Narrative:

Prior to taking the active runway at sbp (runway 29), I was aware of one aircraft in the vicinity that could be a factor during our departure. We had witnessed a PA28 make a very high approach to a missed approach/go around and he was still upwind for runway 29 when we took the runway. He proceeded to make right traffic and I kept him in sight during our initial climb out as he passed off our right side. At that time, the tower issued a traffic call to us regarding a PA28. I assumed, without listening very carefully to the transmission, that he was talking about the one on the right. I said to the captain (PNF) 'he's in sight.' the PNF transmitted a similar reply to tower and I began a left turn to proceed direct rzs VOR, in a VFR climb per our clearance. There are numerous hills in the vicinity of sbp, so we took the option of a VFR climb to avoid the more time consuming IFR routing. I believe I initiated my left turn at about 600 ft AGL or so, an altitude that seems way too low to me now -- considering VFR operations were underway. I was thinking in terms of IFR rules at the time (400 ft AGL before the first turn). When we were almost through a 180 degree turn and climbing at 2000 FPM, the TCASII issued an RA to increase climb, which I responded to. At this point, the captain saw the PA28 for the first time -- about 300-400 ft directly below us. I believe the near midair collision was caused by poor communication between the crew and ATC, by a turn that was too low for the operations and flight conditions, inadequate traffic scan, complacency in treating a more dangerous VFR departure as if it were an IFR departure. In addition, I was suffering the effects of a cold and felt tired. No medication was used.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR TURBOPROP FLC INITIATE TCASII EVASIVE, EXPEDITED CLB ON VFR DEP FROM SBP WHEN CONFLICTING WITH A PA28 ENTERING THE TFC PATTERN.

Narrative: PRIOR TO TAKING THE ACTIVE RWY AT SBP (RWY 29), I WAS AWARE OF ONE ACFT IN THE VICINITY THAT COULD BE A FACTOR DURING OUR DEP. WE HAD WITNESSED A PA28 MAKE A VERY HIGH APCH TO A MISSED APCH/GAR AND HE WAS STILL UPWIND FOR RWY 29 WHEN WE TOOK THE RWY. HE PROCEEDED TO MAKE R TFC AND I KEPT HIM IN SIGHT DURING OUR INITIAL CLBOUT AS HE PASSED OFF OUR R SIDE. AT THAT TIME, THE TWR ISSUED A TFC CALL TO US REGARDING A PA28. I ASSUMED, WITHOUT LISTENING VERY CAREFULLY TO THE XMISSION, THAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE ONE ON THE R. I SAID TO THE CAPT (PNF) 'HE'S IN SIGHT.' THE PNF XMITTED A SIMILAR REPLY TO TWR AND I BEGAN A L TURN TO PROCEED DIRECT RZS VOR, IN A VFR CLB PER OUR CLRNC. THERE ARE NUMEROUS HILLS IN THE VICINITY OF SBP, SO WE TOOK THE OPTION OF A VFR CLB TO AVOID THE MORE TIME CONSUMING IFR ROUTING. I BELIEVE I INITIATED MY L TURN AT ABOUT 600 FT AGL OR SO, AN ALT THAT SEEMS WAY TOO LOW TO ME NOW -- CONSIDERING VFR OPS WERE UNDERWAY. I WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF IFR RULES AT THE TIME (400 FT AGL BEFORE THE FIRST TURN). WHEN WE WERE ALMOST THROUGH A 180 DEG TURN AND CLBING AT 2000 FPM, THE TCASII ISSUED AN RA TO INCREASE CLB, WHICH I RESPONDED TO. AT THIS POINT, THE CAPT SAW THE PA28 FOR THE FIRST TIME -- ABOUT 300-400 FT DIRECTLY BELOW US. I BELIEVE THE NMAC WAS CAUSED BY POOR COM BTWN THE CREW AND ATC, BY A TURN THAT WAS TOO LOW FOR THE OPS AND FLT CONDITIONS, INADEQUATE TFC SCAN, COMPLACENCY IN TREATING A MORE DANGEROUS VFR DEP AS IF IT WERE AN IFR DEP. IN ADDITION, I WAS SUFFERING THE EFFECTS OF A COLD AND FELT TIRED. NO MEDICATION WAS USED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.