Narrative:

We were on course (flight plan route) at FL370 in vicinity of wilkes-barre VOR (lvz). Previous controller had told us to keep our speed up. With no warning, current controller told us 'hold as published at jenno intersection, cross jenno at FL250.' this came as a complete surprise to us as jfk was reporting clear skies with greater than 10 mi visibility. I found myself distracted during the clearance because I was looking at the STAR (lendy 4 into jfk) at the time trying to ascertain the holding pattern, as we were fairly close to the jenno intersection. Instead of beginning an immediate descent (which was required by the crossing restr), I asked my first officer to confirm the altitude clearance with the controller. This took some time as he was busy issuing holding instructions to other aircraft. It also appeared to me that I had more time to descend than we actually did because I had programmed our expected crossing restr (at or below FL230 at harty intersection) into the FMS and the top-of-descent point (T/D) for that restr showed a few mi to go, and I mistook holding at jenno for harty. My display led me to believe I had more time to get down than I actually had. Once we confirmed the altitude clearance with ATC, we started a maximum rate descent with full speed brakes deployed. However, it became obvious that we could not make the restr and we notified the controller of this fact. He was very testy and said 'I gave you that restr for a reason' but said nothing further. I believe the controller could have helped the situation by first advising us that holding instructions were forthcoming. Supplemental information from acn 489128: the captain was flying and had to input the holding into the FMS and didn't' get the crossing restr in the FMS. He did change the altitude window on the control panel to FL250. We both acknowledged the FL250 and pointed to the window. 11 mi from jenno I noticed we wouldn't make the restr and I pointed this out. The controller was in a hurry on his commands and we should have verified the restr was in the FMS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 FLC FAILS TO MAKE THE REVISED ALT XING RESTR ON AN UNEXPECTED HOLD AT JENNO INTXN NEAR LVZ, PA.

Narrative: WE WERE ON COURSE (FLT PLAN RTE) AT FL370 IN VICINITY OF WILKES-BARRE VOR (LVZ). PREVIOUS CTLR HAD TOLD US TO KEEP OUR SPD UP. WITH NO WARNING, CURRENT CTLR TOLD US 'HOLD AS PUBLISHED AT JENNO INTXN, CROSS JENNO AT FL250.' THIS CAME AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE TO US AS JFK WAS RPTING CLR SKIES WITH GREATER THAN 10 MI VISIBILITY. I FOUND MYSELF DISTRACTED DURING THE CLRNC BECAUSE I WAS LOOKING AT THE STAR (LENDY 4 INTO JFK) AT THE TIME TRYING TO ASCERTAIN THE HOLDING PATTERN, AS WE WERE FAIRLY CLOSE TO THE JENNO INTXN. INSTEAD OF BEGINNING AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT (WHICH WAS REQUIRED BY THE XING RESTR), I ASKED MY FO TO CONFIRM THE ALT CLRNC WITH THE CTLR. THIS TOOK SOME TIME AS HE WAS BUSY ISSUING HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS TO OTHER ACFT. IT ALSO APPEARED TO ME THAT I HAD MORE TIME TO DSND THAN WE ACTUALLY DID BECAUSE I HAD PROGRAMMED OUR EXPECTED XING RESTR (AT OR BELOW FL230 AT HARTY INTXN) INTO THE FMS AND THE TOP-OF-DSCNT POINT (T/D) FOR THAT RESTR SHOWED A FEW MI TO GO, AND I MISTOOK HOLDING AT JENNO FOR HARTY. MY DISPLAY LED ME TO BELIEVE I HAD MORE TIME TO GET DOWN THAN I ACTUALLY HAD. ONCE WE CONFIRMED THE ALT CLRNC WITH ATC, WE STARTED A MAX RATE DSCNT WITH FULL SPD BRAKES DEPLOYED. HOWEVER, IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT WE COULD NOT MAKE THE RESTR AND WE NOTIFIED THE CTLR OF THIS FACT. HE WAS VERY TESTY AND SAID 'I GAVE YOU THAT RESTR FOR A REASON' BUT SAID NOTHING FURTHER. I BELIEVE THE CTLR COULD HAVE HELPED THE SIT BY FIRST ADVISING US THAT HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS WERE FORTHCOMING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 489128: THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND HAD TO INPUT THE HOLDING INTO THE FMS AND DIDN'T' GET THE XING RESTR IN THE FMS. HE DID CHANGE THE ALT WINDOW ON THE CTL PANEL TO FL250. WE BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED THE FL250 AND POINTED TO THE WINDOW. 11 MI FROM JENNO I NOTICED WE WOULDN'T MAKE THE RESTR AND I POINTED THIS OUT. THE CTLR WAS IN A HURRY ON HIS COMMANDS AND WE SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED THE RESTR WAS IN THE FMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.