Narrative:

We were flying from phl-alb on an IFR flight plan. I was the PNF. When the first officer received the clearance in phl, it had to be read back 3 times. It was a difficult clearance involving a lot of VOR radials with DME distances (example: go direct to the abc VOR, track outbound on the 020 degree radial for 17 DME, intercept the def VOR 180 degree radial to def VOR, then outbound on the 345 degree radial for 11 mi to intercept V123). I was in the aircraft when the clearance delivery controller read the clearance for the last time. As a crew, we reviewed what we just heard and proceeded to taxi and take off. We were confident through the 3 readbacks and looking over the route. As PNF, I was responsible for setting up our vors throughout the flight. My first officer was having some problems with altitude control and tracking our VOR radials. I had to grab the aircraft from him twice to correct. Once corrected, I gave the aircraft back to him and proceeded with my non-flying duties. It was going fine. Then over jfk VOR, I proceeded to instruct him to fly outbound on the 064 degree radial for 16 DME. The center controller at about 10 DME northeast of jfk VOR stated, 'you are 10 mi off course.' I replied that we were outbound on this radial for 16 DME then onto lga VOR. He replied, 'you're not even supposed to be over jfk VOR, fly heading 030 degrees for alb.' it was then I realized that I had interpreted the clearance wrong. I do not think anything will happen as a result from the center, but I have a few ideas that might help prevent this from happening again. 1) I think a confusing clearance like that could have been made simpler to fly using direct vors and intxns, not random DME/radials. 2) my company needs to pay more for pilot services so that there will be 2 competent pilots in the cockpit and not one. I believe I was distracted when I had to fly the aircraft and navigation, too. 3) my first officer should have been more pro-active. He seemed to rely on me to tell him what to do and where to go. When I screwed up, there was no way he was going to catch it (bad CRM). 4) our company uses the flight and duty loop-hole. What I mean is, we are a non-schedule operation and all our pilots are on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. When called for duty, our company expects 14 hours of duty and 10 hours of flying. Lots of time pilots are tired going to work. This is dangerous. I believe, since we were called out at XA00 am, that fatigue played a major role in this screw up. The FAA needs to stop playing around and change this on-call 24/7 stuff as soon as possible. WX was not a factor. Summary: bad clearance, poor flying skills, bad CRM, and fatigue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZNY CTLR CHALLENGES DA20 FLC TRACK DEV FROM FILED RTE. PLT CONCERNED WITH COMPANY APPLICATION OF FAA FLT TIME DUTY RULES.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING FROM PHL-ALB ON AN IFR FLT PLAN. I WAS THE PNF. WHEN THE FO RECEIVED THE CLRNC IN PHL, IT HAD TO BE READ BACK 3 TIMES. IT WAS A DIFFICULT CLRNC INVOLVING A LOT OF VOR RADIALS WITH DME DISTANCES (EXAMPLE: GO DIRECT TO THE ABC VOR, TRACK OUTBOUND ON THE 020 DEG RADIAL FOR 17 DME, INTERCEPT THE DEF VOR 180 DEG RADIAL TO DEF VOR, THEN OUTBOUND ON THE 345 DEG RADIAL FOR 11 MI TO INTERCEPT V123). I WAS IN THE ACFT WHEN THE CLRNC DELIVERY CTLR READ THE CLRNC FOR THE LAST TIME. AS A CREW, WE REVIEWED WHAT WE JUST HEARD AND PROCEEDED TO TAXI AND TAKE OFF. WE WERE CONFIDENT THROUGH THE 3 READBACKS AND LOOKING OVER THE RTE. AS PNF, I WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTING UP OUR VORS THROUGHOUT THE FLT. MY FO WAS HAVING SOME PROBS WITH ALT CTL AND TRACKING OUR VOR RADIALS. I HAD TO GRAB THE ACFT FROM HIM TWICE TO CORRECT. ONCE CORRECTED, I GAVE THE ACFT BACK TO HIM AND PROCEEDED WITH MY NON-FLYING DUTIES. IT WAS GOING FINE. THEN OVER JFK VOR, I PROCEEDED TO INSTRUCT HIM TO FLY OUTBOUND ON THE 064 DEG RADIAL FOR 16 DME. THE CTR CTLR AT ABOUT 10 DME NE OF JFK VOR STATED, 'YOU ARE 10 MI OFF COURSE.' I REPLIED THAT WE WERE OUTBOUND ON THIS RADIAL FOR 16 DME THEN ONTO LGA VOR. HE REPLIED, 'YOU'RE NOT EVEN SUPPOSED TO BE OVER JFK VOR, FLY HEADING 030 DEGS FOR ALB.' IT WAS THEN I REALIZED THAT I HAD INTERPRETED THE CLRNC WRONG. I DO NOT THINK ANYTHING WILL HAPPEN AS A RESULT FROM THE CTR, BUT I HAVE A FEW IDEAS THAT MIGHT HELP PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN. 1) I THINK A CONFUSING CLRNC LIKE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN MADE SIMPLER TO FLY USING DIRECT VORS AND INTXNS, NOT RANDOM DME/RADIALS. 2) MY COMPANY NEEDS TO PAY MORE FOR PLT SVCS SO THAT THERE WILL BE 2 COMPETENT PLTS IN THE COCKPIT AND NOT ONE. I BELIEVE I WAS DISTRACTED WHEN I HAD TO FLY THE ACFT AND NAV, TOO. 3) MY FO SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRO-ACTIVE. HE SEEMED TO RELY ON ME TO TELL HIM WHAT TO DO AND WHERE TO GO. WHEN I SCREWED UP, THERE WAS NO WAY HE WAS GOING TO CATCH IT (BAD CRM). 4) OUR COMPANY USES THE FLT AND DUTY LOOP-HOLE. WHAT I MEAN IS, WE ARE A NON-SCHEDULE OP AND ALL OUR PLTS ARE ON CALL 24 HRS A DAY, 7 DAYS A WK. WHEN CALLED FOR DUTY, OUR COMPANY EXPECTS 14 HRS OF DUTY AND 10 HRS OF FLYING. LOTS OF TIME PLTS ARE TIRED GOING TO WORK. THIS IS DANGEROUS. I BELIEVE, SINCE WE WERE CALLED OUT AT XA00 AM, THAT FATIGUE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THIS SCREW UP. THE FAA NEEDS TO STOP PLAYING AROUND AND CHANGE THIS ON-CALL 24/7 STUFF ASAP. WX WAS NOT A FACTOR. SUMMARY: BAD CLRNC, POOR FLYING SKILLS, BAD CRM, AND FATIGUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.