Narrative:

The flight was scheduled to depart at AB25. The inbound aircraft making up the flight arrived at approximately AB15. Pushed from the gate at AB45. The airport closed from AB30 until AC00 for runway snow removal, so the captain decided to wait until it officially reopened before beginning deicing. Deicing began around AB05. After roughly 20 mins, the captain inquired about the deicer's progress, and were told that they were still using type I to deice, and the ice/snow accumulation on the wing was difficult to remove. Maintenance completed the type iv application at AB44. They were using only 1 truck, and upon completion of the type iv application, suggested that the maintenance foreman be notified because it took an excessive amount of time to deice, primarily due to only 1 truck being available. However, during subsequent deicing, they did use 2 trucks. Our taxi time to the runway took less than 5 mins. Upon reaching the end of the runway, the captain had the first officer conduct a cabin check of the aircraft for ice accumulation. The first officer observed the right wing to have a smooth and glossy finish, but the left wing looked as if it had not been deiced at all. There was what appeared to be a layer of frozen precipitation on top of the entire wing. The first officer asked the deadheading first officer (A319 qualified) to take a look at the wing as well, and he concurred that it was completely contaminated. This deadheading first officer, incidentally, was an A319 ground school instructor in the mid 1990's. During later discussion with the deadheading captain, he stated that the application of the type iv fluid looked to be very modest, and not applied in accordance with the sweeping motion dictated by air carrier procedures. We taxied back for another application of type I and type iv fluid. We were having a great deal of difficulty establishing communication with the deice truck. When we finally were able to communicate, they said that they were going to get another truck, and a different microphone. They got another truck, but 90% of the xmissions were still unreadable. They seemed to be able to hear us, but we could not hear them. So we directed them to continue the second deice and anti-ice application. The second application started at AD10 and was completed at AD18. After they completed this, they attempted to give a readback of the final deicing/anti-icing report, which was garbled. Since they were not able to communicate the deicing report, one of the deicers came over to the captain's side of the aircraft to give him a thumbs up. In the meantime, the first officer (flying) was on the radio trying to get the deicing report relayed through operations. The deadheading first officer immediately entered the cockpit, and stated that the right wing was still very contaminated. The flying first officer proceeded to check this out, and observed the same. The flying captain asked the deadheading captain to observe the wing, and he also concurred that it was badly contaminated. Again, there was less than 1 min of time between the time that the post application report was tried to be relayed/given, and the deadheading first officer observed the contaminated wing. The deicing crew again gave us no indication of any contamination. The captain decided to return to the gate, and attempt to determine the cause of the contamination and rapid failure of the type iv fluid. Upon reaching the gate, the 4 pilots (2 flying and 2 deadheading) proceeded outside, observed the top of the wing directly via a ladder that was placed next to the wing by a maintenance person and witnessed a significant slushy accumulation and complete failure of the anti-icing fluid. Less than 6 mins had elapsed from the time of the failed attempt to get a deicing report and this inspection. No green fluid residue was noted on either wing. While the captain of A319 flight was attempting to determine the cause of the continued contamination/failure of the deicing/anti-icing, the crew of another flight (B737-300) was being deiced. First officer communicated this situation to them. They advised that they were having maintenance conduct a visual inspection of the aircraft, subsequent to deicing. They proceeded to the runway. As they were nearing the depend of the runway, operations and the captain of our flight contacted them and advised that they should be aware that the possibility exists that the type iv fluid was diluted or contaminated. After conducting their own cabin check, they decided to return to the gate. Both crews (flying and deadheading) met their airplane as it taxied in. The captain and first officer of other flight ran their hands over the wing, recovering large scoops of snow -- enough to make a softball sized snowball with 1 scoop. They then proceeded to jetway, and had discussions with the captain and first officer. They advised that between their post application report, and the time they returned to the gate, about 35 mins had elapsed. It only took this amount of time for the aircraft to be completely covered in snow, over the wings and fuselage. The captain of other flight later stated that he also observed the deicing crew to be giving short squirts of both types of fluid to the wing, as opposed to making sweeping motions. He said that they would squirt, a puff of fluid would appear, and then they would wait for it to dissipate before applying more fluid. Our third departure attempt resulted in a full deice and anti-ice application, however, the precipitation had subsided for the period of time that we taxied to the runway, so no further contamination was noted prior to takeoff. It is this crew member's opinion that a departure with the mentioned contamination might have resulted in a loss of lift at rotation, significant enough to cause loss of control of the aircraft. This is especially true since one wing had no contamination, while the other was seriously contaminated. The ATIS report for the first deicing attempt was 060 degrees at 70 KTS, 7 scattered, 13 overcast, 3/4, ip+, right, br, 01/01M altimeter 29.46. The ATIS report for the second attempt was 050 degrees at 10 KTS, 13 overcast, 3/4 ip, right, br, 01/01, altimeter 29.37. There was not an ATIS noted for this report for the third attempt, however, there was no precipitation falling that the flight crew noted. Union air safety was notified about the problems at hand. The dispatcher was notified and a conference call set up with the maintenance control supervisor in pit. His name was not recorded. In the fear that the type iv fluid may have been contaminated, the captain requested the deicing crew to obtain a sample of the fluid from each of the trucks which will be given to union air safety committee.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 ACR FLTS HAVE DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING PROPER DEICING UNTIL AFTER 3 ATTEMPTS DURING INCLEMENT WX AT PVD, RI.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT AB25. THE INBOUND ACFT MAKING UP THE FLT ARRIVED AT APPROX AB15. PUSHED FROM THE GATE AT AB45. THE ARPT CLOSED FROM AB30 UNTIL AC00 FOR RWY SNOW REMOVAL, SO THE CAPT DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL IT OFFICIALLY REOPENED BEFORE BEGINNING DEICING. DEICING BEGAN AROUND AB05. AFTER ROUGHLY 20 MINS, THE CAPT INQUIRED ABOUT THE DEICER'S PROGRESS, AND WERE TOLD THAT THEY WERE STILL USING TYPE I TO DEICE, AND THE ICE/SNOW ACCUMULATION ON THE WING WAS DIFFICULT TO REMOVE. MAINT COMPLETED THE TYPE IV APPLICATION AT AB44. THEY WERE USING ONLY 1 TRUCK, AND UPON COMPLETION OF THE TYPE IV APPLICATION, SUGGESTED THAT THE MAINT FOREMAN BE NOTIFIED BECAUSE IT TOOK AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF TIME TO DEICE, PRIMARILY DUE TO ONLY 1 TRUCK BEING AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, DURING SUBSEQUENT DEICING, THEY DID USE 2 TRUCKS. OUR TAXI TIME TO THE RWY TOOK LESS THAN 5 MINS. UPON REACHING THE END OF THE RWY, THE CAPT HAD THE FO CONDUCT A CABIN CHK OF THE ACFT FOR ICE ACCUMULATION. THE FO OBSERVED THE R WING TO HAVE A SMOOTH AND GLOSSY FINISH, BUT THE L WING LOOKED AS IF IT HAD NOT BEEN DEICED AT ALL. THERE WAS WHAT APPEARED TO BE A LAYER OF FROZEN PRECIP ON TOP OF THE ENTIRE WING. THE FO ASKED THE DEADHEADING FO (A319 QUALIFIED) TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE WING AS WELL, AND HE CONCURRED THAT IT WAS COMPLETELY CONTAMINATED. THIS DEADHEADING FO, INCIDENTALLY, WAS AN A319 GND SCHOOL INSTRUCTOR IN THE MID 1990'S. DURING LATER DISCUSSION WITH THE DEADHEADING CAPT, HE STATED THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE TYPE IV FLUID LOOKED TO BE VERY MODEST, AND NOT APPLIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SWEEPING MOTION DICTATED BY ACR PROCS. WE TAXIED BACK FOR ANOTHER APPLICATION OF TYPE I AND TYPE IV FLUID. WE WERE HAVING A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFICULTY ESTABLISHING COM WITH THE DEICE TRUCK. WHEN WE FINALLY WERE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE, THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE GOING TO GET ANOTHER TRUCK, AND A DIFFERENT MIKE. THEY GOT ANOTHER TRUCK, BUT 90% OF THE XMISSIONS WERE STILL UNREADABLE. THEY SEEMED TO BE ABLE TO HEAR US, BUT WE COULD NOT HEAR THEM. SO WE DIRECTED THEM TO CONTINUE THE SECOND DEICE AND ANTI-ICE APPLICATION. THE SECOND APPLICATION STARTED AT AD10 AND WAS COMPLETED AT AD18. AFTER THEY COMPLETED THIS, THEY ATTEMPTED TO GIVE A READBACK OF THE FINAL DEICING/ANTI-ICING RPT, WHICH WAS GARBLED. SINCE THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE THE DEICING RPT, ONE OF THE DEICERS CAME OVER TO THE CAPT'S SIDE OF THE ACFT TO GIVE HIM A THUMBS UP. IN THE MEANTIME, THE FO (FLYING) WAS ON THE RADIO TRYING TO GET THE DEICING RPT RELAYED THROUGH OPS. THE DEADHEADING FO IMMEDIATELY ENTERED THE COCKPIT, AND STATED THAT THE R WING WAS STILL VERY CONTAMINATED. THE FLYING FO PROCEEDED TO CHK THIS OUT, AND OBSERVED THE SAME. THE FLYING CAPT ASKED THE DEADHEADING CAPT TO OBSERVE THE WING, AND HE ALSO CONCURRED THAT IT WAS BADLY CONTAMINATED. AGAIN, THERE WAS LESS THAN 1 MIN OF TIME BTWN THE TIME THAT THE POST APPLICATION RPT WAS TRIED TO BE RELAYED/GIVEN, AND THE DEADHEADING FO OBSERVED THE CONTAMINATED WING. THE DEICING CREW AGAIN GAVE US NO INDICATION OF ANY CONTAMINATION. THE CAPT DECIDED TO RETURN TO THE GATE, AND ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE CONTAMINATION AND RAPID FAILURE OF THE TYPE IV FLUID. UPON REACHING THE GATE, THE 4 PLTS (2 FLYING AND 2 DEADHEADING) PROCEEDED OUTSIDE, OBSERVED THE TOP OF THE WING DIRECTLY VIA A LADDER THAT WAS PLACED NEXT TO THE WING BY A MAINT PERSON AND WITNESSED A SIGNIFICANT SLUSHY ACCUMULATION AND COMPLETE FAILURE OF THE ANTI-ICING FLUID. LESS THAN 6 MINS HAD ELAPSED FROM THE TIME OF THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO GET A DEICING RPT AND THIS INSPECTION. NO GREEN FLUID RESIDUE WAS NOTED ON EITHER WING. WHILE THE CAPT OF A319 FLT WAS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE CONTINUED CONTAMINATION/FAILURE OF THE DEICING/ANTI-ICING, THE CREW OF ANOTHER FLT (B737-300) WAS BEING DEICED. FO COMMUNICATED THIS SIT TO THEM. THEY ADVISED THAT THEY WERE HAVING MAINT CONDUCT A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ACFT, SUBSEQUENT TO DEICING. THEY PROCEEDED TO THE RWY. AS THEY WERE NEARING THE DEPEND OF THE RWY, OPS AND THE CAPT OF OUR FLT CONTACTED THEM AND ADVISED THAT THEY SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT THE TYPE IV FLUID WAS DILUTED OR CONTAMINATED. AFTER CONDUCTING THEIR OWN CABIN CHK, THEY DECIDED TO RETURN TO THE GATE. BOTH CREWS (FLYING AND DEADHEADING) MET THEIR AIRPLANE AS IT TAXIED IN. THE CAPT AND FO OF OTHER FLT RAN THEIR HANDS OVER THE WING, RECOVERING LARGE SCOOPS OF SNOW -- ENOUGH TO MAKE A SOFTBALL SIZED SNOWBALL WITH 1 SCOOP. THEY THEN PROCEEDED TO JETWAY, AND HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CAPT AND FO. THEY ADVISED THAT BTWN THEIR POST APPLICATION RPT, AND THE TIME THEY RETURNED TO THE GATE, ABOUT 35 MINS HAD ELAPSED. IT ONLY TOOK THIS AMOUNT OF TIME FOR THE ACFT TO BE COMPLETELY COVERED IN SNOW, OVER THE WINGS AND FUSELAGE. THE CAPT OF OTHER FLT LATER STATED THAT HE ALSO OBSERVED THE DEICING CREW TO BE GIVING SHORT SQUIRTS OF BOTH TYPES OF FLUID TO THE WING, AS OPPOSED TO MAKING SWEEPING MOTIONS. HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD SQUIRT, A PUFF OF FLUID WOULD APPEAR, AND THEN THEY WOULD WAIT FOR IT TO DISSIPATE BEFORE APPLYING MORE FLUID. OUR THIRD DEP ATTEMPT RESULTED IN A FULL DEICE AND ANTI-ICE APPLICATION, HOWEVER, THE PRECIP HAD SUBSIDED FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT WE TAXIED TO THE RWY, SO NO FURTHER CONTAMINATION WAS NOTED PRIOR TO TKOF. IT IS THIS CREW MEMBER'S OPINION THAT A DEP WITH THE MENTIONED CONTAMINATION MIGHT HAVE RESULTED IN A LOSS OF LIFT AT ROTATION, SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO CAUSE LOSS OF CTL OF THE ACFT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE SINCE ONE WING HAD NO CONTAMINATION, WHILE THE OTHER WAS SERIOUSLY CONTAMINATED. THE ATIS RPT FOR THE FIRST DEICING ATTEMPT WAS 060 DEGS AT 70 KTS, 7 SCATTERED, 13 OVCST, 3/4, IP+, R, BR, 01/01M ALTIMETER 29.46. THE ATIS RPT FOR THE SECOND ATTEMPT WAS 050 DEGS AT 10 KTS, 13 OVCST, 3/4 IP, R, BR, 01/01, ALTIMETER 29.37. THERE WAS NOT AN ATIS NOTED FOR THIS RPT FOR THE THIRD ATTEMPT, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO PRECIP FALLING THAT THE FLC NOTED. UNION AIR SAFETY WAS NOTIFIED ABOUT THE PROBS AT HAND. THE DISPATCHER WAS NOTIFIED AND A CONFERENCE CALL SET UP WITH THE MAINT CTL SUPVR IN PIT. HIS NAME WAS NOT RECORDED. IN THE FEAR THAT THE TYPE IV FLUID MAY HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED, THE CAPT REQUESTED THE DEICING CREW TO OBTAIN A SAMPLE OF THE FLUID FROM EACH OF THE TRUCKS WHICH WILL BE GIVEN TO UNION AIR SAFETY COMMITTEE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.