Narrative:

Flight was departing atl for XXX, us. Gave fueler the fuel load of 1400 pounds a side, or 2800 pounds total. Aircraft had 700 pounds a side prior to fueling. Fuel was received and confirmed by 'before start checklist' as 1400 pounds a side as requested. Walkaround after fueling verified that there were no fuel leaks or abnormalities, and fuel service panel was shut properly. Engine start was normal and we taxied for approximately 15 mins to runway 26L. I performed the takeoff and noted large right wing down tendency upon liftoff. When scanning the instruments I noted that all of the fuel from the left wing had somehow xferred into the right wing tank resulting in a 2500-2600 pound imbal. When we realized this, we decided to return to the field as soon as possible. About 1 min later, passing about 2000-2500 ft, the left engine flamed out due to no fuel in the left tank. The fuel xfeed was not open and there is no way to xfer fuel from wing-to-wing by pilot action. We performed engine failure checklist and declared an emergency. We were vectored for a visual approach to runway 26R at atl and landed without incident. The landing was overweight. Upon shutdown at gate, maintenance personnel opened the fueling panel and found several switches on the fueling panel still on, including a defuel switch, which is never supposed to be used in normal fueling, and should have been safety wired closed. Training manuals state these switches are used by maintenance only and can cause fuel to xfer from tank-to-tank if left open with the electric boost pumps on. Contributing cause was also a broken device on the fuel door which contacts the switch covers, closing the switch, when the panel is closed to prevent the switches from being left open. No one knew why the switch (defuel switch) was unsafety wired and open to begin with. We were questioned as to whether the fuel imbal existed after fueling and we failed to notice it, but myself and captain were positive fuel was balanced after fueling. This was later confirmed by a test fueling with the defuel switch open, which resulted in proper fuel balance. There is no other checklist after the 'before start checklist ' prior to takeoff which calls for rechking fuel quantity or balance. The company is investigating the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: E120 CREW HAD ENG FLAMEOUT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION BECAUSE MAINT XFEED VALVE WAS LEFT OPEN.

Narrative: FLT WAS DEPARTING ATL FOR XXX, US. GAVE FUELER THE FUEL LOAD OF 1400 LBS A SIDE, OR 2800 LBS TOTAL. ACFT HAD 700 LBS A SIDE PRIOR TO FUELING. FUEL WAS RECEIVED AND CONFIRMED BY 'BEFORE START CHKLIST' AS 1400 LBS A SIDE AS REQUESTED. WALKAROUND AFTER FUELING VERIFIED THAT THERE WERE NO FUEL LEAKS OR ABNORMALITIES, AND FUEL SVC PANEL WAS SHUT PROPERLY. ENG START WAS NORMAL AND WE TAXIED FOR APPROX 15 MINS TO RWY 26L. I PERFORMED THE TKOF AND NOTED LARGE R WING DOWN TENDENCY UPON LIFTOFF. WHEN SCANNING THE INSTS I NOTED THAT ALL OF THE FUEL FROM THE L WING HAD SOMEHOW XFERRED INTO THE R WING TANK RESULTING IN A 2500-2600 LB IMBAL. WHEN WE REALIZED THIS, WE DECIDED TO RETURN TO THE FIELD ASAP. ABOUT 1 MIN LATER, PASSING ABOUT 2000-2500 FT, THE L ENG FLAMED OUT DUE TO NO FUEL IN THE L TANK. THE FUEL XFEED WAS NOT OPEN AND THERE IS NO WAY TO XFER FUEL FROM WING-TO-WING BY PLT ACTION. WE PERFORMED ENG FAILURE CHKLIST AND DECLARED AN EMER. WE WERE VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26R AT ATL AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE LNDG WAS OVERWT. UPON SHUTDOWN AT GATE, MAINT PERSONNEL OPENED THE FUELING PANEL AND FOUND SEVERAL SWITCHES ON THE FUELING PANEL STILL ON, INCLUDING A DEFUEL SWITCH, WHICH IS NEVER SUPPOSED TO BE USED IN NORMAL FUELING, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SAFETY WIRED CLOSED. TRAINING MANUALS STATE THESE SWITCHES ARE USED BY MAINT ONLY AND CAN CAUSE FUEL TO XFER FROM TANK-TO-TANK IF LEFT OPEN WITH THE ELECTRIC BOOST PUMPS ON. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE WAS ALSO A BROKEN DEVICE ON THE FUEL DOOR WHICH CONTACTS THE SWITCH COVERS, CLOSING THE SWITCH, WHEN THE PANEL IS CLOSED TO PREVENT THE SWITCHES FROM BEING LEFT OPEN. NO ONE KNEW WHY THE SWITCH (DEFUEL SWITCH) WAS UNSAFETY WIRED AND OPEN TO BEGIN WITH. WE WERE QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER THE FUEL IMBAL EXISTED AFTER FUELING AND WE FAILED TO NOTICE IT, BUT MYSELF AND CAPT WERE POSITIVE FUEL WAS BALANCED AFTER FUELING. THIS WAS LATER CONFIRMED BY A TEST FUELING WITH THE DEFUEL SWITCH OPEN, WHICH RESULTED IN PROPER FUEL BAL. THERE IS NO OTHER CHKLIST AFTER THE 'BEFORE START CHKLIST ' PRIOR TO TKOF WHICH CALLS FOR RECHKING FUEL QUANTITY OR BAL. THE COMPANY IS INVESTIGATING THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.