Narrative:

The clearance was teb 4 departure (climb on heading 040 degrees until leaving 1500 ft then left turn direct pnj NDB maintain 2000 ft until crossing pnj NDB then climb to 3000 ft). ATIS was reporting LLWS and pressure dropping rapidly. (I cannot remember actual words used on ATIS and ATIS changed approximately 6 times from first listening until departure.) tower/ground combined and heard 2 or 3 aircraft report windshear greater than 10 KTS on short final in the 15 mins prior to our departure. Briefed for LNAV VNAV departure. I was PF, cleared for takeoff runway 1. Tower advised traffic passing east 2-3 mi at 1000 ft. First officer inadvertently selected VNAV on the ground, autothrottle disengaged, thrust set manually. On rotation, TCASII traffic alert and immediately encountered moderate to severe turbulence causing large airspeed fluctuations and difficulty in focusing on the flight instruments. We passed over the traffic by 400 ft indicated on TCASII. Leaving 1500 ft, turned left to track to pnj and 2000 ft. Xferred to new york departure, vectored 270 degrees climb 6000 ft. At about this point, the r-hand windshield wiper disengaged from the parked position due to the turbulence. The wiper was beating against the windshield at a very rapid rate and I misidented this noise as a highspd warning (clacking). This caused confusion in my mind as speed was well below vmo. After about 30 seconds, the first officer asked if I wanted him to cycle the windshield wiper to try and stow it. I said yes, and when cycled the wiper stowed normally. At this point, new york departure asked for our altitude as we were passing 7500 ft. The first officer advised that we were at 8000 ft descending back to 6000 ft. The controller instructed us to maintain 8000 ft and handed us off to the next controller. This departure was on day 5 of a busy international and domestic schedule with multiple time zone changes. While this is no excuse, I believe that jet lag, the traffic alert, turbulence and inadequate communications between the first officer and myself were certainly contributing factors. Also, we had left our third crew member (another captain) behind on the west coast as we had another international departure the next day. When we were in cruise after the incident, the first officer said he got preoccupied with the traffic and the windshield wiper, and that he was not watching the flight instruments. He assumed that I knew what the noise (or the wiper) was. I said all I had to do was ask him what was happening! We both agreed that in the future we will work on communicating better.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GLF4 CREW OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT ON DEP.

Narrative: THE CLRNC WAS TEB 4 DEP (CLB ON HDG 040 DEGS UNTIL LEAVING 1500 FT THEN L TURN DIRECT PNJ NDB MAINTAIN 2000 FT UNTIL XING PNJ NDB THEN CLB TO 3000 FT). ATIS WAS RPTING LLWS AND PRESSURE DROPPING RAPIDLY. (I CANNOT REMEMBER ACTUAL WORDS USED ON ATIS AND ATIS CHANGED APPROX 6 TIMES FROM FIRST LISTENING UNTIL DEP.) TWR/GND COMBINED AND HEARD 2 OR 3 ACFT RPT WINDSHEAR GREATER THAN 10 KTS ON SHORT FINAL IN THE 15 MINS PRIOR TO OUR DEP. BRIEFED FOR LNAV VNAV DEP. I WAS PF, CLRED FOR TKOF RWY 1. TWR ADVISED TFC PASSING E 2-3 MI AT 1000 FT. FO INADVERTENTLY SELECTED VNAV ON THE GND, AUTOTHROTTLE DISENGAGED, THRUST SET MANUALLY. ON ROTATION, TCASII TFC ALERT AND IMMEDIATELY ENCOUNTERED MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB CAUSING LARGE AIRSPD FLUCTUATIONS AND DIFFICULTY IN FOCUSING ON THE FLT INSTS. WE PASSED OVER THE TFC BY 400 FT INDICATED ON TCASII. LEAVING 1500 FT, TURNED L TO TRACK TO PNJ AND 2000 FT. XFERRED TO NEW YORK DEP, VECTORED 270 DEGS CLB 6000 FT. AT ABOUT THIS POINT, THE R-HAND WINDSHIELD WIPER DISENGAGED FROM THE PARKED POS DUE TO THE TURB. THE WIPER WAS BEATING AGAINST THE WINDSHIELD AT A VERY RAPID RATE AND I MISIDENTED THIS NOISE AS A HIGHSPD WARNING (CLACKING). THIS CAUSED CONFUSION IN MY MIND AS SPD WAS WELL BELOW VMO. AFTER ABOUT 30 SECONDS, THE FO ASKED IF I WANTED HIM TO CYCLE THE WINDSHIELD WIPER TO TRY AND STOW IT. I SAID YES, AND WHEN CYCLED THE WIPER STOWED NORMALLY. AT THIS POINT, NEW YORK DEP ASKED FOR OUR ALT AS WE WERE PASSING 7500 FT. THE FO ADVISED THAT WE WERE AT 8000 FT DSNDING BACK TO 6000 FT. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 8000 FT AND HANDED US OFF TO THE NEXT CTLR. THIS DEP WAS ON DAY 5 OF A BUSY INTL AND DOMESTIC SCHEDULE WITH MULTIPLE TIME ZONE CHANGES. WHILE THIS IS NO EXCUSE, I BELIEVE THAT JET LAG, THE TFC ALERT, TURB AND INADEQUATE COMS BTWN THE FO AND MYSELF WERE CERTAINLY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. ALSO, WE HAD LEFT OUR THIRD CREW MEMBER (ANOTHER CAPT) BEHIND ON THE WEST COAST AS WE HAD ANOTHER INTL DEP THE NEXT DAY. WHEN WE WERE IN CRUISE AFTER THE INCIDENT, THE FO SAID HE GOT PREOCCUPIED WITH THE TFC AND THE WINDSHIELD WIPER, AND THAT HE WAS NOT WATCHING THE FLT INSTS. HE ASSUMED THAT I KNEW WHAT THE NOISE (OR THE WIPER) WAS. I SAID ALL I HAD TO DO WAS ASK HIM WHAT WAS HAPPENING! WE BOTH AGREED THAT IN THE FUTURE WE WILL WORK ON COMMUNICATING BETTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.