Narrative:

Prior to engine start, I briefed the captain on the ATC clearance I had received. This included the departure procedure with a review of the departure procedure chart and en route hi altitude commercial chart. I advised the captain that I had programmed the flight plan and departure procedure into the FMS. During the before taxi checklist, we briefed and discussed the departure procedure and transition as part of the 'avionics tested and set' element of the checklist using the flight plan, FMS and departure procedure chart. Before taxi, all taxi, before takeoff and takeoff events proceeded according to SOP except that during taxi, the captain began taxiing out from the FBO and continued taxiing onto the taxiway. As I was completing the 'flight instruments' portion of the taxi checklist, I asked him, 'whose leg is it going to be / where do you want the flight director?' the captain said 'it's your leg.' we changed controls and continued to taxi. During the taxi checklist, as PF, I included a rebrief of the full departure and transition procedure as part of the crew briefing. The captain retained the departure procedure chart on his yoke clip. During the initial departure phase and at approximately 450 ft AGL, shortly after flap retraction, I began a right turn and called turning right to intercept the rno localizer DME back course. The captain said, 'don't turn right, we need to turn left.' I said 'we have to turn right to intercept the localizer. The localizer is to the right.' he said 'no, you need to turn left, turn left now.' I held my 10 degree intercept and asserted 'the localizer course is to the right.' I pointed at my course indicator. The captain, with what appeared to be significant physical force, took the flight controls simultaneously banking left and stated, 'ok, then we're turning left, I have the controls.' I did not come off of the controls as quickly as he was taking them and he stated again, 'I have the controls.' we entered an immediate 30 degree bank to the left. I continued to advise him to 'turn back to the right' and 'stop your turn' and pointed at the FMS and CDI stating several times 'we have to turn back to the right to get on the localizer.' he stopped the turn, rolled wings level momentarily and then began to turn back. It was after the captain stopped the turn that the ATC controller asked our heading and asked to confirm if we were in a left turn and that we were making a VFR climb and that we were providing our own terrain clearance. The captain responded to ATC that we were in VFR conditions with terrain and traffic in sight. ATC advised we were supposed to be on the wagge 1 departure. I believe ATC asked once again if we were VFR and able to maintain our own terrain separation, then revised the assigned altitude we were climbing from 13000 ft to 15000 ft and assigned a heading of 160 degrees. Prior to takeoff and during the climb, I was keenly aware that we were in VFR conditions and I could see the mountain tops around us as well as a B737 descending overhead into the area from our 11 O'clock high position. I believe the captain acted prematurely and outside the scope of our SOP in taking the controls from me under the described circumstances. I believe these circumstances, as they evolved, constituted a significant breakdown in CRM. During the prior 2 days flying, I believe our CRM was excellent and that we communicated well and worked well as a team in the cockpit. Had this event occurred in actual IFR conditions, the situation, in terms of my required actions, would have been significantly different and I believe I potentially would have had no choice but to physically override the captain on the flight controls. Under the circumstances, I believe that I elected the safest course of action in not attempting to intervene with the captain on the flight controls any further, but rather by using verbal and visual directions to redirect the captain. I cite the following potential contributing factors: pilot fatigue, captain's lack of familiarity with reno area operations, problems at home, distraction (self inflicted), CRM failure by captain's limited CRM training during his career, captain's military attitude 'I am in command,' captain's demonstrated loss of patience, captain's reported no rest from work during his prior 2 '7 on, 7 off' work days due to an airline interview and he rptedly flew several military C130 pilot missions while 'off' duty from our principal employer, and captain's preset erroneous mental image of the SID (departure procedure).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C560 FLC CRM BREAKDOWN ON DEP FROM RNO IS ALERTED BY RNO AND THE FO.

Narrative: PRIOR TO ENG START, I BRIEFED THE CAPT ON THE ATC CLRNC I HAD RECEIVED. THIS INCLUDED THE DEP PROC WITH A REVIEW OF THE DEP PROC CHART AND ENRTE HI ALT COMMERCIAL CHART. I ADVISED THE CAPT THAT I HAD PROGRAMMED THE FLT PLAN AND DEP PROC INTO THE FMS. DURING THE BEFORE TAXI CHKLIST, WE BRIEFED AND DISCUSSED THE DEP PROC AND TRANSITION AS PART OF THE 'AVIONICS TESTED AND SET' ELEMENT OF THE CHKLIST USING THE FLT PLAN, FMS AND DEP PROC CHART. BEFORE TAXI, ALL TAXI, BEFORE TKOF AND TKOF EVENTS PROCEEDED ACCORDING TO SOP EXCEPT THAT DURING TAXI, THE CAPT BEGAN TAXIING OUT FROM THE FBO AND CONTINUED TAXIING ONTO THE TXWY. AS I WAS COMPLETING THE 'FLT INSTS' PORTION OF THE TAXI CHKLIST, I ASKED HIM, 'WHOSE LEG IS IT GOING TO BE / WHERE DO YOU WANT THE FLT DIRECTOR?' THE CAPT SAID 'IT'S YOUR LEG.' WE CHANGED CTLS AND CONTINUED TO TAXI. DURING THE TAXI CHKLIST, AS PF, I INCLUDED A REBRIEF OF THE FULL DEP AND TRANSITION PROC AS PART OF THE CREW BRIEFING. THE CAPT RETAINED THE DEP PROC CHART ON HIS YOKE CLIP. DURING THE INITIAL DEP PHASE AND AT APPROX 450 FT AGL, SHORTLY AFTER FLAP RETRACTION, I BEGAN A R TURN AND CALLED TURNING R TO INTERCEPT THE RNO LOC DME BACK COURSE. THE CAPT SAID, 'DON'T TURN R, WE NEED TO TURN LEFT.' I SAID 'WE HAVE TO TURN R TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. THE LOC IS TO THE R.' HE SAID 'NO, YOU NEED TO TURN L, TURN L NOW.' I HELD MY 10 DEG INTERCEPT AND ASSERTED 'THE LOC COURSE IS TO THE R.' I POINTED AT MY COURSE INDICATOR. THE CAPT, WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL FORCE, TOOK THE FLT CTLS SIMULTANEOUSLY BANKING L AND STATED, 'OK, THEN WE'RE TURNING L, I HAVE THE CTLS.' I DID NOT COME OFF OF THE CTLS AS QUICKLY AS HE WAS TAKING THEM AND HE STATED AGAIN, 'I HAVE THE CTLS.' WE ENTERED AN IMMEDIATE 30 DEG BANK TO THE L. I CONTINUED TO ADVISE HIM TO 'TURN BACK TO THE R' AND 'STOP YOUR TURN' AND POINTED AT THE FMS AND CDI STATING SEVERAL TIMES 'WE HAVE TO TURN BACK TO THE R TO GET ON THE LOC.' HE STOPPED THE TURN, ROLLED WINGS LEVEL MOMENTARILY AND THEN BEGAN TO TURN BACK. IT WAS AFTER THE CAPT STOPPED THE TURN THAT THE ATC CTLR ASKED OUR HDG AND ASKED TO CONFIRM IF WE WERE IN A L TURN AND THAT WE WERE MAKING A VFR CLB AND THAT WE WERE PROVIDING OUR OWN TERRAIN CLRNC. THE CAPT RESPONDED TO ATC THAT WE WERE IN VFR CONDITIONS WITH TERRAIN AND TFC IN SIGHT. ATC ADVISED WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ON THE WAGGE 1 DEP. I BELIEVE ATC ASKED ONCE AGAIN IF WE WERE VFR AND ABLE TO MAINTAIN OUR OWN TERRAIN SEPARATION, THEN REVISED THE ASSIGNED ALT WE WERE CLBING FROM 13000 FT TO 15000 FT AND ASSIGNED A HDG OF 160 DEGS. PRIOR TO TKOF AND DURING THE CLB, I WAS KEENLY AWARE THAT WE WERE IN VFR CONDITIONS AND I COULD SEE THE MOUNTAIN TOPS AROUND US AS WELL AS A B737 DSNDING OVERHEAD INTO THE AREA FROM OUR 11 O'CLOCK HIGH POS. I BELIEVE THE CAPT ACTED PREMATURELY AND OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF OUR SOP IN TAKING THE CTLS FROM ME UNDER THE DESCRIBED CIRCUMSTANCES. I BELIEVE THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AS THEY EVOLVED, CONSTITUTED A SIGNIFICANT BREAKDOWN IN CRM. DURING THE PRIOR 2 DAYS FLYING, I BELIEVE OUR CRM WAS EXCELLENT AND THAT WE COMMUNICATED WELL AND WORKED WELL AS A TEAM IN THE COCKPIT. HAD THIS EVENT OCCURRED IN ACTUAL IFR CONDITIONS, THE SIT, IN TERMS OF MY REQUIRED ACTIONS, WOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT AND I BELIEVE I POTENTIALLY WOULD HAVE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO PHYSICALLY OVERRIDE THE CAPT ON THE FLT CTLS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I BELIEVE THAT I ELECTED THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION IN NOT ATTEMPTING TO INTERVENE WITH THE CAPT ON THE FLT CTLS ANY FURTHER, BUT RATHER BY USING VERBAL AND VISUAL DIRECTIONS TO REDIRECT THE CAPT. I CITE THE FOLLOWING POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: PLT FATIGUE, CAPT'S LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH RENO AREA OPS, PROBS AT HOME, DISTR (SELF INFLICTED), CRM FAILURE BY CAPT'S LIMITED CRM TRAINING DURING HIS CAREER, CAPT'S MIL ATTITUDE 'I AM IN COMMAND,' CAPT'S DEMONSTRATED LOSS OF PATIENCE, CAPT'S RPTED NO REST FROM WORK DURING HIS PRIOR 2 '7 ON, 7 OFF' WORK DAYS DUE TO AN AIRLINE INTERVIEW AND HE RPTEDLY FLEW SEVERAL MIL C130 PLT MISSIONS WHILE 'OFF' DUTY FROM OUR PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER, AND CAPT'S PRESET ERRONEOUS MENTAL IMAGE OF THE SID (DEP PROC).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.