Narrative:

Clear for takeoff on runway 15L at iah, the first officer at controls, advanced the throttles and activated toga switch. The autothrottle disconnected when he pushed toga, power was close to takeoff N1, so I reset the throttle to target N1 and proceeded to verify airspeed. The captain's airspeed indicator was showing no airspeed increase. This seems to happen very fast (time wise). I assumed since it was very quick that we should not be above 100 KTS so I immediately initiated a rejected takeoff procedure, after announcing my intentions. The aircraft stopped normally for the procedure and we taxied off the runway. The first officer then indicated to me that he saw 117 KTS on his airspeed indicator. The emergency equipment was called out to confirm the condition of the brakes and tires. Completed the rejected takeoff checklist, advised the company and returned to the gate after proper logbook write-up was entered. The aircraft was replaced and passenger reboarded and we continued on our flight to atl, GA. After an uneventful flight, landed at atl and passenger deplaned normally. As my first officer and I walked out of the gate, my flight service manager proceeded to ask me what to do with an incident report she had prepared. When I asked what incident report, she indicated that a flight attendant was complaining of back and neck pain. The first officer later indicated to me that he thought it was a passenger and not a flight attendant. All this I find out at atl 4 hours later. No one at any time advised me of any injury or other problem. In retrospect, I think a call on airspeed alive at first indication of airspeed by any pilot would have alerted me his system is operating normally. I could have continued the takeoff and come back to the airport, not having to reject at high speed. I based my decision on the fact that there were 12000 ft of runway and I felt we were not going very fast. As it was, we were over 100 KTS making this procedure a high speed abort. When we taxi off of the runway we had over 6000 ft left of runway with no tire or tire fuse damage. No far was violated at any time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN A300 CALLED FOR REJECTED TKOF AFTER OBSERVING THAT HIS AIRSPD INDICTOR WAS NOT SHOWING AIRSPD INCREASE DURING THE TKOF ROLL. REJECTION WAS NORMAL AND ACFT TAXIED TO GATE FOR MAINT REVIEW OF POSSIBLE PROB. ONE PAX CLAIMED BACK AND NECK INJURY AFTER REJECTED TKOF.

Narrative: CLR FOR TKOF ON RWY 15L AT IAH, THE FO AT CTLS, ADVANCED THE THROTTLES AND ACTIVATED TOGA SWITCH. THE AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECTED WHEN HE PUSHED TOGA, PWR WAS CLOSE TO TKOF N1, SO I RESET THE THROTTLE TO TARGET N1 AND PROCEEDED TO VERIFY AIRSPD. THE CAPT'S AIRSPD INDICATOR WAS SHOWING NO AIRSPD INCREASE. THIS SEEMS TO HAPPEN VERY FAST (TIME WISE). I ASSUMED SINCE IT WAS VERY QUICK THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE ABOVE 100 KTS SO I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A REJECTED TKOF PROC, AFTER ANNOUNCING MY INTENTIONS. THE ACFT STOPPED NORMALLY FOR THE PROC AND WE TAXIED OFF THE RWY. THE FO THEN INDICATED TO ME THAT HE SAW 117 KTS ON HIS AIRSPD INDICATOR. THE EMER EQUIP WAS CALLED OUT TO CONFIRM THE CONDITION OF THE BRAKES AND TIRES. COMPLETED THE REJECTED TKOF CHKLIST, ADVISED THE COMPANY AND RETURNED TO THE GATE AFTER PROPER LOGBOOK WRITE-UP WAS ENTERED. THE ACFT WAS REPLACED AND PAX REBOARDED AND WE CONTINUED ON OUR FLT TO ATL, GA. AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL FLT, LANDED AT ATL AND PAX DEPLANED NORMALLY. AS MY FO AND I WALKED OUT OF THE GATE, MY FLT SVC MGR PROCEEDED TO ASK ME WHAT TO DO WITH AN INCIDENT RPT SHE HAD PREPARED. WHEN I ASKED WHAT INCIDENT RPT, SHE INDICATED THAT A FLT ATTENDANT WAS COMPLAINING OF BACK AND NECK PAIN. THE FO LATER INDICATED TO ME THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A PAX AND NOT A FLT ATTENDANT. ALL THIS I FIND OUT AT ATL 4 HRS LATER. NO ONE AT ANY TIME ADVISED ME OF ANY INJURY OR OTHER PROB. IN RETROSPECT, I THINK A CALL ON AIRSPD ALIVE AT FIRST INDICATION OF AIRSPD BY ANY PLT WOULD HAVE ALERTED ME HIS SYS IS OPERATING NORMALLY. I COULD HAVE CONTINUED THE TKOF AND COME BACK TO THE ARPT, NOT HAVING TO REJECT AT HIGH SPD. I BASED MY DECISION ON THE FACT THAT THERE WERE 12000 FT OF RWY AND I FELT WE WERE NOT GOING VERY FAST. AS IT WAS, WE WERE OVER 100 KTS MAKING THIS PROC A HIGH SPD ABORT. WHEN WE TAXI OFF OF THE RWY WE HAD OVER 6000 FT LEFT OF RWY WITH NO TIRE OR TIRE FUSE DAMAGE. NO FAR WAS VIOLATED AT ANY TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.