Narrative:

Departing out of cleveland, departure control assigned us a heading of 280 degrees to intercept the 310 degree radial out of dryer (djb) then to cetus 2 arrival into detroit. We were then handed off to ZOB (frequency 127.9). After we had checked in with them, and approximately 5 NM northwest of djb VOR, the controller asked us if we had been assigned a heading. We said 'no, we were supposed to intercept the 310 degree radial out of djb.' his response to us was that he showed us past the radial, and that we should maintain the heading to intercept the detroit 147 degree radial inbound, then the cetus arrival. We were still southeast of the 147 degree radial when we received the amended clearance. This verified to us that we could not have been that far off course. We were just coming out of the cone of confusion over the djb VOR, so we couldn't tell exactly how far off we were. Apparently, we were far enough off to get the controller's attention. Possible reasons for the event would be: 1) the short duration of the flight between cle and dtw, resulted in a high cockpit workload at the time. 2) the fact that the intercept heading we were given put us over the djb VOR, in the cone of confusion when we were supposed to intercept the 310 degree radial. 3) the PF was not aggressive enough when he should have led the turn to intercept the radial. 4) I, as the captain, should have seen that he wasn't being as aggressive as he should have been. Possible solutions to prevent future occurrences: 1) from our standpoint, regardless of how heavy the cockpit workload gets, flying and navigating the aircraft have to remain our primary concern. 2) probably should have been more aggressive with the leading of the turn, and 3) from the controller's standpoint, they should be more aware of the fact that an intercept clearance given in the vicinity of the cone of confusion (especially with a conventional aircraft type) they need to allow for slight deviations until re-established on the desired intercepted heading. As far as we know, this event did not cause any type of conflict with another aircraft. We were not given evasive vectors, nor did we hear any given to any other aircraft. We also did not receive any TCASII or GPWS warnings. The controller did not indicate to us that there was any type of conflict or possible violation. The main reason for this report is due to the surprise of the controller as to our position. In my opinion, this should never be the case. Since we somehow got into the situation, I felt it was important to try to find out why.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9-40 CREW HAD TRACK DEV IN ZOB CLASS E AIRSPACE.

Narrative: DEPARTING OUT OF CLEVELAND, DEP CTL ASSIGNED US A HDG OF 280 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE 310 DEG RADIAL OUT OF DRYER (DJB) THEN TO CETUS 2 ARR INTO DETROIT. WE WERE THEN HANDED OFF TO ZOB (FREQ 127.9). AFTER WE HAD CHKED IN WITH THEM, AND APPROX 5 NM NW OF DJB VOR, THE CTLR ASKED US IF WE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED A HDG. WE SAID 'NO, WE WERE SUPPOSED TO INTERCEPT THE 310 DEG RADIAL OUT OF DJB.' HIS RESPONSE TO US WAS THAT HE SHOWED US PAST THE RADIAL, AND THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN THE HDG TO INTERCEPT THE DETROIT 147 DEG RADIAL INBOUND, THEN THE CETUS ARR. WE WERE STILL SE OF THE 147 DEG RADIAL WHEN WE RECEIVED THE AMENDED CLRNC. THIS VERIFIED TO US THAT WE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THAT FAR OFF COURSE. WE WERE JUST COMING OUT OF THE CONE OF CONFUSION OVER THE DJB VOR, SO WE COULDN'T TELL EXACTLY HOW FAR OFF WE WERE. APPARENTLY, WE WERE FAR ENOUGH OFF TO GET THE CTLR'S ATTN. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE EVENT WOULD BE: 1) THE SHORT DURATION OF THE FLT BTWN CLE AND DTW, RESULTED IN A HIGH COCKPIT WORKLOAD AT THE TIME. 2) THE FACT THAT THE INTERCEPT HDG WE WERE GIVEN PUT US OVER THE DJB VOR, IN THE CONE OF CONFUSION WHEN WE WERE SUPPOSED TO INTERCEPT THE 310 DEG RADIAL. 3) THE PF WAS NOT AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE LED THE TURN TO INTERCEPT THE RADIAL. 4) I, AS THE CAPT, SHOULD HAVE SEEN THAT HE WASN'T BEING AS AGGRESSIVE AS HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCES: 1) FROM OUR STANDPOINT, REGARDLESS OF HOW HVY THE COCKPIT WORKLOAD GETS, FLYING AND NAVING THE ACFT HAVE TO REMAIN OUR PRIMARY CONCERN. 2) PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE WITH THE LEADING OF THE TURN, AND 3) FROM THE CTLR'S STANDPOINT, THEY SHOULD BE MORE AWARE OF THE FACT THAT AN INTERCEPT CLRNC GIVEN IN THE VICINITY OF THE CONE OF CONFUSION (ESPECIALLY WITH A CONVENTIONAL ACFT TYPE) THEY NEED TO ALLOW FOR SLIGHT DEVS UNTIL RE-ESTABLISHED ON THE DESIRED INTERCEPTED HDG. AS FAR AS WE KNOW, THIS EVENT DID NOT CAUSE ANY TYPE OF CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ACFT. WE WERE NOT GIVEN EVASIVE VECTORS, NOR DID WE HEAR ANY GIVEN TO ANY OTHER ACFT. WE ALSO DID NOT RECEIVE ANY TCASII OR GPWS WARNINGS. THE CTLR DID NOT INDICATE TO US THAT THERE WAS ANY TYPE OF CONFLICT OR POSSIBLE VIOLATION. THE MAIN REASON FOR THIS RPT IS DUE TO THE SURPRISE OF THE CTLR AS TO OUR POS. IN MY OPINION, THIS SHOULD NEVER BE THE CASE. SINCE WE SOMEHOW GOT INTO THE SIT, I FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO FIND OUT WHY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.