Narrative:

Gate area safety lines worn and faded. Unable to determine if gate had safety lines taxiing in to gate. Fuel truck fueling aircraft on left side of gate area with no safety line visible. But ramp crew had marked area with cones and positioned wing walker on left side in front of truck. After parking, discovered the safety line was completely covered by fuel truck and truck was 10-12 ft inside safety area. Truck completely covered line and the line was not visible to crew. Lines need to be clearly marked and visible to crew. Line crew must be proactive in clearing safety area. Hazard of ground incident extremely high. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter said that the fuel truck did not have a driver and the local company personnel were trying to make the situation work with the cones and guidance. The report has gone to the company safety department for action. There appears, to the reporter, to be a problem with the arrival of the newer models of the B737 and their longer wings with the surface markings of the safety boxes at this and other airports in that they were drawn for the early model aircraft and the new ones do not fit safely into the space provided.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SAFETY BOX MARKINGS ARE FADED AND NOT USED WHEN FUEL TRUCK IS ABANDONED IN THE SAFETY AREA CAUSING CONCERN AND NON STANDARD PARKING PROCS.

Narrative: GATE AREA SAFETY LINES WORN AND FADED. UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF GATE HAD SAFETY LINES TAXIING IN TO GATE. FUEL TRUCK FUELING ACFT ON L SIDE OF GATE AREA WITH NO SAFETY LINE VISIBLE. BUT RAMP CREW HAD MARKED AREA WITH CONES AND POSITIONED WING WALKER ON L SIDE IN FRONT OF TRUCK. AFTER PARKING, DISCOVERED THE SAFETY LINE WAS COMPLETELY COVERED BY FUEL TRUCK AND TRUCK WAS 10-12 FT INSIDE SAFETY AREA. TRUCK COMPLETELY COVERED LINE AND THE LINE WAS NOT VISIBLE TO CREW. LINES NEED TO BE CLRLY MARKED AND VISIBLE TO CREW. LINE CREW MUST BE PROACTIVE IN CLRING SAFETY AREA. HAZARD OF GND INCIDENT EXTREMELY HIGH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAID THAT THE FUEL TRUCK DID NOT HAVE A DRIVER AND THE LCL COMPANY PERSONNEL WERE TRYING TO MAKE THE SIT WORK WITH THE CONES AND GUIDANCE. THE RPT HAS GONE TO THE COMPANY SAFETY DEPT FOR ACTION. THERE APPEARS, TO THE RPTR, TO BE A PROB WITH THE ARR OF THE NEWER MODELS OF THE B737 AND THEIR LONGER WINGS WITH THE SURFACE MARKINGS OF THE SAFETY BOXES AT THIS AND OTHER ARPTS IN THAT THEY WERE DRAWN FOR THE EARLY MODEL ACFT AND THE NEW ONES DO NOT FIT SAFELY INTO THE SPACE PROVIDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.