Narrative:

My flight was departing las en route to sfo. Due to aircraft performance limitations with the local conditions, we were required to perform a flaps 1 degree improved takeoff on the full length runway 7L. From the hold short position we were cleared for takeoff. The lighting is confusing in this area, due to the intersection of runways 7L, 1L and txwys H and F. As we taxied onto the runway, both the captain and I were watching closely to ensure we had the runway environment in sight for the proper runway. The captain and I both believed we were on runway centerline when we began the takeoff roll. Shortly thereafter, the captain and I both suddenly realized we were lined up on the right side runway edge lights for runway 7L. The captain immediately steered for centerline and we continued the takeoff. When the landing gear was retracted after takeoff, the right main landing gear disagreement light was on indicating the landing gear was not up and locked. Placing the landing gear handle to off, caused the right main landing gear down and locked light to illuminate. Discussing the problem with the crew, dispatch and maintenance we decided to land in san francisco. We needed to reduce weight and preferred a lower ground speed for landing. We then conferred with first flight attendant #1 and agreed to prepare the cabin for evacuate/evacuation for the possibility of a gear collapse or fire from a damaged tire. We had normal landing gear indications on approach into sfo. The landing touchdown and rollout felt normal. We kept the passenger in their seats, cleared the runway and stopped for a visual check before taxiing to the gate. The crash truck driver indicated the landing gear appeared normal. At the gate we discovered the landing gear door was damaged and appeared to cause subsequent damage to the tire. We later found out a runway edge light had been damaged in las vegas on runway 7L. Callback conversation with first officer revealed the following information: the first officer stated that, due to their improved takeoff as a result of the high las temperatures, they were using the full length of runway 7L, which is not typical. The crew was dependent on lighting, as this was a nighttime departure. He described the runway as not having any lighting until the intersection with taxiway A8. Thus, as they were lining up on what they perceived as the centerline, they were receiving their cues from lighting that began approximately 1000 ft further down the runway. He reported that the FAA required that he and the captain take extra training in the company's simulator in order to satisfy their concerns about this crew. Callback conversation with captain revealed the following information: the captain recalled that he and the same first officer made the exact same departure the day before during daylight hours. Even then, the area was confusing to the captain and he described it as being 'a mass of concrete.' during the day he could barely make out a small, yellow lead in line to runway 7L. However, in the dark he could not see the lead in line. Further, he described the hold short area as being totally dark and situated in such a way that a 90 degree turn was required in order to line up with the runway. Therefore, the runway lights were impossible to see from the hold short area. The first officer noted that the hold short area appeared to situation lower than the runway, further preventing visibility of the runway lights. The captain stated that normal operations occur at the intersection of taxiway A8 and runway 7L where the normal runway lighting is clearly visible and that operations requiring the full length only happen during unusually hot days. The captain stated that he and the first officer were not rushing, they had no disagreement, and they both thought everything appeared normal. As they started their takeoff roll, both simultaneously realized they were off to the right of the runway and the captain corrected to the center. Both stated that the runway is a non precision runway, therefore, it has no white centerline lights. Yet, they both remembered being in between what appeared to be a set of white runway edge lights. The captain reported that the FAA and NTSB are very interested in this event and that the pilot group attorney contacted him immediately. As word of this event spread, the captain recalled that other company pilots contacted him andstated that they, too, had trouble with this area of las. Both stated that the company will be amending their airport page for las, warning of possible visual illusions at this end of runway 7L.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CREW, DEPARTING LAS ON RWY 7L, FULL LENGTH, FOUND DURING THE TKOF ROLL THAT THEY WERE LINED UP WITH THE R SIDE EDGE LIGHTS. THEY LANDED AT SFO WITH A DAMAGED LNDG GEAR AFTER STRIKING AN EDGE LIGHT AT LAS.

Narrative: MY FLT WAS DEPARTING LAS ENRTE TO SFO. DUE TO ACFT PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS WITH THE LCL CONDITIONS, WE WERE REQUIRED TO PERFORM A FLAPS 1 DEG IMPROVED TKOF ON THE FULL LENGTH RWY 7L. FROM THE HOLD SHORT POS WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. THE LIGHTING IS CONFUSING IN THIS AREA, DUE TO THE INTXN OF RWYS 7L, 1L AND TXWYS H AND F. AS WE TAXIED ONTO THE RWY, BOTH THE CAPT AND I WERE WATCHING CLOSELY TO ENSURE WE HAD THE RWY ENVIRONMENT IN SIGHT FOR THE PROPER RWY. THE CAPT AND I BOTH BELIEVED WE WERE ON RWY CTRLINE WHEN WE BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE CAPT AND I BOTH SUDDENLY REALIZED WE WERE LINED UP ON THE R SIDE RWY EDGE LIGHTS FOR RWY 7L. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY STEERED FOR CTRLINE AND WE CONTINUED THE TKOF. WHEN THE LNDG GEAR WAS RETRACTED AFTER TKOF, THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR DISAGREEMENT LIGHT WAS ON INDICATING THE LNDG GEAR WAS NOT UP AND LOCKED. PLACING THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE TO OFF, CAUSED THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE. DISCUSSING THE PROB WITH THE CREW, DISPATCH AND MAINT WE DECIDED TO LAND IN SAN FRANCISCO. WE NEEDED TO REDUCE WT AND PREFERRED A LOWER GND SPD FOR LNDG. WE THEN CONFERRED WITH FIRST FLT ATTENDANT #1 AND AGREED TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR EVAC FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A GEAR COLLAPSE OR FIRE FROM A DAMAGED TIRE. WE HAD NORMAL LNDG GEAR INDICATIONS ON APCH INTO SFO. THE LNDG TOUCHDOWN AND ROLLOUT FELT NORMAL. WE KEPT THE PAX IN THEIR SEATS, CLRED THE RWY AND STOPPED FOR A VISUAL CHK BEFORE TAXIING TO THE GATE. THE CRASH TRUCK DRIVER INDICATED THE LNDG GEAR APPEARED NORMAL. AT THE GATE WE DISCOVERED THE LNDG GEAR DOOR WAS DAMAGED AND APPEARED TO CAUSE SUBSEQUENT DAMAGE TO THE TIRE. WE LATER FOUND OUT A RWY EDGE LIGHT HAD BEEN DAMAGED IN LAS VEGAS ON RWY 7L. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH FO REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO STATED THAT, DUE TO THEIR IMPROVED TKOF AS A RESULT OF THE HIGH LAS TEMPS, THEY WERE USING THE FULL LENGTH OF RWY 7L, WHICH IS NOT TYPICAL. THE CREW WAS DEPENDENT ON LIGHTING, AS THIS WAS A NIGHTTIME DEP. HE DESCRIBED THE RWY AS NOT HAVING ANY LIGHTING UNTIL THE INTXN WITH TXWY A8. THUS, AS THEY WERE LINING UP ON WHAT THEY PERCEIVED AS THE CTRLINE, THEY WERE RECEIVING THEIR CUES FROM LIGHTING THAT BEGAN APPROX 1000 FT FURTHER DOWN THE RWY. HE RPTED THAT THE FAA REQUIRED THAT HE AND THE CAPT TAKE EXTRA TRAINING IN THE COMPANY'S SIMULATOR IN ORDER TO SATISFY THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THIS CREW. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH CAPT REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT RECALLED THAT HE AND THE SAME FO MADE THE EXACT SAME DEP THE DAY BEFORE DURING DAYLIGHT HRS. EVEN THEN, THE AREA WAS CONFUSING TO THE CAPT AND HE DESCRIBED IT AS BEING 'A MASS OF CONCRETE.' DURING THE DAY HE COULD BARELY MAKE OUT A SMALL, YELLOW LEAD IN LINE TO RWY 7L. HOWEVER, IN THE DARK HE COULD NOT SEE THE LEAD IN LINE. FURTHER, HE DESCRIBED THE HOLD SHORT AREA AS BEING TOTALLY DARK AND SITUATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT A 90 DEG TURN WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO LINE UP WITH THE RWY. THEREFORE, THE RWY LIGHTS WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE FROM THE HOLD SHORT AREA. THE FO NOTED THAT THE HOLD SHORT AREA APPEARED TO SIT LOWER THAN THE RWY, FURTHER PREVENTING VISIBILITY OF THE RWY LIGHTS. THE CAPT STATED THAT NORMAL OPS OCCUR AT THE INTXN OF TXWY A8 AND RWY 7L WHERE THE NORMAL RWY LIGHTING IS CLRLY VISIBLE AND THAT OPS REQUIRING THE FULL LENGTH ONLY HAPPEN DURING UNUSUALLY HOT DAYS. THE CAPT STATED THAT HE AND THE FO WERE NOT RUSHING, THEY HAD NO DISAGREEMENT, AND THEY BOTH THOUGHT EVERYTHING APPEARED NORMAL. AS THEY STARTED THEIR TKOF ROLL, BOTH SIMULTANEOUSLY REALIZED THEY WERE OFF TO THE R OF THE RWY AND THE CAPT CORRECTED TO THE CTR. BOTH STATED THAT THE RWY IS A NON PRECISION RWY, THEREFORE, IT HAS NO WHITE CTRLINE LIGHTS. YET, THEY BOTH REMEMBERED BEING IN BTWN WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SET OF WHITE RWY EDGE LIGHTS. THE CAPT RPTED THAT THE FAA AND NTSB ARE VERY INTERESTED IN THIS EVENT AND THAT THE PLT GROUP ATTORNEY CONTACTED HIM IMMEDIATELY. AS WORD OF THIS EVENT SPREAD, THE CAPT RECALLED THAT OTHER COMPANY PLTS CONTACTED HIM ANDSTATED THAT THEY, TOO, HAD TROUBLE WITH THIS AREA OF LAS. BOTH STATED THAT THE COMPANY WILL BE AMENDING THEIR ARPT PAGE FOR LAS, WARNING OF POSSIBLE VISUAL ILLUSIONS AT THIS END OF RWY 7L.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.