Narrative:

First officer's leg anticipating the river visual to runway 19 in dca. The first officer only had 8 months with our company, but had been into this airport before with prior B727 captain experience. Second leg of trip and first officer's first leg. Due to special airport considerations, difficulty of approach including proximity of prohibited airspace and noise considerations, we mutually briefed the approach extensively including radio set-up, lateral track and missed approach procedures. First officer was flying very well and with his background, I did not anticipate any problems with the approach. Approach control dumped us in, keeping us high as we neared the beginning of the approach, but the first officer recognized the need to get down to the vertical profile by establishing drag early, and by 6 DME we were established on the vertical profile while maintaining the appropriate ground track over the river. All looked well, but as we crossed 4 DME which requires a major left turn, he turned slowly and appeared to be rolling out early aiming south of the required track. At that point I advised further left. By the time he rolled out on the new heading, I was already on edge and advised that it was time to come right. He complied, but assumed that I was trying to point him toward the runway. He turned in, but way too far. I was confused and when he didn't swing back, I took the aircraft. Later we realized that he was headed for runway 15 which is all lit up and a natural target. As I started to swing out on the modified base, the tower advised us to widen out for traffic. I complied, but told the tower that I would be unable to go very far. We were too low to do much jockeying around without overshooting the final. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful. In hindsight I thought that the tower might not have been as concerned about traffic conflicts as they were about our ground track and proximity to the right bank of the river. Based on that possibility, I called the tower after arrival. The tower supervisor advised no problems with our approach or ground track. The first officer and I discussed the approach extensively. The first officer admitted that while he was familiar with the approach, his recent experience had been in daylight. It all looks different at night. The river which is the primary NAVAID is all, but impossible to see at night. You have to know where it goes and how it turns without really being able to see it. It's more the absence of light and referenced by landmarks that are very obvious to one who had done it a lot before at night, but not obvious to anyone without recent nighttime experience. My verbal attempts at correcting the ground track were misinterpreted and part of the problem. There was nothing but good intentions, but any comments are distracting and there is no time for 2-WAY conversation. The final result was safe and didn't violate any navigation rules, but it wasn't pretty and required me take over control which any captain hates to do. Unfortunately by the time I did, we were too low to allow for any more errors. I sensed a great deal of confusion and realized in hindsight that I was partly to blame. The result was the only safe course of action I could pursue. I knew exactly where we were and what it would take to complete the approach safely. I was unsure that my first officer did, so I took the aircraft. As soon as I took over and started to swing left my first officer realized that he had been headed for the wrong runway, but it was too late to switch back, so I completed the approach and landing. What I learned is what I have known for a long time. There are so many variables in this approach that the potential for minor error is incredible and the potential for major error is always there.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CAPT RELATES DIFFICULTIES IN FLYING THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 19 IN DCA.

Narrative: FO'S LEG ANTICIPATING THE RIVER VISUAL TO RWY 19 IN DCA. THE FO ONLY HAD 8 MONTHS WITH OUR COMPANY, BUT HAD BEEN INTO THIS ARPT BEFORE WITH PRIOR B727 CAPT EXPERIENCE. SECOND LEG OF TRIP AND FO'S FIRST LEG. DUE TO SPECIAL ARPT CONSIDERATIONS, DIFFICULTY OF APCH INCLUDING PROX OF PROHIBITED AIRSPACE AND NOISE CONSIDERATIONS, WE MUTUALLY BRIEFED THE APCH EXTENSIVELY INCLUDING RADIO SET-UP, LATERAL TRACK AND MISSED APCH PROCS. FO WAS FLYING VERY WELL AND WITH HIS BACKGROUND, I DID NOT ANTICIPATE ANY PROBS WITH THE APCH. APCH CTL DUMPED US IN, KEEPING US HIGH AS WE NEARED THE BEGINNING OF THE APCH, BUT THE FO RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO GET DOWN TO THE VERT PROFILE BY ESTABLISHING DRAG EARLY, AND BY 6 DME WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON THE VERT PROFILE WHILE MAINTAINING THE APPROPRIATE GND TRACK OVER THE RIVER. ALL LOOKED WELL, BUT AS WE CROSSED 4 DME WHICH REQUIRES A MAJOR L TURN, HE TURNED SLOWLY AND APPEARED TO BE ROLLING OUT EARLY AIMING S OF THE REQUIRED TRACK. AT THAT POINT I ADVISED FURTHER L. BY THE TIME HE ROLLED OUT ON THE NEW HEADING, I WAS ALREADY ON EDGE AND ADVISED THAT IT WAS TIME TO COME R. HE COMPLIED, BUT ASSUMED THAT I WAS TRYING TO POINT HIM TOWARD THE RWY. HE TURNED IN, BUT WAY TOO FAR. I WAS CONFUSED AND WHEN HE DIDN'T SWING BACK, I TOOK THE ACFT. LATER WE REALIZED THAT HE WAS HEADED FOR RWY 15 WHICH IS ALL LIT UP AND A NATURAL TARGET. AS I STARTED TO SWING OUT ON THE MODIFIED BASE, THE TWR ADVISED US TO WIDEN OUT FOR TFC. I COMPLIED, BUT TOLD THE TWR THAT I WOULD BE UNABLE TO GO VERY FAR. WE WERE TOO LOW TO DO MUCH JOCKEYING AROUND WITHOUT OVERSHOOTING THE FINAL. THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. IN HINDSIGHT I THOUGHT THAT THE TWR MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN AS CONCERNED ABOUT TFC CONFLICTS AS THEY WERE ABOUT OUR GND TRACK AND PROX TO THE R BANK OF THE RIVER. BASED ON THAT POSSIBILITY, I CALLED THE TWR AFTER ARR. THE TWR SUPVR ADVISED NO PROBS WITH OUR APCH OR GND TRACK. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE APCH EXTENSIVELY. THE FO ADMITTED THAT WHILE HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE APCH, HIS RECENT EXPERIENCE HAD BEEN IN DAYLIGHT. IT ALL LOOKS DIFFERENT AT NIGHT. THE RIVER WHICH IS THE PRIMARY NAVAID IS ALL, BUT IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE AT NIGHT. YOU HAVE TO KNOW WHERE IT GOES AND HOW IT TURNS WITHOUT REALLY BEING ABLE TO SEE IT. IT'S MORE THE ABSENCE OF LIGHT AND REFED BY LANDMARKS THAT ARE VERY OBVIOUS TO ONE WHO HAD DONE IT A LOT BEFORE AT NIGHT, BUT NOT OBVIOUS TO ANYONE WITHOUT RECENT NIGHTTIME EXPERIENCE. MY VERBAL ATTEMPTS AT CORRECTING THE GND TRACK WERE MISINTERPRETED AND PART OF THE PROB. THERE WAS NOTHING BUT GOOD INTENTIONS, BUT ANY COMMENTS ARE DISTRACTING AND THERE IS NO TIME FOR 2-WAY CONVERSATION. THE FINAL RESULT WAS SAFE AND DIDN'T VIOLATE ANY NAV RULES, BUT IT WASN'T PRETTY AND REQUIRED ME TAKE OVER CTL WHICH ANY CAPT HATES TO DO. UNFORTUNATELY BY THE TIME I DID, WE WERE TOO LOW TO ALLOW FOR ANY MORE ERRORS. I SENSED A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION AND REALIZED IN HINDSIGHT THAT I WAS PARTLY TO BLAME. THE RESULT WAS THE ONLY SAFE COURSE OF ACTION I COULD PURSUE. I KNEW EXACTLY WHERE WE WERE AND WHAT IT WOULD TAKE TO COMPLETE THE APCH SAFELY. I WAS UNSURE THAT MY FO DID, SO I TOOK THE ACFT. AS SOON AS I TOOK OVER AND STARTED TO SWING L MY FO REALIZED THAT HE HAD BEEN HEADED FOR THE WRONG RWY, BUT IT WAS TOO LATE TO SWITCH BACK, SO I COMPLETED THE APCH AND LNDG. WHAT I LEARNED IS WHAT I HAVE KNOWN FOR A LONG TIME. THERE ARE SO MANY VARIABLES IN THIS APCH THAT THE POTENTIAL FOR MINOR ERROR IS INCREDIBLE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR MAJOR ERROR IS ALWAYS THERE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.