Narrative:

Our flight was from buenos aires to ZZZ, us, and our contract maintenance was having a problem getting the forward cargo door open. It was on deferral and needed to be manually opened but could be electrically closed. The contract maintenance folks were not familiar with the door and seemed to be having trouble, so I called our maintenance folks to insure proper procedures were being followed, and after a 30 min delay we got the cargo loaded and were on our way. My confidence in the contract maintenance was not very high at this point. Approximately 1 hour out of buenos aires, northbound on UA301, #1 hydraulic fluid level went to zero. We got out the manuals and followed the procedures and called our maintenance control ZZZ along with our dispatcher. After reviewing all the required pubs and discussing all the options available, a joint plan was formulated. In light of the quality of the contract maintenance in eze and the fact that our remaining hydraulic system and their back-up system were all functioning normally, it was decided to press on to our destination. We had several divert airfields along our route of flight and were prepared to divert if the need presented itself. We kept an eye on the fuel burn and the WX for each divert field all the way to destination where an uneventful landing was made. After thinking about it for a few days, I think the more prudent course of action would have been to return to eze and taken our chances with contract maintenance plus all the wasted fuel, broken passenger connections and delays a return would have caused. Sometimes the pace of operations plus economic considerations can steer your thinking from the most safety conscious choice to another which is balanced between safety and operational necessity.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD11 CREW HAD #1 HYD SYS FAILURE APPROX 1 HR N OF SAEZ. THEY DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO DEST, OVER 10 HRS AWAY.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS FROM BUENOS AIRES TO ZZZ, US, AND OUR CONTRACT MAINT WAS HAVING A PROB GETTING THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR OPEN. IT WAS ON DEFERRAL AND NEEDED TO BE MANUALLY OPENED BUT COULD BE ELECTRICALLY CLOSED. THE CONTRACT MAINT FOLKS WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE DOOR AND SEEMED TO BE HAVING TROUBLE, SO I CALLED OUR MAINT FOLKS TO INSURE PROPER PROCS WERE BEING FOLLOWED, AND AFTER A 30 MIN DELAY WE GOT THE CARGO LOADED AND WERE ON OUR WAY. MY CONFIDENCE IN THE CONTRACT MAINT WAS NOT VERY HIGH AT THIS POINT. APPROX 1 HR OUT OF BUENOS AIRES, NBOUND ON UA301, #1 HYD FLUID LEVEL WENT TO ZERO. WE GOT OUT THE MANUALS AND FOLLOWED THE PROCS AND CALLED OUR MAINT CTL ZZZ ALONG WITH OUR DISPATCHER. AFTER REVIEWING ALL THE REQUIRED PUBS AND DISCUSSING ALL THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE, A JOINT PLAN WAS FORMULATED. IN LIGHT OF THE QUALITY OF THE CONTRACT MAINT IN EZE AND THE FACT THAT OUR REMAINING HYD SYS AND THEIR BACK-UP SYS WERE ALL FUNCTIONING NORMALLY, IT WAS DECIDED TO PRESS ON TO OUR DEST. WE HAD SEVERAL DIVERT AIRFIELDS ALONG OUR RTE OF FLT AND WERE PREPARED TO DIVERT IF THE NEED PRESENTED ITSELF. WE KEPT AN EYE ON THE FUEL BURN AND THE WX FOR EACH DIVERT FIELD ALL THE WAY TO DEST WHERE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG WAS MADE. AFTER THINKING ABOUT IT FOR A FEW DAYS, I THINK THE MORE PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RETURN TO EZE AND TAKEN OUR CHANCES WITH CONTRACT MAINT PLUS ALL THE WASTED FUEL, BROKEN PAX CONNECTIONS AND DELAYS A RETURN WOULD HAVE CAUSED. SOMETIMES THE PACE OF OPS PLUS ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS CAN STEER YOUR THINKING FROM THE MOST SAFETY CONSCIOUS CHOICE TO ANOTHER WHICH IS BALANCED BTWN SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL NECESSITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.