Narrative:

As PIC on a C208B operated by air carrier X, I was handed off to mke approach control. Having just listened to the current ATIS, I advised them of my altitude with the ATIS letter. ILS runway 19R was in use with a circle to either runway 25R or runway 25L. Shortly after checking in with mke approach, I was given a vector to intercept the runway 19R localizer course. At this time, I was still on top of the overcast and the ceiling was at 1000-1500 ft AGL. I was not notified of any PIREPS of icing, but anticipating getting at least light to moderate accumulation. I had all the deice equipment on and planned to intercept the GS on top of the overcast. During my descent on ILS runway 19R, I was cleared to circle to the east for a landing on runway 25L. Shortly after breaking out of the overcast, I started a left turn to achieve an adequate distance for my final leg. At this point, I heard the tower clear air carrier Y regional jet for takeoff on runway 25L and they were advised to keep minimal time on the runway because an aircraft was on a right base. This was a common practice with mke tower and posed no threat at this time. I slowed the aircraft to approximately 125 KTS to give more separation. The tower then asked if I could fly through the final and make an s-turn back, which I acknowledged and complied. Upon turning back to intercept final, air carrier Y was not airborne and had not declared an abort. I assumed that he was still in the takeoff roll and the only safe option was to put the aircraft down on the beginning of the runway and stop. I estimate the separation between the 2 aircraft at least 2000 ft and knew I could stop in a very short distance. Performing a go around at that time would have put the 2 aircraft airborne and dangerously close to each other. Another important factor in my decision was that I had approximately 1/2 inch of ice on the aircraft and the stall speed would now be unknown. When I was about 5 ft from touchdown and about 70-80 KTS, the tower advised me to go around. Initiating a go around was not a safe option, as that would have caused an extremely close situation when factors such as ground effect, present aircraft ice and time to accelerate to adequate airspeed to establish a positive rate of climb. It was about this time that air carrier Y said 'tower, this is not going to work, we will need to go back and try this again.' the tower then advised me to go around again but I was already on the runway and practically stopped. He then said 'good job of stopping.' after taxiing into the air carrier X ramp and securing the aircraft, I called the tower supervisor to discuss the situation. He asked why I did not go around and I advised him that by the time I was given a go around, I was too low and slow and the engine was unspooled. He then said that he knew there was icing and that air carrier Y should have declared an abort much earlier. The bottom line is that if I initiated a go around at the time I was given the command, I would have either collided with air carrier Y or would have been very close to that aircraft by the time needed to accelerate and establish a climb. Factors in my decision were aircraft ice, my present landing weight of 7736 pounds, aircraft speed and ht above the ground. This was a pilot judgement call and was the only safe option.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF A CARGO C208 LANDED BEHIND A REGIONAL JET ON THE TKOF ROLL RESULTING IN THE REGIONAL JET ABORTING TKOF SINCE HE HEARD THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCT THE C208 TO GO AROUND. THE C208 STOPPED SUFFICIENTLY SHORT TO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE RJ JET ABORTING.

Narrative: AS PIC ON A C208B OPERATED BY ACR X, I WAS HANDED OFF TO MKE APCH CTL. HAVING JUST LISTENED TO THE CURRENT ATIS, I ADVISED THEM OF MY ALT WITH THE ATIS LETTER. ILS RWY 19R WAS IN USE WITH A CIRCLE TO EITHER RWY 25R OR RWY 25L. SHORTLY AFTER CHKING IN WITH MKE APCH, I WAS GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 19R LOC COURSE. AT THIS TIME, I WAS STILL ON TOP OF THE OVCST AND THE CEILING WAS AT 1000-1500 FT AGL. I WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF ANY PIREPS OF ICING, BUT ANTICIPATING GETTING AT LEAST LIGHT TO MODERATE ACCUMULATION. I HAD ALL THE DEICE EQUIP ON AND PLANNED TO INTERCEPT THE GS ON TOP OF THE OVCST. DURING MY DSCNT ON ILS RWY 19R, I WAS CLRED TO CIRCLE TO THE E FOR A LNDG ON RWY 25L. SHORTLY AFTER BREAKING OUT OF THE OVCST, I STARTED A L TURN TO ACHIEVE AN ADEQUATE DISTANCE FOR MY FINAL LEG. AT THIS POINT, I HEARD THE TWR CLR ACR Y REGIONAL JET FOR TKOF ON RWY 25L AND THEY WERE ADVISED TO KEEP MINIMAL TIME ON THE RWY BECAUSE AN ACFT WAS ON A R BASE. THIS WAS A COMMON PRACTICE WITH MKE TWR AND POSED NO THREAT AT THIS TIME. I SLOWED THE ACFT TO APPROX 125 KTS TO GIVE MORE SEPARATION. THE TWR THEN ASKED IF I COULD FLY THROUGH THE FINAL AND MAKE AN S-TURN BACK, WHICH I ACKNOWLEDGED AND COMPLIED. UPON TURNING BACK TO INTERCEPT FINAL, ACR Y WAS NOT AIRBORNE AND HAD NOT DECLARED AN ABORT. I ASSUMED THAT HE WAS STILL IN THE TKOF ROLL AND THE ONLY SAFE OPTION WAS TO PUT THE ACFT DOWN ON THE BEGINNING OF THE RWY AND STOP. I ESTIMATE THE SEPARATION BTWN THE 2 ACFT AT LEAST 2000 FT AND KNEW I COULD STOP IN A VERY SHORT DISTANCE. PERFORMING A GAR AT THAT TIME WOULD HAVE PUT THE 2 ACFT AIRBORNE AND DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO EACH OTHER. ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MY DECISION WAS THAT I HAD APPROX 1/2 INCH OF ICE ON THE ACFT AND THE STALL SPD WOULD NOW BE UNKNOWN. WHEN I WAS ABOUT 5 FT FROM TOUCHDOWN AND ABOUT 70-80 KTS, THE TWR ADVISED ME TO GO AROUND. INITIATING A GAR WAS NOT A SAFE OPTION, AS THAT WOULD HAVE CAUSED AN EXTREMELY CLOSE SIT WHEN FACTORS SUCH AS GND EFFECT, PRESENT ACFT ICE AND TIME TO ACCELERATE TO ADEQUATE AIRSPD TO ESTABLISH A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB. IT WAS ABOUT THIS TIME THAT ACR Y SAID 'TWR, THIS IS NOT GOING TO WORK, WE WILL NEED TO GO BACK AND TRY THIS AGAIN.' THE TWR THEN ADVISED ME TO GO AROUND AGAIN BUT I WAS ALREADY ON THE RWY AND PRACTICALLY STOPPED. HE THEN SAID 'GOOD JOB OF STOPPING.' AFTER TAXIING INTO THE ACR X RAMP AND SECURING THE ACFT, I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR TO DISCUSS THE SIT. HE ASKED WHY I DID NOT GO AROUND AND I ADVISED HIM THAT BY THE TIME I WAS GIVEN A GAR, I WAS TOO LOW AND SLOW AND THE ENG WAS UNSPOOLED. HE THEN SAID THAT HE KNEW THERE WAS ICING AND THAT ACR Y SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN ABORT MUCH EARLIER. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT IF I INITIATED A GAR AT THE TIME I WAS GIVEN THE COMMAND, I WOULD HAVE EITHER COLLIDED WITH ACR Y OR WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY CLOSE TO THAT ACFT BY THE TIME NEEDED TO ACCELERATE AND ESTABLISH A CLB. FACTORS IN MY DECISION WERE ACFT ICE, MY PRESENT LNDG WT OF 7736 LBS, ACFT SPD AND HT ABOVE THE GND. THIS WAS A PLT JUDGEMENT CALL AND WAS THE ONLY SAFE OPTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.