Narrative:

Laxx 3 departure. Crew briefed and discussed the SID, including the 220 degree heading at the smo 160 degree radial. Given 2000 ft restr initially, then in fairly rapid sequence 3000 ft, then 4000 ft by socal departure. Noticed we had passed the smo 160 degree radial and began turn when socal said 'looks like you're going straight out, turn left heading 190 degrees.' in examining our late turn, we noticed a few factors. First, both pilots are on 'reserve' and had to flown out of lax for many yrs. Last min change resulted in a taxi ride from sna to lax to cover this flight. Crew discussed the recent 'near hit' of a cargo aircraft and a light aircraft at lax. Our company does not deem TCASII necessary on a $55,000,000 aircraft, so we resolved before takeoff that we would make extra effort to 'stay outside' for traffic. Obviously we stayed 'outside' too much, and were slow to start our turn. The turn point (smo 160 degree radial) had been entered in the FMC and selected manually on the VOR, but our attention outside diverted our attention to timely navigation. The constant altitude changes, plus a speed restr issued at about 3000 ft further diverted our attention. In discussing our error, we resolved to pay more attention to all the details. Due to the recent cargo 'near hit,' we were overly fixated on collision avoidance. Autoplt could have been used, but I am not sure of its value in this case, since our error was not enough time 'inside' the cockpit. Normally on the B757, the opposite is true. We do not think any conflicts occurred due to our late turn.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 CARGO FLT HS A HDG TRACK DEV ON THE LAXX SID DEP W OF LAX, CA.

Narrative: LAXX 3 DEP. CREW BRIEFED AND DISCUSSED THE SID, INCLUDING THE 220 DEG HDG AT THE SMO 160 DEG RADIAL. GIVEN 2000 FT RESTR INITIALLY, THEN IN FAIRLY RAPID SEQUENCE 3000 FT, THEN 4000 FT BY SOCAL DEP. NOTICED WE HAD PASSED THE SMO 160 DEG RADIAL AND BEGAN TURN WHEN SOCAL SAID 'LOOKS LIKE YOU'RE GOING STRAIGHT OUT, TURN L HDG 190 DEGS.' IN EXAMINING OUR LATE TURN, WE NOTICED A FEW FACTORS. FIRST, BOTH PLTS ARE ON 'RESERVE' AND HAD TO FLOWN OUT OF LAX FOR MANY YRS. LAST MIN CHANGE RESULTED IN A TAXI RIDE FROM SNA TO LAX TO COVER THIS FLT. CREW DISCUSSED THE RECENT 'NEAR HIT' OF A CARGO ACFT AND A LIGHT ACFT AT LAX. OUR COMPANY DOES NOT DEEM TCASII NECESSARY ON A $55,000,000 ACFT, SO WE RESOLVED BEFORE TKOF THAT WE WOULD MAKE EXTRA EFFORT TO 'STAY OUTSIDE' FOR TFC. OBVIOUSLY WE STAYED 'OUTSIDE' TOO MUCH, AND WERE SLOW TO START OUR TURN. THE TURN POINT (SMO 160 DEG RADIAL) HAD BEEN ENTERED IN THE FMC AND SELECTED MANUALLY ON THE VOR, BUT OUR ATTN OUTSIDE DIVERTED OUR ATTN TO TIMELY NAV. THE CONSTANT ALT CHANGES, PLUS A SPD RESTR ISSUED AT ABOUT 3000 FT FURTHER DIVERTED OUR ATTN. IN DISCUSSING OUR ERROR, WE RESOLVED TO PAY MORE ATTN TO ALL THE DETAILS. DUE TO THE RECENT CARGO 'NEAR HIT,' WE WERE OVERLY FIXATED ON COLLISION AVOIDANCE. AUTOPLT COULD HAVE BEEN USED, BUT I AM NOT SURE OF ITS VALUE IN THIS CASE, SINCE OUR ERROR WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME 'INSIDE' THE COCKPIT. NORMALLY ON THE B757, THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE. WE DO NOT THINK ANY CONFLICTS OCCURRED DUE TO OUR LATE TURN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.