Narrative:

1) how the problem arose: various runways were being used through unicom communications. The winds were light and variable, but mostly from the northwest. Runways 08, 26 and 30 had been used for takeoffs and approachs during the preceding hour. After deciding to depart on runway 30 straight out, I announced my intentions, taxied to the hold position and performed my run up. When I completed my run up I announced that I was ready to depart on runway 30. I heard the cessna -- I do not recall the north number -- call 'downwind' for runway 04. I announced that I was taking runway 30 for departure and began my takeoff roll. 2) how it was discovered: I was airborne and climbing out when I reached the intersection of runway 30 and 04 and heard him call 'base to final' and saw the cessna over the approach end of runway 04 on short final. He announced that he was going to go around. We had each other in sight and he passed well behind and below me as I continued a straight out departure. I transmitted an apology saying that I didn't get his call, meaning I didn't understand his position on his downwind when I took the runway. I did not hear a base call before I started rolling and incorrectly assumed that I had more time. He didn't respond, but I heard him giving position reports in his downwind and throughout his go around approach. It wasn't a question of radios. 3) contributing factors: although I heard runway 04 I believe my mind thought runway 08. Although various runways had been used in the hour that I was on the ramp observing flight activities, up to this point runway 04 had not. I certainly never would casually take off on an intersecting runway. 04) corrective actions: this was in no way due to any actions by the other pilot. I should have held in position and called for a position report to make certain where he was in the pattern and how he intended to fly the pattern. Moreover, I should have better familiarized myself with the airport layout as several runways had been in use. This problem can be avoided by me taking the actions I have noted and this will indelibly put those procedures into my mind every time I prepare for takeoff or prepare for landing. Human factors 1) perception, judgements, decisions: failure to accurately establish position and pattern profile of an aircraft in the pattern. Subsequent decision to depart. 2) actions or inactions: taking the runway without accurately establishing position and pattern profile of the other aircraft. 3) factors affecting the quality of human performance: incorrect assumption regarding the pattern being flown by the other aircraft. On the positive side, once the situation developed and both pilots were aware of each other, neither did anything unpredictable that would have caused the other to take further action. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter is very disturbed that he was not more focused on the position of the other aircraft. There were several aircraft waiting for takeoff behind him. He was completing his pre takeoff procedures, and, receiving no position of a base leg turn by the other aircraft, presumed he had plenty of time for departure prior to the aircraft turning onto final. He has developed new procedures for himself on takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AT NON TOWERED ARPT WITH MULTIPLE INTERSECTING RWYS, ACFT DEPARTED AS SECOND ACFT REPORTED TURN TO FINAL ON INTERSECTING RWY. LANDING ACFT MADE A GAR.

Narrative: 1) HOW THE PROBLEM AROSE: VARIOUS RWYS WERE BEING USED THROUGH UNICOM COMS. THE WINDS WERE LIGHT AND VARIABLE, BUT MOSTLY FROM THE NW. RWYS 08, 26 AND 30 HAD BEEN USED FOR TKOFS AND APCHS DURING THE PRECEDING HR. AFTER DECIDING TO DEPART ON RWY 30 STRAIGHT OUT, I ANNOUNCED MY INTENTIONS, TAXIED TO THE HOLD POS AND PERFORMED MY RUN UP. WHEN I COMPLETED MY RUN UP I ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS READY TO DEPART ON RWY 30. I HEARD THE CESSNA -- I DO NOT RECALL THE N NUMBER -- CALL 'DOWNWIND' FOR RWY 04. I ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS TAKING RWY 30 FOR DEP AND BEGAN MY TKOF ROLL. 2) HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: I WAS AIRBORNE AND CLIMBING OUT WHEN I REACHED THE INTERSECTION OF RWY 30 AND 04 AND HEARD HIM CALL 'BASE TO FINAL' AND SAW THE CESSNA OVER THE APCH END OF RWY 04 ON SHORT FINAL. HE ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS GOING TO GAR. WE HAD EACH OTHER IN SIGHT AND HE PASSED WELL BEHIND AND BELOW ME AS I CONTINUED A STRAIGHT OUT DEP. I XMITTED AN APOLOGY SAYING THAT I DIDN'T GET HIS CALL, MEANING I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND HIS POS ON HIS DOWNWIND WHEN I TOOK THE RWY. I DID NOT HEAR A BASE CALL BEFORE I STARTED ROLLING AND INCORRECTLY ASSUMED THAT I HAD MORE TIME. HE DIDN'T RESPOND, BUT I HEARD HIM GIVING POS RPTS IN HIS DOWNWIND AND THROUGHOUT HIS GAR APCH. IT WASN'T A QUESTION OF RADIOS. 3) CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ALTHOUGH I HEARD RWY 04 I BELIEVE MY MIND THOUGHT RWY 08. ALTHOUGH VARIOUS RWYS HAD BEEN USED IN THE HR THAT I WAS ON THE RAMP OBSERVING FLT ACTIVITIES, UP TO THIS POINT RWY 04 HAD NOT. I CERTAINLY NEVER WOULD CASUALLY TAKE OFF ON AN INTERSECTING RWY. 04) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: THIS WAS IN NO WAY DUE TO ANY ACTIONS BY THE OTHER PLT. I SHOULD HAVE HELD IN POS AND CALLED FOR A POS RPT TO MAKE CERTAIN WHERE HE WAS IN THE PATTERN AND HOW HE INTENDED TO FLY THE PATTERN. MOREOVER, I SHOULD HAVE BETTER FAMILIARIZED MYSELF WITH THE ARPT LAYOUT AS SEVERAL RWYS HAD BEEN IN USE. THIS PROBLEM CAN BE AVOIDED BY ME TAKING THE ACTIONS I HAVE NOTED AND THIS WILL INDELIBLY PUT THOSE PROCEDURES INTO MY MIND EVERY TIME I PREPARE FOR TKOF OR PREPARE FOR LNDG. HUMAN FACTORS 1) PERCEPTION, JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS: FAILURE TO ACCURATELY ESTABLISH POS AND PATTERN PROFILE OF AN ACFT IN THE PATTERN. SUBSEQUENT DECISION TO DEPART. 2) ACTIONS OR INACTIONS: TAKING THE RWY WITHOUT ACCURATELY ESTABLISHING POS AND PATTERN PROFILE OF THE OTHER ACFT. 3) FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE: INCORRECT ASSUMPTION REGARDING THE PATTERN BEING FLOWN BY THE OTHER ACFT. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, ONCE THE SIT DEVELOPED AND BOTH PLTS WERE AWARE OF EACH OTHER, NEITHER DID ANYTHING UNPREDICTABLE THAT WOULD HAVE CAUSED THE OTHER TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR IS VERY DISTURBED THAT HE WAS NOT MORE FOCUSED ON THE POS OF THE OTHER ACFT. THERE WERE SEVERAL ACFT WAITING FOR TKOF BEHIND HIM. HE WAS COMPLETING HIS PRE TKOF PROCS, AND, RECEIVING NO POSITION OF A BASE LEG TURN BY THE OTHER ACFT, PRESUMED HE HAD PLENTY OF TIME FOR DEPARTURE PRIOR TO THE ACFT TURNING ONTO FINAL. HE HAS DEVELOPED NEW PROCS FOR HIMSELF ON TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.