED HE DIDN'T APPRECIATE THE ATC CTLR'S TONE OF VOICE AND LET THE CTLR KNOW WE WERE FOLLOWING TWR INSTRUCTIONS TO AVOID THE AIRSHIP AND HELI. THE CTLR TOLD HIM TO CONTACT MDW TWR ABOUT THE MATTER, THEN STATED, WE SHOULD BE ON FREQ 118.8. THE SWITCH WAS MADE AND NO FURTHER PROBS OCCURRED ON THE DEP AND NO FURTHER COMMENTS ABOUT A DEP DEV WERE MENTIONED. REMAINDER OF FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. BEING BUSY WITH A HVY WT TKOF ON A HOT, HUMID DAY AND HAVING A CTLR NOT CTLING, BUT LECTURING WAS UNCOOL. CROWDED AIRSPACE AND A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT ARE ENOUGH STRESS. FINALLY, I BELIEVE THE ENTIRE EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD I BEEN ABLE TO SET THE FREQ 118.8 BEFORE TKOF ROLL GETTING THE CORRECT CTLR, THE FIRST TIME, PROBABLY WOULD HAVE MADE THE DEP UNEVENTFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.